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General introduction 
 
Many transactions in matching markets happen through private 
intermediaries. Examples of intermediate service providers are online 
listing platforms and real estate brokers in real estate markets, online job 
boards, temporary help agencies and recruitment agencies in the labor 
market, and online dating platforms in the dating market. This dissertation 
analyzes - both theoretically and empirically - the profit maximizing 
behavior of these intermediaries and evaluates the market distortions that 
can emerge from this behavior. It is particularly relevant to evaluate the 
business models used by these type of intermediaries today, given that the 
nature of matching markets has drastically been changing over the past two 
decades. More specifically, the rise of the internet resulted in a vast increase 
in information availability in these markets. 
On the one hand, the internet has led to the development of a “new” type of 
intermediaries: online listing platforms who offer a matching service in 
return for a flat fee. These online platforms have largely substituted for 
informal search channels and local newspapers and they take up a dominant 
position in most matching markets today. To illustrate this, Manning (2011) 
reports for the UK that the percentage of unemployed (employed) job-
seekers using the internet rose from 48% (62%) in 2005 to 79% (82%) in 
2009. Similarly, Kuhn and Mansour (2014) report for the US that between 
2000 and 2009, the share of young, unemployed workers who used the 
internet to look for work tripled, from 24 to 74%. The same story holds for 
real estate markets: the National Association of Realtors (2012) reports for 
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the US in 2012 that 90% of buyers used the internet in their home search 
and 93% of sellers state that their home was listed or advertised on the 
Internet. 
On the other hand, the increased information availability has forced 
“incumbent” intermediaries to adjust their business strategies. In real estate 
brokerage, for example, the new technologies had a significant impact on 
the nature of competition among brokers. Previously, real estate agents 
relied heavily on their competitors to offer an efficient matching service by 
sharing information about local real estate markets. A consequence of this 
collaboration was that it led to apparent collusive broker behavior in pricing 
their services. In the US, for example, throughout most of the 20th century 
brokers charged a fixed commission rate of 6%, independent of the number 
of competitors within a local market. These traditional information systems, 
however, are severely under pressure today. Brokers rely less heavily on 
their colleagues to establish valuable real estate transactions which has led 
brokers to deviate from offering the traditional service packages and from 
the conventional fixed commission rates (see, for example, the USDOJ-
FTC (2007) report on the US brokerage industry for a detailed discussion 
on this transition). 
This dissertation evaluates both the behavior of online intermediaries taking 
into account the particularities of their novel matching technologies, as well 
as that of the more traditional matchmakers taking into account the changed 
environment in which they operate. To do this, the dissertation is divided 
into four chapters. The first chapter is purely theoretical and models the 
optimal pricing behavior of a monopoly platform that operates in a matching 
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market and that charges a flat participation fee to users on both sides of the 
market. The second chapter extends this model and makes specific 
assumptions to account for the particularities of online listing service 
platforms. This model is then taken to the data to estimate the market 
distortions that result from the pricing behavior of a large online real estate 
advertisement platform in Belgium. The third chapter again presents theory 
on optimal pricing by a matchmaker that is now allowed to charge a fee 
proportional to an observed component of the match valuation between 
matched participants (like the sales price of a real estate property or the 
wage of a worker). Finally, the fourth chapter again imposes specific 
assumptions to account for the particularities of real estate brokerage 
services and extends the model to imperfect broker competition in setting 
the commission rate charged for their service. This model is then taken to 
the data to test for market efficiency in the Belgian real estate brokerage 
industry. The remainder of this introduction presents a more detailed 
summary of each of the four chapters. 
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Chapter 1: Monopoly flat fee pricing and market 
distortions 
 
This theoretical piece of work builds on the literature of two-sided markets 
(e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2003), Weyl (2010)) to evaluate the optimal pricing 
behavior of platforms that operate in one-to-one matching markets, 
emphasizing the role of the network externalities typically present in these 
type of markets. More specifically, the existing models of two-sided 
markets explain why platforms charge different prices to different groups 
of participants. Generally, the platform will subsidize participation on a side 
of the market the higher is that side’s positive cross-side externality to users 
on the other side of the market. However, in matching markets there also 
exists a negative own-side congestion externality that the platform 
internalizes by taxing users for its presence.  
Assuming a monopoly platform pricing model, the first contribution of this 
chapter is to show that these positive cross-side and negative own-side 
externalities can be summarized by the matching elasticity derived from a 
general matching function (e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)) that 
captures the efficiency of the platform’s matching technology. The platform 
charges a lower price to a side of the market the higher is that side’s 
matching elasticity. The second contribution is to show that the platform’s 
pricing strategy only partially internalizes the efficiency of its matching 
technology, compared to the social optimum. In particular, the possibility is 
discussed that a monopoly matchmaker sets too high a price on the low-
price side of the market and too low a price on the high-price side of the 
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market, resulting in insufficient inequality in prices from a social point of 
view. 
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Chapter 2: Market distortions in online real estate 
advertisement pricing 
 
This chapter aims to empirically apply the framework presented in the first 
chapter and test for the efficiency of the pricing behavior of a private online 
real estate listing platform. The results in the first chapter were derived for 
general preferences of participants and a general platform matching 
technology. In contrast, the present chapter makes explicit assumptions on 
this, tailored for a listing service platform that operates in a real estate 
market. For example, matched participants are allowed to bargain over the 
division of the match surplus, such that the sales price of a property becomes 
an endogenous outcome variable. In addition, the matching technology is 
modeled such that it accounts for the asymmetries inherent to the presence 
of a “listing-side” (sellers) and “searching-side” (buyers) on the platform. 
This way the socially optimal fees charged to sellers and buyers can be 
derived in terms of parameter values that are either observable or can be 
estimated. These counterfactual fees can then be compared to the observed 
fees in practice. 
Combining data on the number of listings and their online duration on a 
large online listing platform with administrative data on the total amount of 
real estate sales in Belgium in 2013 yields a proxy for the efficiency of the 
matching technology offered by the platform. In addition, by imposing 
specific assumptions on the distributions of buyer and seller preference 
parameters, these can be estimated from the distribution of ask-prices 
available from a large sample of listings, combined with other detailed 
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listing characteristics. The resulting estimates for the socially optimal fees 
suggest that the observed fees in practice are significantly below the socially 
optimal levels. The reason for this is that the negative externalities that 
inherently arise from the matching and bargaining process among buyers 
and sellers are currently insufficiently internalized in the service fees 
charged to buyers and sellers compared to the social optimum. This result 
sharply contrasts the conventional result for standard product markets that 
firm market power unambiguously results in upwardly distorted prices. 
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Chapter 3: Proportional service fees as a selection 
tool 
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation analyze matchmakers that charge 
a flat fee in return for their services, which applies well to the “new” type 
of online intermediaries, as described above. However, the “incumbent” or 
more traditional intermediaries typically charge fees proportional to an 
observed component of the match valuation of matched participants. 
Examples are real estate brokers that charge a commission proportional to 
the sales price of a property and recruitment agencies that charge a fee 
proportional to the wage of a placed worker. This chapter tackles the 
question why some intermediaries charge a proportional service fee in 
return for their services, some a flat fee and some a combination of both. To 
do so, a monopoly pricing model is presented in which a service provider 
attracts consumers allowed to be heterogeneous in two dimensions. One 
dimension of consumer types always remains private information. The other 
consumer type, however, is assumed to become revealed to the monopolist 
once the service is provided and a fee can be charged proportional to its 
revealed value on top of a flat service fee. 
It is shown that the service provider only makes use of a proportional service 
fee if its use induces “advantageous selection” of consumers into the 
market. That is, when the consumers with the highest observable types are 
also the ones with the highest willingness to pay for the service. In addition, 
the monopolist exclusively uses a proportional fee and no flat fee when the 
advantageous selection effect outweighs an “adverse sorting” effect at the 
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margin, which is inherent to the use of this fee type. In terms of welfare, it 
is shown that a Pigouvian planner never charges a proportional service fee 
because it has an inefficient misallocation effect, familiar from the third 
degree price-discrimination literature. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that 
allowing a monopolist to use of a proportional fee has very similar welfare 
effects as allowing for third-degree price discrimination. 
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Chapter 4: Competitive service fees, free entry and 
social efficiency in real estate brokerage 
markets 
 
It is well-known from the literature that a lack of price competition in setting 
commission rates combined with limited entry constraints for new brokers 
to enter local real estate markets can result in significant social waste (e.g. 
Hsieh and Moretti (2003)). As argued above, however, over the past two 
decades the landscape of real estate brokerage markets has been changing 
by the emergence of new information technologies, which resulted in 
intensified price competition among brokers. It is therefore important to 
investigate market efficiency under imperfect broker competition, rather 
than assuming the absence of price competition as in most of the existing 
literature. 
This chapter presents a model of imperfect competition among brokers that 
operate in a market for real estate and charge a service fee to sellers, that 
consists of flat and proportional component and is allowed to be imperfectly 
passed through to buyers through an asymmetric Nash bargain over the sale 
price of the traded real estate properties. In this setting it is shown that there 
exists an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree of price 
competition among brokers in setting their service fees and social value 
generated in the market. This because the presence uncertainty about the 
bargaining outcomes when participants enter the market results in negative 
participation externalities, which should be internalized in the broker 
service fees. Thus neither monopoly (broker collusion) nor Bertrand, but an 
intermediate degree of price competition is optimal from a social point of 
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view. In addition, in the presence of fixed entry costs and free broker entry, 
the familiar result that free broker entry always results in excessive entry 
from a social point of view (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Hsieh and 
Moretti (2003)) is confirmed in the present setting.  
Both findings combined, that marginal cost pricing is not efficient and that 
entry is always excessive, has important implications for the effectiveness 
of different policy instruments that can be used should a social planner want 
to regulate the market to establish the social optimum. When the observed 
service fee is below the socially optimal level, regulating the service fee 
brokers are allowed to charge will result in a conflict of interest. Raising the 
fee will bring it closer to its desired level, but it will also worsen the entry 
distortion because a higher markup for a given fixed cost will incentivize 
more brokers to enter the market. In this case, it is preferable the regulate 
broker entry, given that restricting the number of brokers allowed to operate 
the market will both raise the service fee and mitigate the entry distortion. 
In contrast, when the observed service fee is above the socially optimal level 
(for example due to broker collusion), the opposite policy recommendation 
holds. Restricting entry will mitigate the entry distortion, but will also 
undesirably further raise the service fee or leave it unaffected. In contrast, 
regulating the service fee in this case can again mitigate both distortions at 
the same time, given that for a lower service fee some brokers will be forced 
to exit the market. 
The model is then taken to the data on the Belgian market for real estate 
brokerage. Based on estimated parameter values derived from the data, 
several welfare counterfactuals are constructed to evaluate the effectiveness 
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of the different policy instruments that can possibly be used by a social 
planner. Given that in the observed equilibrium the average service fee is 
below the social optimum, entry regulation is predicted to yield a welfare 
gain of about 20%. In contrast, regulating the service fee, neglecting the 
entry effect, would result is a welfare loss of about 40%. These results 
illustrate the importance of making the proper choice of which policy 
instrument to use should a policymaker aspire to intervene in a real estate 
brokerage market. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Monopoly flat fee pricing and market distortions1 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a model of how a private intermediary that operates 
as a matchmaker in a one-to-one matching market should optimally price 
its services when charging a flat fee to both sides of the market. This pricing 
behavior is then compared to that of a social planner to evaluate the potential 
market distortions that can arise in this setting. The model forms the basis 
for the theory used in all subsequent chapters, which either extend the model 
or impose more specific assumptions, depending on the application at hand. 
The model emphasizes the specific role of the network externalities that are 
typically present in matching markets. For example, the probability for an 
individual worker to find a job through an online job board decreases when 
there are more job-seekers and fewer vacancies. Similarly, a realtor may 
find it difficult to sell one’s home when rivalry among sellers is fierce and 
the task is likely to be easier when there are more potential buyers searching 
for a property. In other words, a matching technology is typically 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on the article “Platform Pricing in Matching Markets” published in 
the Review of Network Economics, 2014, 12(4): 437–457, jointly with Maarten Goos and 
Patrick Van Cayseele. 
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characterized by important congestion or negative own-side network 
externalities and by positive cross-side network externalities. 
To investigate how platforms account for network externalities when 
charging different prices between sides of the market has precisely been the 
focus of a recent strand of literature, referred to as the “two-sided markets” 
literature (see, among others, Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole 
(2003, 2006), Armstrong (2006), Weyl (2010))2. Generally, the platform’s 
price to one side of the market will be lower the larger is that side’s positive 
cross-side externality to users on the other side of the market. For example, 
when one side of the market only differs in that there are more users, the 
platform will charge this side a lower price because it is easier for users on 
the other side to trade. However, matching markets are also characterized 
by a negative own-side congestion externality. This because the realization 
of a worker-firm match, for example, implies that this vacancy is no longer 
available to other job-seekers and that this worker is no longer employable 
at other firms. 
To formally analyze the different incentives that a matchmaking platform 
has in its pricing behavior, this chapter first introduces a general matching 
function – a concept well-known from the labor economics literature (see, 
for example, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a review)3 – that captures 
the platform’s matching technology. The matching technology is said to be 
more efficient for a side of the market when the negative own-side 
                                                 
2 See Rysman (2009) and Evans and Schmalensee (2013) for recent surveys on the two-
sided markets literature. 
3 Also see Pissarides (2000) and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for overviews of 
how the matching function is put to work in labor market theory and applications. 
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externality – which is expressed in absolute value throughout the analysis – 
is small and the positive cross-side externality is large. It is shown that the 
platform’s matching efficiency for a side of the market can be meaningfully 
summarized by that side’s matching elasticity, defined as the percentage 
increase in total matches for a percentage increase in own-side participation. 
That is, a smaller negative own-side and larger positive cross-side 
externality – or a more efficient matching technology – implies a higher 
matching elasticity for that side of the platform.  
The first contribution of this chapter is to show that the optimal price 
charged by a monopoly matchmaker to a side of the market is lower when 
that side’s matching elasticity is higher. The intuition for this result is 
simple. A higher matching elasticity results from a smaller negative own-
side and a larger positive cross-side externality. Because this gives the 
monopoly matchmaker less of an incentive to tax the negative own-side 
effect and more of an incentive to subsidize the positive cross-side 
externality, its price will be lower. Consistently, it is shown that in a 
symmetric setting in which two sides differ only in their matching 
elasticities, the monopoly matchmaker charges a lower price to the side that 
has the highest matching elasticity. 
The second contribution of this chapter is to show that a monopoly 
matchmaker only partially internalizes the efficiency of its matching 
technology compared to the incentives of a social planner. More 
specifically, a higher matching elasticity leads to a larger difference 
between the private platform’s and socially optimal price. The intuition for 
this is the following. A higher matching elasticity decreases the profit 
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maximizing price which increases participation by marginal users. 
However, these marginal users value the platform’s service less than the 
average user. This heterogeneity in user types gives the private platform an 
incentive to discourage participation by charging a higher price compared 
to a social maximizer that internalizes the matching externalities through 
their average and not marginal user valuations. In addition to this, a 
relationship is derived between the matching technology and price 
distortions between sides of the platform. In particular, it is shown that a 
monopoly matchmaker could set too low a price on the high-price side of 
the market and too high a price on the low-price side of the market, resulting 
in inequality in prices between sides of the platform that is too low from a 
social point of view. To illustrate this case, realistic parameter values are 
assumed for lognormally distributed heterogeneity in user types and a 
constant returns to scale matching function. 
In the literature, various other contributions have recently been made on the 
topic of optimal pricing by matching platforms. Closest related is Chen and 
Huang (2012) who consider a specific matching technology where sellers 
post the price for their goods to attract buyers and buyers choose sellers. 
They analyze optimal platform pricing in this setting and show that the 
seller-side of the market is never subsidized by a private platform. To 
compare, the model presented here does not analyze the possibility that 
platform fees are passed through by sellers in the price of a good and the 
matching technology is more general than the one assumed in their model, 
which allows to derive a general relationship between the price charged on 
each side and that side’s matching elasticity. Their result that sellers are 
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never subsidized is consistent with the present model when the seller-side 
of the market has the lowest matching elasticity. In chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, a specific listing technology is analyzed which confirms that 
the “listing-side” of the market (i.e. sellers) indeed have a lower matching 
elasticity than buyers by nature of the listing technology and hence are 
charged a higher fee. 
Also closely related is the study of Niedermayer and Shneyerov (2013) who 
analyze optimal platform pricing in a dynamic random matching model with 
buyer-seller bargaining. They show that under a symmetric matching 
technology, asymmetric bargaining weights results in asymmetric optimal 
platform fees and suggest that the presence of a monopoly intermediary in 
a search market can be welfare enhancing. In contrast, the present chapter 
has exogenous valuations for buyers and sellers and ignores certain 
bargaining issues to focus on the market distortions that potentially emerge 
from an asymmetric matching technology. 
In addition, Damiano and Li (2007, 2008) explore the sorting role of optimal 
pricing by a private monopolist and by duopolists under user “quality” 
differentiation. Gomes and Pavan (2014) further extend the model to allow 
for many-to-many matching. In contrast, the model presented here abstract 
from complementarities between user types such that sorting of users plays 
no role and the platform is not allowed to price discriminate within user 
groups. Instead, the focus here is on the network externalities linked to the 
matching technology. 
Finally, Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) propose a general framework to 
analyze how the joint presence of cross- and own-side network externalities 
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affects the market participation decision of two types of user groups. They 
do not explicitly analyze, however, the optimal pricing behavior of 
platforms. Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009), among others, do analyze 
the impact of both network effects on optimal platform behavior, but not in 
a setting of one-to-one matching as in the present chapter.4 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
framework of a monopoly matchmaker where network externalities are 
captured by a matching function that generally characterizes the platform’s 
matching technology. Section 3 shows how the platform’s optimal prices 
depend on the platform’s matching technology, and Section 4 examines 
implications for welfare. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Framework 
2.1 User preferences and demand 
Consider a platform that connects two types of user groups 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆. One 
can think of side 𝐵 as being buyers and side 𝑆 as being sellers of a real estate 
property or any other good for which trade between participants on the two 
sides of the market is exclusive, that is, if two users are matched they cannot 
match with any other users. For a labor market, one can think of 𝐵 as being 
workers and 𝑆 as being firms. When users on side 𝐼 participate they have a 
probability 0 ≤ 𝑚𝐼 ≤ 1 of being matched,  assumed to be the same for all 
                                                 
4 Other contributions that evaluate the impact of own-side externalities on the behavior of 
platforms in different settings are, for example, Reisinger, Ressner and Schmidtke (2009), 
Viecens (2009), Anderson and de Palma (2009) and Casadesus-Masanell and Halaburda 
(2014). 
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users on the same side but allowed to differ across sides – these matching 
probabilities are further characterized in the next subsection.  
Users on side 𝐼 are heterogeneous in two dimensions: 𝑉𝐼 denotes the 
valuation of an 𝐼-side user when matched and 𝑍𝐼 when unmatched. For 
example, the match valuation 𝑉𝐵 could be the valuation of a buyer for a real 
estate property, net of the price the buyer expects to pay for the property, or 
it could be the wage a job-seeker expects to get when finding a job through 
the platform. Similarly, 𝑉𝑆 could be the price a home-seller expects to 
receive, net of any costs of providing the good to the market, or it could be 
the revenue a firm expects to make from hiring a worker, net of the wage 
the firm has to pay. The outside option 𝑍𝐵 could be the net valuation a buyer 
expects to receive when purchasing the good through an alternative 
platform, or the disutility of not purchasing at all (in which case 𝑍𝐵 might 
be negative), or it could be the job-seeker’s reservation wage of accepting a 
job through the platform or its unemployment benefit. Finally, 𝑍𝑆 could be 
the expected gains of selling through an alternative matchmaker or the 
mortgage cost for the home-owner when not selling, or it could be the 
opportunity cost to a firm of not hiring a worker through the platform. Note 
these valuations of users are considered as exogenous in this chapter and 
the description is deliberately kept a bit vague such that any interpretation 
is feasible at this point. The following chapters will impose more specific 
assumptions these preferences. 
The platform charges a flat fee for the matching service, which is allowed 
to differ across the two sides of the market, but is the same to all participants 
within sides. The price is modeled as a per-match fee 𝑝𝐼 which is paid by 
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participants conditional on being matched. Note that the price can 
equivalently be modeled as a participation fee 𝑃𝐼 which is paid by users 
when they enter the platform by simply substituting for 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼/𝑚𝐼 in all 
expressions below. It is convenient, however, to display the analysis in 
terms of per-match fees because it simplifies notation. Further note that the 
equivalence between the two fee types might not necessarily hold in 
practice. For example, it could be costly to monitor matching outcomes such 
that the platform would prefer charging participation over per-match fees. 
Appendix 1.A at the end of this chapter discusses the assumptions 
underlying the equivalence in greater detail and elaborates on cases for 
which it no longer holds. 
In the setting described, expected utility for a user on side 𝐼 of the platform 
equals: 
𝑈𝐼 = (𝑉𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼)𝑚𝐼 + 𝑍𝐼(1 − 𝑚𝐼)                                (1) 
Expected utility net of the outside option, defined as  𝑢𝐼 ≡ 𝑈𝐼 − 𝑍𝐼, can 
then be written as: 
𝑢𝐼 = (𝑣𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼)𝑚𝐼                                                (2) 
in which 𝑣𝐼 ≡ 𝑉𝐼 − 𝑍𝐼 is defined as the net match valuation. Users 
participate at the platform when their expected net utility is positive, i.e. 
when 𝑢𝐼 ≥ 0.5 
                                                 
5 Note that the participation decision only depends on a single source of user heterogeneity, 
i.e. a user’s net match valuation 𝑣𝐼. This simplification follows from the assumptions that 
users are risk neutral and that they differ in their outside options rather than in their fixed 
benefits of using the platform as is assumed in, among others, Armstrong (2006), Rochet 
and Tirole (2006) and Weyl (2010). 
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Finally, assume that the net match valuation 𝑣𝐼 is distributed by a twice 
continuously differentiable distribution function 𝐹𝐼(. ) and density function 
𝑓𝐼(. ) that are public information. When the mass of potential participants 
is normalized to unity, the fraction of participating users on side 𝐼 of the 
platform is given by: 
𝑁𝐼 = 1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑝𝐼)                                              (3) 
2.2 The matching function and matching elasticities  
If 𝑁𝐵 users participate on side 𝐵 and 𝑁𝑆 users participate on side 𝑆 of the 
platform, assume that the total amount of matches is given by the well-
known matching function 𝑀 = 𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆  ). The advantage of introducing 
this matching function is that it allows us to account for the efficiency of 
the matching technology without having to make explicit the imperfections 
in the matching process. Also assume that the platform is a random 
matchmaker such that all participants on the same side have the same 
probability of being matched: 
𝑚𝐼 = 𝑀/𝑁𝐼                                                    (4) 
As is standard in the matching literature, the matching function 𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆) 
is assumed to be (i) twice continuously differentiable; (ii) weakly 
increasing; (iii) weakly concave; and to have that (iv) 𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 0) =
𝑀(0,𝑁𝑆) = 0; (v) 𝑀 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆]. Under these weak regularity 
conditions, it is easy to show that the match probability 𝑚𝐼 =
𝑀(𝑁𝐼 , 𝑁𝐽)/𝑁𝐼 (with 𝐽 the other side than 𝐼) is weakly decreasing in own-
side participation 𝑁𝐼 which captures a negative own-side externality, and 
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weakly increasing in cross-side participation 𝑁𝐽 which captures a positive 
cross-side externality.  
A useful way to summarize the negative own-side and positive cross-side 
externalities in the matching technology is through the matching elasticity 
for side 𝐼: 
𝜙𝐼 ≡
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑁𝐼
𝑁𝐼
𝑀
                                                  (5) 
with 0 ≤ 𝜙𝐼 ≤ 1. The matching elasticity for side 𝐼 is defined as the 
percentage increase in the total amount of matches for a percentage increase 
in own-side participation. Importantly, there is a one-to-one relationship 
between the negative own-side and positive cross-side externalities and the 
matching elasticity. To see this, note that the negative own-side externality 
per-match is given by: 
|𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝑚𝐼
𝜕𝑁𝐼
1
𝑚𝐼
| = 1 − 𝜙𝐼                                      (6) 
which is the absolute value of the sum across 𝑁𝐼 participants (which gives 
the term 𝑁𝐼) of the decrease in their match probability when another 𝐼-side 
user enters the platform (which gives the term 𝜕𝑚𝐼/𝜕𝑁𝐼) rescaled on a per-
match base (which gives the term 1/𝑚𝐼). Similarly, the positive cross-side 
externality per-match is the sum across 𝑁𝐽 participants of the increase in 
their match probability when another 𝐼-side user enters the platform:  
𝑁𝐽
𝜕𝑚𝐽
𝜕𝑁𝐼
1
𝑚𝐼
= 𝜙𝐼                                            (7) 
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The intuition of equations (6) and (7) is straightforward. Equation (6) shows 
that the matching elasticity is decreasing in the negative own-side 
externality. The reason for this is that an additional participant on side 𝐼 
decreases the matching probability for all 𝐼-side users. This effect is smaller 
if additional users are more easily matched, i.e. if the matching elasticity is 
larger. Similarly, equation (7) shows that the matching elasticity is 
increasing in the positive cross-side externality because an additional user 
on side 𝐼 leads to an increase in the matching probability for 𝐽-side users 
that is higher the more efficient the platform is at matching 𝐼-side users. 
3 Monopoly pricing 
3.1 Platform profits 
Assume that there is a private monopoly platform that sets per-match fees 
to both sides of the platform in a first stage. In the second stage potential 
users on both sides simultaneously decide to participate. In a third stage, 
matched users pay the per-match fee to the platform. In this setting, the 
monopoly matchmaker will choose per-match fees 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝑆 to maximize 
profits given by: 
𝜋(𝑝𝐵, 𝑝𝑆) = (𝑝𝐵 + 𝑝𝑆)𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆)                              (8) 
subject to equation (3). Also note that for simplicity there are assumed to be 
no costs for operating the platform. 
  
26 
 
3.2 Equilibrium prices 
Proposition 1.1 follows from the first-order conditions of the profit 
maximization problem, in which 𝜇𝐼 ≡ (1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑣 ?̃?))/𝑓𝐼 (𝑣 ?̃?) is the inverse 
hazard rate of demand on side 𝐼 and 𝑣 ?̃? is the net match valuation of the 
marginal 𝐼-side participant who is indifferent between participating or not 
such that 𝑣 ?̃?  ≡ 𝑝𝐼:6 
Proposition 1.1 At the optimal allocation, the per-match fee a private 
monopoly platform charges on each side 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆 (𝐽 ≠ 𝐼) is: 
𝑝𝐼 = 𝜇𝐼 + 𝑣 ?̃?(1 − 𝜙𝐼) − 𝑣?̃?𝜙𝐼                                   (9) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (9) is the inverse hazard 
rate of demand, which is the classic Cournot (1838) measure of monopoly 
market power. The second term on the right-hand side shows how the 
platform internalizes the per-match negative own-side externality by taxing 
𝐼-side users. This tax is larger when the matching elasticity is smaller, i.e. 
when the platform’s matching technology is less efficient because the 
negative own-side externality is stronger. The final term on the right-hand 
side of equation (9) shows how the platform subsidizes the positive cross-
side externality. This subsidy is increasing in the matching elasticity 
                                                 
6 It is well-known from the platform pricing literature that in the described optimization 
problem, induced by the presence of network externalities, there is equilibrium multiplicity 
because of user coordination failures. Appendix 1.B discusses various approaches 
proposed by Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) and Weyl (2010) of how the platform can 
uniquely establish its preferred equilibrium. 
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because a more efficient matching technology exists when an additional 𝐼-
side user increases the matching probability of any 𝐽-side user by more.  
In sum, it is shown that the platform’s matching technology – characterized 
by negative own-side and positive cross-side externalities – can be 
meaningfully summarized by the matching elasticity and that the price a 
monopoly matchmaker charges on any side of the platform is decreasing in 
that side’s matching elasticity. 
3.3 Asymmetric pricing between sides of the platform 
So far it was analyzed what determines the optimal price on a given side of 
the platform. An interesting question is what this implies for price 
asymmetries between sides of the platform. Using equation (9) and the fact 
that  𝑣 ?̃? ≡ 𝑝𝐼 and 𝑣?̃? ≡ 𝑝𝐽, it follows that: 
𝑝𝐵 + 𝑝𝑆 =
𝜇𝐵
𝜙𝐵
=
𝜇𝑆
𝜙𝑆
 or that 
𝜙𝐵
𝜙𝑆
=
𝜇𝐵
𝜇𝑆
                          (10) 
where the inverse hazard rates are given by 𝜇𝐼 ≡ (1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑝𝐼))/𝑓𝐼(𝑝𝐼) for 
𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆. For example, assume that 𝜙𝐵 > 𝜙𝑆 and that 𝜇𝐼 is decreasing in 𝑝𝐼 
for 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆. If the platform’s technology is such that it is better at matching 
side-𝐵 than side-𝑆 users such that 𝜙𝐵 > 𝜙𝑆, we must have that 𝜇𝐵 > 𝜇𝑆. 
And if these inverse hazard rates are decreasing in their prices such that 
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𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝑆, the platform will charge a lower price to the side that has the 
highest matching elasticity.7 
Whether 𝜇𝐼 is increasing or decreasing in 𝑝𝐼 depends on the distribution of 
net match valuations.8 To summarize these findings, assume for simplicity 
that net match valuations are symmetrically distributed and that the 
matching elasticities are constant. It can easily be shown that in this case 
the inverse hazard rate of the symmetric distribution must be decreasing for 
the second-order conditions of the model not to be violated (See Weyl 
(2010) for details), such that from proposition 1.1 and equation (10) it 
follows that: 
Corollary 1.1 For symmetrically distributed net match valuations (𝐹𝐵(. ) =
𝐹𝑆(. )) and a constant elasticity matching function (𝜙𝐵 and 𝜙𝑆 constant), a 
monopoly platform always charges the lowest per-match fee to the side of 
the market with the highest matching elasticity: 
𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝑆 ⇔ 𝜙𝐵 > 𝜙𝑆                                      (11) 
Note that corollary 1.1 assumes that matching elasticities are constant, i.e. 
independent of the chosen allocation by the platform. However, 
                                                 
7 Also note that equation (10) is consistent with Rochet and Tirole (2003) who assume that 
each user on one side can interact with all the users on the other side. This implies a 
“matching elasticity” of unity on each side of the market. Consequently, they show that the 
optimal price structure satisfies 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑝𝑆 = 𝜇𝐵 = 𝜇𝑆 or that price asymmetries can arise 
because of differences in underlying preferences between both sides of the platform. 
However, equation (10) shows that asymmetric prices can also be explained by the 
properties of the matching technology under which the platform operates even if 
preferences are symmetrically distributed. 
8 Fabinger and Weyl (2014) provide a formal discussion on the properties of demand and 
show that for the majority of distribution classes the inverse hazard rate is decreasing in 
price. 
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externalities induced by a marginal participant on either side might vary 
with the amount of users already present on both sides of the platform. For 
example, the externalities induced by an additional listing posted on an 
online listing platform for real estate could be very different whether that 
listing is the 10th or 1000th listing posted at the platform for a fixed amount 
of searching buyers. Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a micro-
foundation for the matching function to account for the specificities of the 
technology offered by a listing platform which allows for elasticities that 
vary with the allocation of buyers and sellers. The intuition of corollary 1.1 
will remain valid even if the matching elasticities are no longer constants. 
Also then the side of the platform that has the higher matching elasticity is 
charged a lower price. 
4 Socially optimal pricing and market distortions  
4.1 The social planner’s objective function  
An important question is how the optimal pricing behavior of a private 
monopoly matchmaker discussed in the previous section compares to the 
outcome of a social planner. Assume a Pigouvian platform that sets prices 
to maximize its total social value, equal to the sum of aggregate utility of 
participants on the two sides of the market and the private platform’s profits. 
The maximization problem for the welfare maximizer is then given by: 
max
𝑝𝜔
𝐵 ,𝑝𝜔
𝑆
𝜔 = (𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅ + 𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅)𝑀(𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆)                            (12) 
subject to equation (3) for 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆 and where: 
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𝑣 ?̅? ≡
1
𝑁𝐼
∫ 𝑣𝐼𝑓𝐼(𝑣𝐼)𝑑𝑣𝐼
∞
𝑝𝐼
                                  (13) 
denotes the average net match valuation of participants on side 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆.  
4.2 Pigouvian prices 
Proposition 1.2 shows how the social maximizer internalizes the negative 
own-side and positive cross-side externality in the matching function: 
Proposition 1.2 At the optimal allocation, a Pigouvian platform charges a 
per-match fee 𝑝𝐼 on each side 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆 (𝐽 ≠ 𝐼) that equals: 
𝑝𝜔
𝐼 = 𝑣 ?̅?(1 − 𝜙𝐼) − 𝑣𝐽̅̅ ̅𝜙𝐼                                  (14) 
From equation (14) it is clear that the Pigouvian platform also taxes the 
negative own-side and subsidizes the positive cross-side externality. 
However, it does so proportional to the average net match valuation of all 
users participating on the platform, and not the marginal user’s match 
valuation as was the case in proposition 1.1. Before turning to the market 
distortions that result from these diverging incentives, first note that the 
Pigouvian price can also be written as: 
 𝑝𝜔
𝐼 = 𝑣 ?̅?𝜙𝐽 − 𝑣𝐽̅̅ ̅𝜙𝐼 + 𝑣 ?̅?(1 − 𝜙𝐼 − 𝜙𝐽)                   (15) 
Equation (15) demonstrates that when the matching technology is 
characterized by constant returns to scale, the Pigouvian platform will 
unambiguously subsidize one side of the market and will exactly recover 
this subsidy from the other side. To see this, note that for 𝜙𝐵 + 𝜙𝑆 = 1, 
𝑝𝜔
𝐵 = 𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅ 𝜙𝑆 − 𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅𝜙𝐵 and 𝑝𝜔
𝑆 = 𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅𝜙𝐵 − 𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅ 𝜙𝑆, which are exactly opposites: 
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𝑝𝜔
𝐵 = −𝑝𝜔
𝑆 . Which side of the market is subsidized depends on the matching 
technology, but also on the underlying heterogeneity of net match 
valuations. This result is further illustrated in the application in subsection 
4.5. 
4.3 Market Distortions 
To illustrate the diverging incentives of the private and Pigouvian platform 
more clearly, equations (9) and (17) can be used to define the market 
distortion on side 𝐼 as: 
𝑀𝐷𝐼 ≡ 𝑝𝐼 − 𝑝𝜔
𝐼 = 𝜇𝐼 + (𝑣𝐽̅̅ ̅ − 𝑣?̃?)𝜙𝐼 − (𝑣 ?̅? − 𝑣 ?̃?)(1 − 𝜙𝐼)⏟                      
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
      (16) 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (19) is the inverse hazard 
rate of demand – the classic Cournot distortion – that captures the market 
power of the private monopolist. The final two terms on the right-hand side 
of equation (16) relate to the matching externalities and, following Weyl 
(2010), can be interpreted as a Spence distortion.9  
The first term of the Spence distortion is consistent with Weyl (2010) who 
shows that the diverging incentives of the private and Pigouvian platform 
to account for positive cross-side externalities result in an upward distortion 
                                                 
9 This terminology refers to the contribution of Spence (1975), who first pointed out that a 
monopoly that decides both on price (or quantity) and product quality tends to serve the 
quality preferences of marginal consumers instead of average consumers as would be 
optimal from a social point of view. Weyl (2010) revisits this argument for multi-sided 
platforms, by interpreting the amount of users on one side as a measure of quality of the 
platform service for users on the other side. 
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of prices.10 By only internalizing the cross-side externality at the marginal 
and not average valuation of cross-side users, the private monopoly 
platform subsidizes this externality less than what is socially desirable. 
Consequently, the positive cross-side externality results in too high a price 
and too little participation. However, the last term in equation (16) shows 
that when the platform is a matchmaker, there also is a negative own-side 
externality that leads to a negative term in the Spence distortion. The reason 
for this is that the monopoly matchmaker taxes the negative own-side 
externality at the marginal less than average valuation of own-side users. 
This leads to a price that is less than what is socially desirable and too much 
participation.  
Note that even though there is only one source of user heterogeneity in our 
setting, the Spence distortion can be downward if the negative own-side 
effect dominates the positive cross-side effect – a result that cannot be 
obtained from standard platform models where own-side congestion plays 
no role. On any side this is more likely to be the case if the matching 
elasticity is smaller, i.e. when the platform is a less efficient matchmaker on 
that side of the market. The next two subsections explore the relationship 
                                                 
10 This result unambiguously holds when there is only one source of user heterogeneity in 
transaction valuations – or net match valuations in our setting – which implies 𝑣 ?̅? − 𝑣 ?̃?  is 
always positive. More generally, it is possible to have a negative Spence distortion also 
when there are only positive cross-side externalities. For example, Rochet and Tirole 
(2006) allow for multidimensional heterogeneity in user types and equilibrium in their 
model could result in a negative Spence distortion. As argued by Weyl (2010) this will be 
the case if the spread between the average transaction valuation of marginal and infra-
marginal users is negative, which will depend on the dominating source of heterogeneity 
in user types. 
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between the platform’s matching technology and market distortions on both 
sides of the market in greater detail. 
4.4 Asymmetries in Spence distortions between sides of 
the platform 
An interesting question is how the Spence distortion relates between sides 
of the platform and how this relationship depends on the platform’s 
matching technology. To address this question, define 𝑠 ?̅? ≡ 𝑣 ?̅? − 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑣 ?̅? −
𝑣 ?̃? as the average per-match surplus of users on side 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆 of the market 
and note that (19) can be written as (with 𝐽 ≠ 𝐼): 
𝑀𝐷𝐼 = 𝜇𝐼 + 𝑠?̅?𝜙𝐼 − 𝑠 ?̅?𝜙𝐽 − 𝑠 ?̅?(1 − 𝜙𝐼 − 𝜙𝐽)                    (17) 
For example, assume that the matching function has constant returns to 
scale, i.e. 𝜙𝐵 + 𝜙𝑆 = 1. If this is the case, the sign of the Spence distortion 
on side 𝐵 coincides with the sign of 𝑠𝑆̅̅̅𝜙𝐵 − 𝑠𝐵̅̅ ̅𝜙𝑆 and on side 𝑆 with 
𝑠𝐵̅̅ ̅𝜙𝑆 − 𝑠𝑆̅̅̅𝜙𝐵. Consequently, when the Spence distortion is positive on one 
side, it must be negative on the other side. Equation (17) also provides a 
more general relationship between Spence distortions on both sides of the 
market and the platform’s matching technology: 
Corollary 1.2 When the matching function has weakly decreasing returns 
to scale (𝜙𝐵 + 𝜙𝑆 ≤ 1), the Spence distortion is weakly negative on at least 
one side of the market. When the matching function has increasing returns 
to scale (𝜙𝐵 + 𝜙𝑆 > 1), the Spence distortion is positive on at least one 
side of the market. 
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Finally note that corollary 1.2 and equation (17) do not exclude the 
possibility that the market distortion as a whole is negative. For example, 
assume that the negative own-side externality on side 𝑆 of the market is 
large such that  𝜙𝑆 is small and 𝜙𝐵 + 𝜙𝑆 ≤ 1. From corollary 1.2 we then 
know that the Spence distortion must be negative on at least one side of the 
market. Say this is the high-price side 𝑆 of the market. If on this side the 
negative Spence distortion is larger in absolute value than the classic 
distortion resulting from market power, equation (16) shows that the market 
distortion as a whole will be negative. What this means is that the private 
monopolist charges the high-price side 𝑆 too low a price. Moreover, the 
Spence distortion on the low-price side 𝐵 of the market will be too high, 
such that the inequality in market prices between both sides of the market 
is too low from a social point of view. The next subsection shows this is the 
case when heterogeneity is lognormally distributed assuming realistic 
parameter values and when there is a constant returns to scale matching 
function. 
4.5 An application: lognormal heterogeneity and 
constant returns to scale matching 
The previous subsection derived a relationship between the platform’s 
matching technology and market distortions in a very general way. For 
example, it didn’t determine on which side of the market the Spence 
distortion will be negative when the matching function has decreasing or 
constant returns to scale. And for the side that has the negative Spence 
distortion, whether the market distortion as a whole is also negative. To 
answer these type of questions one needs to be more specific about the 
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underlying heterogeneity of user types and returns to scale in the matching 
function. 
To illustrate this, think of side 𝐵 as workers and of side 𝑆 as firms in a labor 
market and assume lognormally distributed net match valuations, 𝐹(. ), for 
both workers and firms. This could be the case if labor productivity and 
therefore the wage is lognormally distributed, and firms value productivity 
and workers value wages. More specifically,  assume that net match 
valuations are lognormally distributed on both sides with mean 10.4 and 
standard deviation 0.85. These parameter values are borrowed from 
Fabinger and Weyl (2014), who obtain these values by calibrating the 
lognormal distribution to the 2011 US yearly income distribution. Also 
assume a constant elasticity matching function homogeneous of degree 1 
such that 𝜙𝐵 + 𝜙𝑆 = 1. 
Remember from corollary 1.1 that if 𝜙𝐵 > 𝜙𝑆 we must also have that  𝑝𝐵 <
𝑝𝑆 when the inverse hazard rate of demand is decreasing in price, which can 
easily be shown to be the case in the present example. Moreover, from 
equation (20) it follows that the sign of the Spence distortion on the worker-
side coincides with the sign of 𝑠𝑆̅̅̅𝜙𝐵 − 𝑠𝐵̅̅ ̅𝜙𝑆 and on the firm-side with 
𝑠𝐵̅̅ ̅𝜙𝑆 − 𝑠𝑆̅̅̅𝜙𝐵. So if the Spence distortion is negative on one side of the 
market, it must be positive on the other. To see on which side it is positive 
and on which side it is negative, one needs to solve the model, which is done 
next. 
Figure 1 illustrates the model’s optimal prices and distortions on both sides 
of the market.  
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Figure 1: Optimal Prices and Distortions on Both Sides of the Market 
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The horizontal axes depict the matching elasticity on the worker-side 
ranging from 0.5 to 1, and hence the matching elasticity on the firm-side 
ranging from 0.5 to zero given that 𝜙𝐵 = 1 − 𝜙𝑆. In other words, Figure 1 
shows what happens to equilibrium prices and distortions on both sides of 
the market when the efficiency of the matching technology becomes more 
asymmetric in favor of the worker-side of the market. 
The top-left panel of Figure 1 shows that the optimal private price for 
workers goes down and for firms goes up when 𝜙𝐵 increases, consistent 
with corollary 1.1. The top-right panel demonstrates that the classic Cournot 
distortion increases on the worker-side and decreases on the firm-side as 𝜙𝐵 
increases, which is consistent with a decreasing inverse hazard rate. The 
bottom-left panel of Figure 1 shows that the Spence distortion is always 
positive for workers – i.e. the low-price side of the market, and always 
negative for firms – i.e. the high-price side of the market. 
The market distortion as a whole on each side of the market is the sum of 
the Cournot and Spence distortions, given in the top-right and bottom-left 
panels of Figure 1 respectively. The total market distortion also is the 
difference between the private and Pigouvian prices, given in the bottom-
right panel of Figure 1 for workers and for firms. Note that in this example 
the Pigouvian platform always subsidizes the more efficient worker-side of 
the market and recovers this subsidy from the firm-side, consistent with 
proposition 1.2 for a constant returns to scale matching function. 
The bottom-right panel further implies that the total market distortion on the 
worker-side is unambiguously upward, even though the worker side is the 
low-priced side of the market. The private price for firms is smaller than 
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their Pigouvian price for minimal asymmetry in the matching technology. 
In other words, despite that the firm-side is the high priced side of the 
market, the private price is still too low compared to what is socially 
optimal. Together with the positive total market distortion on the worker-
side of the platform, this implies that the inequality in prices between sides 
of the platform is too low from a social point of view. 
5 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how a private monopoly matchmaker internalizes 
the matching externalities – a negative own-side congestion and positive 
cross-side externality – that are inherent to its matching technology. If the 
matching technology is more efficient (i.e. the negative own-side 
externality is small and the positive cross-side externality is large) on a side 
of the market, the monopoly matchmaker will charge that side a lower price 
for its service.  
In addition, the model also predicts that a monopoly matchmaker will only 
partially internalize the platform’s matching externalities. In particular, the 
Spence distortion on a side of the market is increasing in the platform’s 
matching efficiency for that side of the market. Comparing distortions 
between sides of the platform, it was also shown that the Spence distortion 
must be negative (positive) on at least one side of the market if the matching 
function exhibits decreasing or constant (increasing) returns to scale. For 
example, assuming that buyers are matched more efficiently in a constant 
returns to scale matching technology and that heterogeneity in user type is 
lognormally distributed using realistic parameter values, it was illustrated 
that prices are too high for buyers and too low for sellers for minimal 
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asymmetries in matching elasticities between sides of the market. That is, 
inequality in market prices between sides of the online listing platform is 
too low from a social point of view.  
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Appendix 1.A: Participation fees, per-match fees and 
platform costs 
All results in the main text are expressed in terms of fixed “per-match” fees 
denoted by 𝑝𝐼 for side 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆. However, all results can instead be 
expressed in terms of fixed “participation fees” denoted by 𝑃𝐼, which is 
levied when users enter the platform, by simply substituting for 𝑝𝐼 =
𝑃𝐼/(𝑀/𝑁𝐼) in all expressions.  
From the point of view of users, the indifference between paying a fixed 
per-match fee or a fixed participation fee directly follows from the 
assumptions of risk-neutrality, that matching is random (i.e. match 
probabilities are the same for users on a particular side) and that there are 
no transfers between matched users. To illustrate this, note that expected net 
utility of users when the platform can charge both types of fees is given by: 
𝑢𝐼 = (𝑣𝐼 − 𝑝𝐼)𝑚𝐼 − 𝑃𝐼                                      (𝐴1) 
Users participate when 𝑣𝐼 ≥ 𝑣 ?̃? ≡ 𝑃𝐼/𝑚𝐼 = 𝑝𝐼 and demand is given by 
𝑁𝐼 = 1 − 𝐹𝐼(𝑣 ?̃?). So, the platform can reach any desired allocation 
(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆) whether one or both pricing instruments are available and is 
therefore indifferent between both.  
That the platform is indifferent between fixed per-match and fixed 
participation fees only holds when platform costs are independent of the 
type of fee charged. To see this, assume that the platform incurs a per-match 
cost 𝑐 proportional to the amount of matches that occur through the platform 
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and a side-specific cost 𝐶𝐼 to attract users on each side. When both fees are 
available to the platform, profits can be written as: 
𝜋 = (𝑝𝐵 + 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑐)𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆) + (𝑃𝐵 − 𝐶𝐵)𝑁𝐵 + (𝑃𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆)𝑁𝑆    (𝐴2) 
When 𝑐, 𝐶𝐵 and 𝐶𝑆 are constants, the platform can maximize profits by 
choosing the optimal allocation 𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆 and by setting both types of fees 
such that the right amount of users on each side are attracted. Note that any 
allocation can be reached by setting 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑝𝑆 = 0 and adjusting the 
participation fee or by setting 𝑃𝐵 = 𝑃𝑆 = 0 and adjusting the per-match fee. 
But when 𝑐, 𝐶𝐵 and 𝐶𝑆 are not constant and depend on the value of the fees 
charged, the equivalence between the two fee types no longer holds. For 
example, if 𝑐 = 0 when 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑝𝑆 = 0 and 𝑐 > 0 when 𝑝𝐵 or 𝑝𝑆 > 0 and 
𝐶𝐵 and 𝐶𝑆 constant, then the platform always prefers participation over flat 
fees. This scenario is particularly relevant when it is costly for matchmakers 
to observe individual matches in order to charge fixed per-match fees.11  
Finally, note that the discussion so far assumed that the availability of a 
single pricing instrument on each side of the market suffices for the platform 
to reach its desired allocation. However, the presence of network 
externalities typically implies that the platform faces a problem of 
equilibrium multiplicity. As suggested by Caillaud and Jullien (2001), the 
availability of multiple pricing instruments on each side of the market can 
                                                 
11 When the platform observes matches, it can typically do better than charging fixed per-
match fees. When (part of) the match surplus is observed, the platform can price 
discriminate between users. For example, real estate brokers observe the selling price of a 
transaction or temporary help agencies observe the wage of the workers they assign to 
firms. These platforms typically price discriminate users by charging a commission fee 
proportional to the observed component of the match surplus. Analyzing proportional fee 
pricing is taken up in the third and fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
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help the platform to reach its preferred equilibrium. This issue is further 
addressed in Appendix 1.B. 
Appendix 1.B: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness  
It is well-known from the platform literature that if a platform chooses 
optimal prices in the first stage and users of the two sides simultaneously 
decide on participation in the second stage, there is an inherent problem of 
equilibrium multiplicity due to user coordination failures. Borrowing the 
terminology in Caillaud and Jullien (2001), a “bad-expectation” market 
allocation can always prevail in which case none of the users of either side 
participate, whatever prices charged by the platform. This because they 
have negative beliefs about the participation decision of users on the other 
side. So, the question is when the “good-expectation” market allocation will 
prevail that was described in the main text of the paper. 
One way to address the issue is to assume a “rational-expectations” 
equilibrium as suggested by Caillaud and Jullien (2003). The intuition is 
that users on both sides have “favorable” beliefs about the participation 
decision of other users. When there exists an equilibrium that for users of 
both sides is favorable compared to, for example, the nonparticipation 
equilibrium, users will decide to participate. In our setting, when users on 
side 𝐵 have favorable beliefs about the participation decision of 𝑆-side 
users, they participate when their net match valuation is greater than or 
equal to the per-match fee charged by the platform. So, demand on side 𝐵 
is equal to 𝑁𝐵 = 1 − 𝐹𝐵 (𝑝𝐵 ). Similarly, under favorable beliefs demand 
on side 𝑆 is equal to 𝑁𝑆 = 1 − 𝐹𝑆(𝑝𝑆 ) and there exists a unique set of 
prices that corresponds to the monopolist’s profit maximizing allocation. 
43 
 
Moreover, as suggested by Caillaud and Jullien (2001), the assumption of 
favorable beliefs is unnecessary if the platform can use multiple pricing 
instruments. For example, when the platform can charge per-match as well 
as participation fees on each side of the market, it can grant a small 
participation subsidy arbitrarily close to zero such that all users on both 
sides are willing to participate. The platform can then adjust its per-match 
fees to establish its profit maximizing allocation. This would also be 
possible in the present model since the fixed per-match and participation 
fees are isomorphic as was discussed in Appendix 1.A. 
In case the platform charges participation fees conditional on the amount of 
users or “insulating tariffs”, Weyl (2010) shows how a unique equilibrium 
can exist. The intuition is that the platform can select any chosen amount of 
participants on a particular side by charging them a price conditional on the 
amount of users entering on the other side of the market. For this to be 
possible, there must be a unique price on a side of the market which can be 
written as a function of participation on both sides. In our model, inverse 
demand in terms of a fixed participation fee on side 𝐼 of a market can be 
written as: 
𝑃𝐼(𝑁𝐼 , 𝑁𝐽) = 𝐹𝐼
−1
(1 − 𝑁𝐼)
𝑀(𝑁𝐼 , 𝑁𝐽)
𝑁𝐼
                      (𝐵1) 
Now, note that for any given amount of 𝐽-side participants, say 𝑁?̃?, there is 
a unique price that pins down or insulates the level of 𝐼-side participation 
desired by the platform, say 𝑁?̃?, and 𝑃𝐼(𝑁?̃? , 𝑁?̃?) is the unique insulating 
tariff. Once the participation rate on side 𝐼 is fixed there is no longer a 
coordination problem on side 𝐽 and the platform can attract any desired 
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amount of users. In other words, the platform can implement any desired 
allocation 𝑁?̃? , 𝑁?̃? by charging an insulating tariff on at least one side of the 
market. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Market distortions in online real estate 
advertisement pricing1 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to make two contributions. Firstly, to adjust the general 
platform matching model of the first chapter to the specific setting of a 
matchmaker that provides a listing service in a market for residential real 
estate. Secondly, to apply this model using data on the largest online real 
estate listing platform in Belgium with the purpose to learn about the 
efficiency of the matching technology and pricing behavior of the platform. 
To do this, the analysis is built up as follows. Section 2 extends the model 
of chapter 1 to allow for Nash bargaining between matched buyers and 
sellers to divide the match surplus, such that the sales price of real estate 
properties is endogenously determined in the model. In addition, specific 
assumptions are imposed on the matching technology to account for the 
asymmetric nature of a matching process by which one side of the market 
lists advertisements (sellers) and the other side of the market 
uncoordinatedly searches through these advertisements (buyers). Optimal 
                                                 
1 This chapter is single-authored and presents new material. 
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participation fees for buyers and listing fees for sellers are then derived for 
a monopolist and a Pigouvian planner. 
The theoretical results show that the platforms, on top of the positive cross-
side and negative own-side externalities that result from the matching 
process extensively discussed in chapter 1, account for an additional 
negative cross-side externality that results from the bargaining process. 
Attracting an additional buyer has a negative impact on the sales price 
sellers expect to receive because this buyer has a lower valuation for the 
good than the inframarginal buyers. Similarly, an additional seller has a 
higher reservation price of providing the good to the market than the 
inframarginal sellers, such that buyers expect to pay a higher price for the 
good when this sellers enters the platform. Notably, there are no diverging 
incentives between the monopoly and Pigouvian platform to account for this 
externality. This because all users on each side value this externality to the 
same extent and hence no additional Spencian distortion arises. 
Section 3 describes the data and the institutional setting of the Belgian 
market for online real estate listings. Administrative data are available on 
total sales and average prices of real estate across districts in Belgium. In 
addition, a cross-section is available on the total amount of listings posted 
on the platform and on the listing fees charged to sellers. Finally, a large 
sample of listings is available with detailed characteristics and a proxy for 
time-to-sell - the online listing duration. The competitive environment of 
the platform is also described in this section with some supporting data on 
the size of the competitors. The observed platform clearly dominates the 
market. It is by far the largest in terms of visiting buyers and it seems to be 
47 
 
the only platform that succeeds to charge a positive listing fee to sellers – 
the main competitors are all free of charge. This does not imply, however, 
that the platform can be treated as a monopolist. Should the platform exploit 
its dominant position through its fee setting, it would be likely to endanger 
its dominant position. Therefore, in the empirical analysis it is assumed that 
the platform serves full market demand on both sides of the market, but it 
is not assumed the observed listing fees are the fees a true monopolist would 
charge. 
Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Specific assumptions are imposed 
on the distributions of buyer and seller preference parameters and it is 
shown how the relevant distribution parameters can be linked to an observed 
distribution of sales prices. After some manipulation, the ask-price data 
from the listing sample is then used to back out the distribution parameters. 
In addition, from the estimated time-to-sell the relevant technology 
parameters and outcomes can also be derived from the data.  
When all the model parameters are known, the counterfactual market 
outcomes of a Pigouvian planner and a monopolist can be calculated and 
compared to the observed market outcomes. The results suggest that the 
observed fees charged to buyers and sellers are too low compared to the 
socially optimal fees and hence that it would be welfare improving to attract 
less listings and searching buyers on the platform. This because the negative 
externalities that arise from the matching and bargaining process are not 
properly internalized. A true monopolist would charge even higher fees than 
the social planner on both sides of the market. Nevertheless, the results 
show that the monopoly outcome comes closer to the social optimum than 
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the observed outcome. The results therefore suggest that (latent) 
competition is currently too strong in the Belgian market for real estate 
listings for the market to function efficiently. 
In the literature, the related theoretical contributions are essentially the same 
as the ones described in chapter 1, so I will be brief on this. It should perhaps 
only be noted that the contribution of Niedermayer and Shneyerov (2013) 
is now more closely related than before, given that the present model also 
allows for transferable utility between matched participants. The results 
confirm Niedermayer and Shneyerov’s result that, when abstracting from 
the matching externalities, the platform charges a higher fee to the side of 
the market with the larger bargaining weight. 
This chapter relates to two strands of empirical literatures. On the one hand, 
there is a recent literature, among others, instigated by the work of Mark 
Rysman and Lapo Filistrucchi with their respective co-authors, that 
empirically investigates the nature of and efficiency issues in two-sided 
markets (see, for example, Rysman (2004, 2007), Argentesi and Filistrucchi 
(2007), Filistrucchi, Klein and Michielsen (2012), Gowrisankaran, Park and 
Rysman (2014), Jin and Rysman (2014)). This work mainly focusses on 
quantifying network externalities, estimating distortions from market power 
and evaluating the anti-trust implications of mergers between platforms (see 
also Evans and Noel (2008), Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) and Song 
(2013) on this) for various applications, like yellow pages, payment cards, 
newspapers, sports card conventions, DVD players, etc.  
The present study deviates from this literature by topic, by studying a 
matching market and accounting for the additional externalities that arise in 
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that setting, which are shown to be quantitatively more important than the 
familiar positive cross-side externalities and can reverse the conventional 
welfare effects of market power. The only empirical paper I am aware of 
with a similar research agenda is that of Loertscher and Niedermayer 
(2012), who investigate the efficiency of matching intermediaries that use 
percentage fees as a pricing instrument and apply their model to the Boston 
real estate brokerage market in the 1990s. They focus on direct mechanisms 
to model the matching and bargaining process, however, and abstract from 
the externalities that are the emphasis of the present analysis. 
On the other hand, there is a recent literature that evaluates the efficiency of 
matching technologies in real estate markets. Genesove and Han (2012) 
explicitly estimate the matching function across MSA’s in the US for real 
estate markets as a whole. They do not distinguish between matching 
channels, however, and hence do not link their estimates to the behavior of 
private matching platforms active in the market. In addition, Hendel, Nevo 
and Ortalo-Magné (2009) compare the efficiency of two types of matching 
platforms in the US, one operated by real estate brokers (MLS) and one that 
services independent sellers (FSBO), and investigate whether selling one’s 
own property at a low listing fee is worth the effort compared to using a 
more expensive broker (also see Bernheim and Meer (2010) and Levitt and 
Syverson (2008)). They do not investigate, however, whether the listing fee 
by itself is set efficiently. Another crucial difference with the present setting 
is that in Belgium independent sellers and brokers do not list their properties 
on separate platforms and the analysis makes no distinction between these 
two user groups when evaluating the matching efficiency of the platform. 
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2 A model of online real estate advertisement pricing  
2.1 User preferences and demand 
Consider a mass 𝑆 of sellers who contemplate posting 𝛾 ≥ 1 advertisements 
on an online listing platform with the purpose to sell a single homogeneous 
real estate property. In return for this sellers are charged a flat fee 𝑃𝑆 for 
each listing. Sellers might post their advertisement more than once, for 
example, to get more exposure on the platform. Similarly, there is a mass 𝐵 
of buyers that potentially use the platform in their search for a real estate 
property. Buyers are charged a participation fee 𝑃𝐵 to use the technology 
offered by the platform to search through the database of listings, 
independently of how intensively they use the technology. Denote the 
search intensity of buyers by 𝛼 ≥ 0. The listing and search intensities are 
considered exogenous and are assumed to be same across all sellers and 
buyers, respectively. Depending on the fees charged by the platform, 𝑁𝑆 
sellers and 𝑁𝐵 buyers participate. In turn, depending on 𝑁𝑆 and 𝑁𝐵 and the 
matching technology offered by the platform, sellers have a probability 𝑚𝑆 
and buyers a probability 𝑚𝐵 of being matched. These match probabilities 
are assumed to  be the same for all participants on the same side, but allowed 
to differ across sides of the market. The specificities of the matching 
technology offered by the platform are further described in the next 
subsection. 
Sellers are heterogeneous in their reservation price of providing the real 
estate property to the market through the platform, denoted by 𝑠, assumed 
to be smoothly distributed by 𝐹𝑆(. ) on [𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐻] with density 𝑓𝑆(. ). 
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Similarly, buyers are heterogeneous in their valuation for the homogeneous 
real estate property, denoted by 𝑏, distributed by 𝐹𝐵(. ) on [𝑏𝐿 , 𝑏𝐻] with 
density 𝑓𝐵(. ). When a seller type 𝑠 and a buyer type 𝑏 are matched, the 
match surplus is efficiently divided between the two parties, assuming that 
the participation fees charged at entry are sunk when the match is 
established. That is, the fees are not taken up in the bargain over the sales 
price of the property. More specifically, assume that the sales price 𝜌 is 
chosen to maximize the following Nash bargain: 
max
𝜌
(𝑏 − 𝜌)1−𝛽 (𝜌 − 𝑠)𝛽                                      (1) 
where 𝛽 denotes the bargaining weight of sellers and hence 1 − 𝛽 is the 
bargaining weight of buyers.2 This results in the following expression for 
the sales price: 
𝜌(𝑏, 𝑠) = 𝛽𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑠                                       (2) 
In the described setting, expected utility of sellers when listing their real 
estate property at the platform is equal to: 
                                                 
2 The assumptions on the bargaining process have two convenient implications for the 
purpose of the present analysis. On the one hand, Nash bargaining is efficient in the sense 
that any match for which the buyer valuation is sufficiently high to cover the seller 
reservation price will be established. In alternative price determination games there might 
be additional distortions that arise from seller and/or buyer market power or informational 
imperfections. Given the focus of the present analysis on the distortions that possibly arise 
the private behavior of the listing platform, however, I prefer to exclude any additional 
potential inefficiencies. On the other hand, by assuming that sales prices are determined at 
the individual transaction level, rather than through a competitive market clearing 
mechanism (which would also exclude the aforementioned additional distortions), implies 
ex post sales price dispersion for homogeneous real estate goods. In the empirical part of 
this chapter, it is precisely the residual variation in sales prices (after controlling for 
observable real estate characteristics) that will be used to identify the buyer demand and 
seller supply parameters of the model. 
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𝑢𝑆 = (𝜌(?̅?, 𝑠) − 𝑠)𝑚𝑆 − 𝛾𝑃𝑆                                  (3) 
where ?̅? denotes the expected buyer type, or the average buyer valuation, 
defined as: 
?̅? ≡
1
1−𝐹𝐵(?̃?)
∫ 𝑏𝑓𝐵(𝑏)𝑑𝑏
𝑏𝐻
?̃?
                                     (4)  
in which ?̃? denotes the valuation of the marginal buyer that participates at 
the platform. 
Similarly, expected utility of buyers to search for a real estate property on 
the listing platform is equal to: 
𝑢𝐵 = (𝑏 − 𝜌(𝑏, ?̅?))𝑚𝐵 − 𝑃𝐵                                   (5) 
where ?̅? denotes the expected or average seller reservation price, defined as: 
?̅? ≡
1
𝐹𝑆(?̃?)
∫ 𝑠𝑓𝑆(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
?̃?
𝑠𝐿
                                          (6)  
in which ?̃? denotes the reservation price of the marginal seller that 
participates at the platform. 
Sellers participate when 𝑢𝑆 ≥ 0, such that the marginal seller reservation 
price is equal to: 
?̃? = ?̅? −
1
𝛽
𝑝𝑆                                                   (7) 
where 𝑝𝑆 = 𝛾𝑃𝑆/𝑚𝑆 denotes the expected per-match fee for sellers. Given 
that the fee charged by the platform is not taken up in the bargain over the 
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sales price, the same equivalence holds between 𝑝𝑆 and 𝑃𝑆 as described in 
the first chapter. Seller demand for the platform service follows: 
𝑁𝑆 = 𝑆𝐹𝑆(?̃?)                                               (8) 
Inverse seller demand can hence be written as: 
𝑝𝑆 = 𝛽(?̅? − 𝐹𝑆
−1
(𝑁𝑆/𝑆))                                           
= 𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?)                                                         (9) 
Similarly, buyers participate when 𝑢𝐵 ≥ 0, such that the marginal buyer 
valuation can be written as: 
?̃? = ?̅? +
1
1 − 𝛽
𝑝𝐵                                          (10) 
where 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑃𝐵/𝑚𝐵 denotes the expected per-match fee for buyers. Buyer 
demand is equal to: 
𝑁𝐵 = 𝐵 (1 − 𝐹𝐵(?̃?))                                      (11) 
Inverse buyer demand again follows: 
𝑝𝐵 = (1 − 𝛽)(𝐹𝐵
−1
(1 − (𝑁𝐵/𝐵) ) − ?̅?) 
= (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)                                                         (12)  
Note that even though there is an additional externality that affects user 
preferences compared to the model described in chapter 1 – utility is now 
affected by cross-side participation not only through the match probability, 
but also through the expected sales price – the coordination problem faced 
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by the platform is essentially the same: the participation decision of users 
on one side of the market depends on their expectation about participation 
of the users on the other side of the market. As discussed in appendix 1.B 
of chapter 1, the platform can resolve this problem by charging insulating 
tariffs, as suggested by Weyl (2010). That is, for any number of buyers that 
show up at the platform, the participation fee of sellers can be adjusted to 
attract the desired number of sellers and vice versa. To see this, note from 
expression (9) that inverse seller demand solely depends on 𝑁𝑆 (through 
?̃? = 𝐹𝑆
−1
(𝑁𝑆/𝑆)) and 𝑁𝐵 (through ?̅? in which ?̃? = 𝐹𝐵
−1
(1 − (𝑁𝐵/𝐵) )) 
and hence is independent of 𝑝𝐵. Similarly, inverse buyer demand, given by 
expression (12), depends only on 𝑁𝐵 and 𝑁𝑆 and is independent of 𝑝𝑆. 
Hence, any desired allocation 𝑁𝑆, 𝑁𝐵 can be established by properly 
adjusting  𝑝𝑆 and 𝑝𝐵. 
2.2 Platform matching technology 
Assume the match probability of sellers and buyers, respectively, is given 
by: 
𝑚𝑆 =
𝑀
𝑁𝑆
  and  𝑚𝐵 =
𝑀
𝑁𝐵
                                   (13) 
in which the matching function 𝑀 = 𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆) denotes the number of 
matches that occur through the platform given that 𝑁𝐵 buyers and 𝑁𝑆 sellers 
participate. The matching elasticity for sellers and buyers, respectively, is 
defined as: 
𝜙𝑆 ≡
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑁𝑆
𝑁𝑆
𝑀
  and  𝜙𝐵 ≡
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑁𝐵
𝑁𝐵
𝑀
                       (14) 
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As in chapter 1, 𝜙𝑆 is interpreted as a measure for the positive cross-side 
externalities exerted by sellers on the buyer-side and 1 − 𝜙𝑆 measures (the 
absolute value of) own-side congestion among sellers. Similarly, 𝜙𝐵 
measures the positive cross-side externalities induced by the participation 
decision of buyers and 1 − 𝜙𝐵 is a measure of congestion among buyers. 
Rather than assuming a general matching function as in the previous 
chapter, this chapter imposes specific assumptions on the matching process 
to account for the specificities of a matchmaker that provides an online 
listing service. More specifically, a familiar microfoundation of the 
matching function – “urn-ball” matching – is reinterpreted in the context of 
online listings. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide a detailed 
discussion on the origin and applications of the urn-ball matching function. 
Assume that sellers participate by posting advertisements for their real 
estate property on the platform and that buyers uncoordinatedly search 
through these listings. More specifically, each participating seller lists 𝛾 
advertisements and each participating buyer randomly applies to 𝛼 
advertisements. So, some sellers may receive no applications while others 
may receive many. It is assumed that those sellers receiving more 
applications randomly select one buyer, such that some buyers that applied 
will remain unmatched. In this setting, it is the presence of coordination 
failures among buyers that characterizes the platform’s matching 
technology and externalities.  
To fully capture the intuition of this matching process it is convenient to 
build up the matching function step by step. Given that 𝑁𝑆 sellers list 𝛾 
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advertisements on the platform and that each of the 𝑁𝐵 buyers randomly 
applies to 𝛼 advertisements, each seller has a probability 𝛾/𝛾𝑁𝑆 of 
receiving an application from any given buyer, assuming a buyer applies at 
most once to a particular seller. Hence, the probability of not receiving an 
application from that buyer is (1 − 1/𝑁𝑆). In total, 𝛼𝑁𝐵 applications get 
sent out, so the probability that a seller ends up without any buyer is then 
given by: 
(1 − 1/𝑁𝑆)𝛼𝑁
𝐵
≈ exp(−𝛼𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝑆  )                      (15)  
where the approximation holds only if 𝑁𝑆 is sufficiently large. Hence, the 
probability that a given seller will be matched to a buyer is approximated 
by 1 − exp(−(𝛼𝑁𝐵)/𝑁𝑆) and the expected number of total matches is then 
given by the following matching function: 
𝑀(𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆) = 𝑁𝑆(1 − exp(−α𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝑆))                  (16) 
It follows from this matching function that the matching elasticities with 
respect to buyers and sellers are, respectively: 
𝜙𝐵 =
𝑁𝐵
𝑁𝑆
exp (−α𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝑆)
(1 − exp (−α𝑁𝐵/𝑁𝑆))
  and  𝜙𝑆 = 1 − 𝜙𝐵        (17) 
Expression (17) illustrates that the matching function is homogeneous of 
degree 1 and that the matching elasticities are not constant, but rather 
depend on the allocation of buyers and sellers. Moreover, the matching 
elasticities are not symmetric between both sides of the platform. For 
example, assuming that 𝑁𝑆 = 𝑁𝐵 and that 𝛼 = 1, it follows that 𝜙𝑆 = 0.42  
and 𝜙𝐵 = 0.58. The higher matching elasticity for buyers than for sellers 
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captures the fact that the listing platform is more efficient at matching 
buyers than sellers. One intuition for this is that buyers are “active” in this 
model in the sense that they apply to advertisements taking into account the 
(expected) behavior of other buyers. In contrast, sellers are “passive” in the 
sense that they simply post listings and hope that at least one buyer 
responds. 
Note that the parameter 𝛼 can be interpreted more broadly as simply being 
the number of applications sent out by each buyer. For example, if the static 
matching game described here is repeated many times and when every 
period a fraction 1 − 𝛼 of buyers does not apply to any advertisement and 
the remaining fraction 𝛼 applies to a single listing, the per-period matching 
function will also exactly be expression (16). However, the parameter 𝛼 will 
now be between 0 and 1 rather than being larger than or equal to unity. Even 
more loosely, given that 𝑀 is increasing in 𝛼, in the presence of other 
frictions on top the coordination frictions described here, one can also think 
of this parameter as generally capturing the efficiency of the matching 
technology offered by the platform in terms of resolving these frictions. For 
example, housing is an extremely heterogeneous good and not every buyer 
can be matched to any seller. A higher 𝛼 then implies that the platform 
technology is better at bringing the right buyer to the right seller. 
In addition, note that the matching function is independent of 𝛾, the amount 
of listings posted by each seller. This because all sellers have the same 
listing intensity and hence the same probability of receiving an application 
from each buyer. The seller listing intensity do will play an important role 
58 
 
to properly identify the unique amount sellers at platform in the empirical 
part of this paper. 
2.3 Platform profits and social value 
A monopoly platform maximizes profits: 
𝜋 = (𝑝𝐴 + 𝑝𝐵)𝑀(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵)                                (18) 
by choosing the optimal allocation of buyers and sellers, subject to inverse 
buyer and seller demand, given by expressions (9) and (12). 
Total social value, equal to the sum of aggregate utility of participants on 
the two sides of the market and the private platform’s profits, can be written 
as: 
𝜔 = (?̅? − ?̅?)𝑀(𝑁𝐴, 𝑁𝐵)                                 (19) 
A Pigouvian planner optimally chooses the allocation of buyers and sellers 
by maximizing (19), subject to (9) and (12). 
Note that the platform is assumed to incur no costs. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the marginal costs to attract sellers and buyers are 
approximately zero for a listing platform. Sellers themselves fill in the 
details of their listings and they simply pay the listing fee once they are 
ready to upload. Similarly, buyers use the technology of the platform as a 
tool to search for a suited property, so they also incur their search costs 
themselves. The platform only needs to assure that the technology runs 
properly, which might entail some fixed operating costs, but no marginal 
costs. Fixed costs should not influence the short-run pricing decision of the 
platform and are therefore ignored in the remainder of the analysis. 
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2.4 Results 
Proposition 2.1 follows from the first-order conditions of the profit 
maximization problem, in which 𝜇𝐵 ≡ (1 − 𝐹𝐵(?̃?))/𝑓𝐵(?̃?) is the inverse 
hazard rate of demand for buyers and 𝜇𝑆 = 𝐹𝑆(?̃?)/𝑓𝑆(?̃?) is the inverse 
hazard rate of demand for sellers. Equivalently to chapter 1, 𝑣?̃? denotes the 
net expected match value of the marginal buyer that participates and 𝑣?̃? 
denotes the net expected match value of the marginal seller. In the present 
setting these are equal to: 
𝑣?̃? = (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)  and  𝑣?̃? = 𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?)                   (20) 
The marginal participants are indifferent between participating or not such 
that 𝑣?̃? = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑣?̃? = 𝑝𝑆. 
Proposition 2.1 At the optimal allocation, the per-match fee a private 
monopoly platform charges to buyers and sellers, respectively, is: 
𝑝𝐵 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜇𝐵 + 𝑣?̃?(1 − 𝜙𝐵) −  𝑣?̃?𝜙𝐵 + 𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?)           (21) 
𝑝𝑆 = 𝛽𝜇𝑆 +  𝑣?̃?(1 − 𝜙𝑆) − 𝑣?̃?𝜙𝑆 + (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)            (22) 
Comparing the results in proposition 2.1 to those in proposition 1.1 in 
chapter 1 nicely illustrates the implications of allowing matched 
participants to bargain over the division of the match surplus on the optimal 
pricing behavior of a monopoly platform. Remember that 𝛽 and 1 − 𝛽 
denote the bargaining weight of sellers and buyers, respectively. 
Expressions (21) and (22) demonstrate that the inverse hazard rates on each 
side are now weighted by the bargaining weight of participants on that side. 
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So, all else equal, the platform possesses more market power on the side 
with stronger bargaining weight. This seems intuitive, given that a larger 
bargaining weight results in a higher willingness-to-pay for the platform 
service. The intuition of the second and third term in expressions (21) and 
(22) is the same as in proposition 1.1. The platform taxes the negative 
congestion effect and subsidizes the positive indirect network effect that 
results from the random matching process to the extent that the marginal 
participant on each side is willing to pay for this.  
The last term in expressions (21) and (22) is novel and it captures how the 
monopolist accounts for the additional externality that arises in the presence 
of bargaining. When an additional buyer enters the platform, this will have 
a negative impact on the expected sales price of sellers, given that a 
marginal buyer always has a lower willingness-to-pay for the good than 
inframarginal buyers. To see this, remember that the sales price any seller 
type 𝑠 expects to receive is equal to 𝜌(?̅?, 𝑠) = 𝛽?̅? + (1 − 𝛽)𝑠. So, the 
impact on the expected sales price of an additional buyer entering the 
platform is −𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?)/𝑁𝐵. Adding up this effect for all buyers that enter 
the platform, the magnitude of this negative externality is exactly the tax the 
platform imposes on buyers in the optimal price charged to buyers: 
𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?). Similarly, an additional seller entering the platform has a positive 
effect on the sales price buyers expect to pay and hence a negative effect on 
expected buyer utility. This because the marginal seller has a higher 
reservation price of providing the good to the market and will only settle for 
a higher sales price relative to the inframarginal sellers. The sales price any 
buyer type 𝑏 expects to pay is 𝜌(𝑏, ?̅?) = 𝛽𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)?̅? and the impact of 
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an additional seller on this is (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)/𝑁𝑠. Adding this up over all 
sellers that participate is again exactly the tax imposed on sellers in the 
optimal seller fee: (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?). 
Proposition 2.2 shows how the social planner sets the per-match fee to 
maximize total social value, in which 𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅  denotes the net expected match 
value of the average buyer that participates and 𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅  denotes the net expected 
match value of the average seller: 
𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅ = (1 − 𝛽)(?̅? − ?̅?)  and   𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅ = 𝛽(?̅? − 𝑠̅)                   (23) 
Proposition 2.2 At the optimal allocation, the per-match fee a Pigouvian 
platform charges to buyers and sellers, respectively, is: 
𝑝𝜔
𝐵 = 𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅ (1 − 𝜙𝐵) − 𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅𝜙𝐵 + 𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?)                      (24) 
𝑝𝜔
𝑆 = 𝑣𝑆̅̅ ̅(1 − 𝜙𝑆) − 𝑣𝐵̅̅̅̅ 𝜙𝑆 + (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)                 (25) 
The first two terms in expressions (24) and (25) demonstrate that the social 
planner taxes the negative congestion effect and subsidizes the positive 
indirect network effect to the extent that the average participant on each side 
is willing to pay for this, rather than the marginal participant as the private 
monopoly does, resulting in a similar Spence distortion as described in 
chapter 1. The last terms, however, show that the Pigouvian platform 
internalizes the negative cross-side externality that affects the expected 
cross-side sales price exactly the same way as the monopolist does. The 
reason for this is that every buyer type 𝑏 and every seller type 𝑠 value this 
externality to the same extent, so no additional Spencian distortion arises 
here. 
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The remainder of this chapter aims to quantify and compare private and 
socially optimal fees charged to buyers and sellers using preference and 
matching parameters derived from data from a large online real estate listing 
platform in Belgium. Before showing the results, the following section first 
describes the data and institutional setting of the investigated online real 
estate advertisements market. 
3 Data and institutional setting of the Belgian online 
real estate advertisements market 
Belgium is a small country in Western Europe with a surface of 
approximately 30500 sq.km. and the population counts about 11.1 million 
citizens. The country consists of three main regions (the bilingual Brussels 
Capital Region, the northern Dutch-speaking Flemish region and the 
southern French-speaking Walloon region) and is further subdivided into 
10 provinces, 43 districts (cities including their respective agglomerations 
and rural areas), 589 municipalities (most disaggregated level of political 
relevance, each municipality has a local government and elected major) and 
1146 zip-codes (towns in rural areas and local residential areas in urban 
parts of the country). 
3.1 Administrative data on the number of residential 
real estate sales and average sales prices by district  
The first dataset used in the empirical analysis is publicly available data 
from the national statistics office Belgium on total sales and average prices 
of real estate at the level of districts on quarterly basis from 1990Q1 to 
2013Q4. The data categorizes real estate into “ordinary residential houses”, 
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“villas, bungalows and manors”, “apartments” and “residential land”. 
Throughout the analysis only the distinction between “houses” and 
“apartments” is made. Sales of houses by district is calculated as the sum of 
ordinary residential houses and villas, bungalows and manors. The average 
price of houses is calculated as the weighted average by sales of these two 
categories. The data on residential land is not used. Table 1 reports summary 
statistics on total sales and average prices in 2013. 
Table 1: total sales and average prices of houses and apartments in 2013 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Total 
sales houses 43 1847 1496 309 7303 79416 
sales apartments 43 985 1747 27 9170 42367 
average price houses (€) 43 206739 57795 127246 399754 206739 
average price apartments (€) 43 185096 38450 119175 315215 185096 
 
The table shows that on average 1847 houses were sold across districts in 
2013, ranging from 309 in Bastogne to 7303 in the district of Antwerp, and 
the average number of apartments sold was 985, ranging from 27 in 
Philippeville to 9170 in the Brussels Capital Region. In total, 79416 houses 
and 42367 apartments were sold in 2013 across the country. The average 
price of housing is about €206000, with a minimum of €127000 in Charleroi 
and a maximum of €400000 in the Brussels Capital Region. Apartments sell 
on average for €185000, going from €120000 in Thuin to €315000 in the 
district of Bruges. 
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3.2 Platform data on the number of listings by zip-code 
The second dataset used is a cross-section of listings posted on the largest 
online listing platform for real estate in Belgium in early April 2014. Within 
each zip-code, the data contains a variable with the total number of houses 
that were listed on the platform at the time the data were collected and one 
with the number of houses labeled as “new construction”. For both of these 
categories, there is an additional variable that reports the number of “recent 
listings” that were posted on the platform at most 15 days before the time 
of collection. The same four variables are available for apartments.  
The sales data reported in table 1 above come from the national land registry 
office and only contain “old constructions”, in the sense that “new 
constructions” that are sold for the first time do not have to be reported in 
Belgium by law and therefore are not counted in the number of sales by 
district. To make the listings data comparable to the sales data, the “new 
construction” listings are therefore extracted from the total amount of 
listings to get a proxy for the number of “old construction” listings, which 
is the measure used for the subsequent analysis. Table 2 reports summary 
statistics for the adjusted number of total (all) and recent (max 15 days) 
listings for houses and apartments, aggregated up to the level of districts. 
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Table 2: cross-section of total and recent listings on the platform 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Total 
listings houses (all) 43 1328 1045 290 5366 57098 
listings apartments (all) 43 898 1536 14 8513 38626 
listings houses (max 15 days) 43 200 169 34 806 8611 
listings apartments (max 15 days) 43 84 192 0 1048 3621 
 
Table 2 illustrates that the average number of total listings for houses and 
apartments across districts is 1328 and 898, respectively. The average 
number of recent listings for houses and apartments is 200 and 84, 
respectively. There is again significant variation across districts and as 
expected this variation is closely related to the number of sales across 
districts reported in table 1. The correlation coefficient between housing 
sales and total housing listings across districts is 0.95 and between total 
housing sales and recent housing listings 0.94. Similarly, for apartments the 
correlation coefficients are 0.98 and 0.98, respectively. In total, 57098 
houses and 38626 apartments were listed on the platform for Belgium as a 
whole at the time the data was collected. In addition, a total of 8611 recent 
housing listings and 3621 recent apartment listings were posted on the 
platform at that time. 
3.3 Sample of listings with detailed character istics 
The third dataset used is a sample of 7149 listings posted on the platform 
early December 2013. All the listings were recent listings at the time, i.e. 
they were online at most 15 days when the data was collected. 
Subsequently, the status of all the listings (online vs. offline) was checked 
on weekly basis for 20 weeks. Table 3 reports a brief description of the 
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available listing characteristics and their summary statistics. On top of the 
reported variables, the location of each listed property is also available at 
the level of zip-codes. 
Table 3: sample listings with characteristics 
Variable Description Obs Mean St. Dev. 
category = 1 if house, = 0 if apartment 7149 0.72 0.45 
agency = 1 if the seller is a real estate agency, = 0 otherwise 7149 0.75 0.43 
notary = 1 if the seller is a notary, = 0 otherwise 7149 0.09 0.29 
owner = 1 if the seller is an independent owner, = 0 otherwise 7149 0.16 0.37 
askprice ask-price in euros at time of placement listing 6846 307237 337215 
size living surface of property in sq. m. 4967 171 109 
bedrooms number of bedrooms 6993 2.98 1.23 
weeks online number of weeks a listing was online 7149 14.30 6.61 
offline = 1 if listing offline after 21 weeks, = 0 if still online 7149 0.66 0.48 
 
Table 3 shows that 72% of the listings in the sample are houses and 28% 
apartments. In addition, 75% was listed by a real estate agency, 9% by a 
notary and 16% by independent sellers (for-sale-by-owner). The average 
ask-price for properties is about €300000 which is about €100000 more than 
the price at which properties are actually sold as suggested by table 1 above. 
The average living surface of properties in squared meters is 171, with an 
average of 3 bedrooms. Note that the ask-price, size and number of 
bedrooms is not available for all the listings. Sellers might both deliberately 
or accidentally have withheld this information when posting the property on 
the platform. The average time online was 14.3 weeks. However, this is an 
underestimate of the true average time online given that the observed online 
durations are right censored at 21 weeks (assuming that each listing was 
online 1 week at the start of the observation period). The final row in the 
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table shows that 66% of the listing was offline after 21 weeks, but the 
remaining 34% was still online. 
A few notes are in place here about the institutional setting of the Belgian 
market for real estate compared to, for example, the US market. Firstly, 
there is the role of notaries. A notary is a publicly appointed legal 
administrator who, among other things, is assigned to legally close real 
estate transactions among sellers and buyers. Furthermore, every real estate 
transaction has to be registered by a notary by law. On top of this, notaries 
might also take up the role sellers of real estate. For example, in the case of 
seizures due to failed mortgages, notaries are typically appointed to sell the 
property on behalf of the bank, which usually happens through a public 
auction. Or, notaries might also sell real estate on behalf of sellers who 
request this, in which case they essentially take up the role of a real estate 
agent. Table 1 shows that 9% of the listings in the sample are placed by 
notaries. 
Secondly, buyers are almost never represented by a real estate agent in 
Belgium. This in contrast to the US, for example, where buyers are almost 
always represented by a broker. This can again be explained by the presence 
of notaries. As mentioned, notaries assure that every real estate transaction 
is properly closed by all legal requirements, so there is little incentive for 
buyers to hire an additional intermediary to take up this role. Instead, buyers 
independently search for real estate properties of their interest, usually 
through online listing platforms, like the one described here. Once a buyer 
has taken interest in a property, three scenarios can occur. Firstly, the 
property is put up for sale by an independent seller, in which case the buyer 
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directly contacts the seller. The buyer can visit the property and possibly 
make an offer. If the buyer and the seller come to an agreement, they go to 
a notary to legally close the transaction. Secondly, if the seller hired a real 
estate agent, the buyer deals with the agent to visit the property and bargain 
over the price. If they come to an agreement and the seller also consents, all 
three parties visit a notary to close the transaction. Finally, when a property 
is offered by a notary, the buyer can either visit the public auction at a fixed 
date or the notary takes up the role of a real estate agent on behalf of a seller. 
Especially in the latter case, but also in the former two scenarios, a buyer 
always can employ a notary of his or her choosing if the buyer feels that the 
notary hired by the seller might underrepresent his or her interests. In this 
case the transaction is closed by both notaries, similar to the US where 
buyers and sellers usually each hire a broker. 
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3.4 Platform listing fees 
Table 4 reports the publicly available listing fees charged to sellers for 
placing a real estate advertisement at the online platform. 
Table 4: listing fees 
Properties with an ask price below € 125000 
1 month € 44.9  
2 months € 54.9   
Properties with an ask price above € 125000 
1 month € 54.9  
2 months € 64.9  
3 months € 74.9 "recommended minimum duration" 
4 months € 84.8 "recommended duration" 
6 months € 99.0 "most advantageous" 
12 months € 149.0   
Option PLUS € 44.9 "additional visibility for total duration" 
  € 24.9 "additional visibility for 1 month" 
 
The table shows that sellers can freely choose their listing duration, ranging 
from one month to 12 months and the per-month fee is regressive in the 
listing duration. Listings posted with an ask-price below €125000 get a 
discount, at least for the first two months. Seller can also choose a “plus” 
option, in which case the advertisement receives additional visibility for the 
entire or part of the listing duration. Listings with this option get highlighted 
and are shown at the top of the search page when the relevant search criteria 
are entered. 
Unfortunately, for the listings in the sample described in table 3, the tariff 
sellers chose to list their property is not available. In what follows, it will 
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be assumed a representative seller chooses the recommended duration of 4 
months, which corresponds to a weekly listing fee of €4.8. Also note that 
buyers are never charged to use the platform service in any way. They can 
freely use the technology offered by the platform to search through the 
database of real estate properties under general or very specific search 
criteria of their choosing. 
3.5 Competitive environment of the platform 
The model described in section 2 assumes a monopoly platform. The 
platform under observation, however, although it is by far the largest in 
terms daily visits, is not the only online real estate listing platform active in 
the Belgian market. There are two other noteworthy “general” real estate 
listing platforms that offer a similar service than the platform for which the 
data are available. In addition, there are some “specialized” platforms that 
either focus on a particular type of listings, like luxurious real estate, or 
focus on real estate that is sold in a particular region. Unfortunately, I have 
no detailed listing data available for these competitors. However, by manual 
inspection of the online market structure, I am confident that the following 
description of the nature of platform competition fits the market under 
investigation well.3 
On the buyer-side, all the competitors allow for free buyer participation. 
According to CIM (Centre for Media Information), the weekly visits 
attracted by the platform under investigation is about 5 times the number 
attracted by its largest competitor and about 6 times that of the second 
                                                 
3 See De Smet and Van Cayseele (2010) for a more detailed description of the Belgian 
market for real estate listings. 
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largest competitor.4 So, it seems reasonable to assume that a representative 
buyer first will visit the platform under observation and perhaps in second 
instance will also visit the other webpages to make sure to be fully informed 
about all market offers.  
On the seller-side, most competitors offer free listings (except for some of 
the specialized platforms) and it seems like these platforms make their 
revenues by attracting other types of product advertisers which are 
displayed at the platform webpages. Consequently, the second largest 
competitor attracts about the same amount of listings as the observed 
platform and the second largest competitor attracts about two thirds of this 
amount, as reported on their webpages. It therefore seems reasonable to 
assume that any seller who is willing to pay the fee described in table 4 
above will do so because this platform has the largest base of potential 
buyers. Most of them will also post their listing on the free platforms to 
make sure to get full exposure. In addition, there might be some sellers who 
are not willing to pay the fee and will only post their listing on the free 
platforms. 
In what follows, it will be assumed that the platform under observation 
serves full market demand on both the buyer- and seller-side of the market. 
However, it will not be assumed that the observed fees charged by the 
                                                 
4 CIM reported for the first week of May 2014 that the platform under observation attracted 
240156 “sessions” of visiting buyers. A session starts when a person visits the platform, 
during the session the person searches through the advertisements and the session ends 
when the person leaves the website. One should not think of this number as “unique” buyers 
visiting the platform in a week. If a buyer is searching intensively for real estate he or she 
is expected to visit the platform multiple times a week, or even multiple times a day. For 
the largest competitor 49548 sessions were reported and for the second largest competitor 
39498. 
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platform are necessarily the fees a true monopolist would charge. That is, 
the fees that would be charged when the only outside option to buyers and 
sellers would be simply not to purchase or sell their properties, because 
there is no other way to find a trading partner besides using this particular 
platform. 
Without explicitly modeling them here, some foundations for the observed 
market structure can be found in two-sided markets literature. To start, it is 
well-known from this literature that when participants “multi-home” (use 
multiple platforms) on one or both sides of the market this tends to tends to 
reduce market power compared to the case where competitors can 
exclusively isolate participants on one or both sides of the market (e.g. 
Rochet and Tirole (2003), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and White and 
Weyl (2012)). In the market investigated here, participants on both sides 
multi-home which might explain, despite the fact that one platform clearly 
dominates the market, that market power is limited. 
In addition, De Smet and Van Cayseele (2010) investigate a platform 
business model referred to as “spidering”.  Spidering platforms collect as 
many listings as possible from all individual suppliers in the market, usually 
free of charge and use this gathered information to extract revenue from 
buyer or advertisers. The main competitors of the dominant platform in the 
market under investigation apply this business model. So, they do not 
directly compete with the dominant platform through listing fees, but they 
do provide a valuable outside option to sellers and buyers which again is 
likely to prohibit the listing platform to exploit its dominant position. 
  
73 
 
4 Empirical Analysis 
The analysis in this section proceeds as follows. First a value for all the 
exogenous parameters from the model presented above is derived from the 
data presented in the previous section, imposing additional assumptions 
where necessary for identification. Then, using these parameter values, the 
steady state matching equilibrium is simulated for the observed market 
allocation of buyers and seller. Finally, the counterfactual market outcomes 
are simulated should a Pigouvian planner and a monopolist set the service 
fees. 
4.1 Deriving the model parameters from the data 
Remember from section 2 that the exogenous parameters in the model are: 
 𝐵 and 𝑆, the potential mass of buyers and sellers that participate to 
the platform, respectively. 
 𝛼 and 𝛾, the search and listing intensities of buyers and sellers, 
respectively. 
 1 − 𝛽 and 𝛽, the bargaining weight of buyers and sellers, 
respectively. 
 The distributional parameters of 𝑏 ~ 𝐹𝐵(𝑏) and 𝑠 ~ 𝐹𝑆(𝑠), the 
buyer valuations and the reservation prices for a homogeneous real 
estate property. 
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4.1.1 Market size 
To start, based on the administrative data reported in table 1, the total 
amount of sales of houses and apartments on weekly basis across the 
country in 2013 can be calculated: 
(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 +  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠)/52 = 2336 
This value is used as a proxy for both the mass of buyers 𝐵 and sellers 𝑆 
that potentially patronize the listing platform on weekly basis. Note that this 
implicitly assumes that all buyers and sellers that contemplate purchasing 
or selling a property, respectively, will actually do so, either through the 
observed platform or through one of the competing matching channels, but 
no one remains unmatched. I thus ignore any buyers (sellers) that, for 
example, make a tradeoff between purchasing (selling) or renting and 
eventually make the decision to rent. The assumed market size should thus 
be interpreted as a conservative lower bound. In addition, assuming 𝐵 and 
𝑆 are equal ignores any short-run fluctuations in the market and all results 
should be interpreted as long-run outcomes in which the market must be 
balanced. Consistently the matching outcomes and welfare analysis is 
evaluated at the simulated long-run steady state equilibrium, as discussed in 
greater detail below. 
4.1.2 Listing and search intensities  
Now, given that buyers are never charged for the service, assume that all 
buyers participate in the market through the observed listing platform. That 
is 𝑁𝐵 = 𝐵 = 2366.  
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The amount of sellers that participate 𝑁𝑆, which will be smaller than 𝑆 given 
that the weekly listing fee 𝑃𝑆 = €4.8 is positive, is not directly observable. 
A proxy, however, can be obtained for the number of novel listings being 
posted on weekly basis on the platform, 𝛾𝑁𝑆. More specifically, using that 
a snapshot of the number of recent listings posted on the platform (that were 
online at most 15 days at this point) is observed in the cross section of total 
listings reported in table 2, the number of novel listings posted on weekly 
basis can be calculated as follows: 
(((𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠) ∗ (1
− (1/𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠) ∗ 2))/15) ∗ 7 
To obtain a value for this, a proxy for the average listing duration is 
required, which in turn can be obtained from the listing sample reported in 
table 3. The table shows that an average listing in the sample was online 
14.3 weeks. This value is biased, however, given that the observation period 
is right censored at 20 weeks. Using standard survival analysis techniques, 
of which the details can be found in appendix 2.A, the online duration 
should the sample not be censored can be predicted, which results in a 
predicted value of 21.03 weeks. This in turn results in an estimate of a total 
of 5166 new listings being posted at the platform every week, i.e. 𝛾𝑁𝑆 =
5166. 
A proxy for 𝛾, and thus for 𝑁𝑆, is simultaneously identified with the 
distributional parameters using the inverse demand equation for sellers (9), 
which can be written as: 
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𝑝𝑆 = 𝛾𝑃𝑆
𝑁𝑆
𝑀
= 𝛽 (∫ 𝑏𝑓𝐵(𝑏)𝑑𝑏
𝑏𝐻
𝑏𝐿
− 𝐹𝑆
−1
(𝑁𝑆/𝑆))           (26) 
in which the expected match duration of sellers 𝑁𝑆/𝑀 is proxied by the 
predicted listing duration, 𝑁𝑆/𝑀 = 21.03, and using that 𝑃𝑆 = 4.8 and 
𝑁𝑆 = 5166/𝛾. 
Once 𝑁𝑆, 𝑁𝐵 and 𝑁𝑆/𝑀 are known, the buyer search intensity parameter 
𝛼 follows from rewriting the matching function (16): 
𝛼 = − ln (1 −
𝑀
𝑁𝑆
)
𝑁𝑆
𝑁𝐵
                                          (27)  
4.1.3 Bargaining weights 
Remember that the surplus when a seller type 𝑠 and a buyer type 𝑏 are 
matched is assumed to be efficiently divided among both parties through 
Nash-bargaining over the sales price. For simplicity, and given that there is 
no data available to get a proxy on this, assume that the bargaining game is 
symmetric. That is, the bargaining weight of both buyers and sellers is one 
half: 𝛽 = 1 − 𝛽 = 0.5. One could argue this assumption is reasonable given 
that buyers and sellers in real estate markets are essentially the same 
persons, merely taking up the role of buyer or seller at a different place at a 
different time, such that on aggregate the bargaining weights should balance 
out. However, other factors might play a role as well, like underlying 
asymmetries in reservation values or differences in information availability 
when taking up a different role, as well as the cyclical state of the market. 
For example, when the market is tight on the buyer-side, buyers perhaps 
possess more bargaining power than sellers. Harding, Rosenthal and 
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Sirmans (2003) and Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) formally analyze the 
determinants of bargaining weights across buyers and sellers. 
4.1.4 Distributional parameters 
For symmetric bargaining weights the expression for the sales price 
bargained between a seller type 𝑠 and a buyer type 𝑏 for symmetric 
bargaining weights reduces to: 
𝜌(𝑏, 𝑠) =
1
2
(𝑏 + 𝑠)                                          (28) 
In addition, assume that the valuation of buyers for the real estate good is 
uniformly distributed over the interval [𝑏𝐿 , 𝑏𝐻] and that the reservation 
price of sellers to provide the good to the market is uniformly distributed 
over the interval [𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐻]. Furthermore, assume that the lower bound of 
buyer values is restricted such that 𝑏𝐿 =
1
2
(𝑠𝐿 + 𝑠𝐻) and that the upper 
bound of seller reservation prices is restricted to be 𝑠𝐻 =
1
2
(𝑏𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻). 
These assumptions imply that the distributions of buyer values and seller 
reservation prices can be summarized in the following scheme: 
 
                         𝑠𝐿                   𝑏𝐿 =
1
2
(𝑠𝐿 + 𝑠𝐻)      𝑠𝐻 =
1
2
(𝑏𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻)            𝑏𝐻 
0 << _____|________________|________________|________________|_____ >> ∞ 
                                                                                    |    
                                                                    ?̃? =
1
2
(𝑏𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻) − 2𝑝𝑆    
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Note that the distributional parameters are chosen such that for free 
participation on both sides (𝑝𝑆 = 𝑝𝐵 = 0) all potential sellers and all 
potential buyers will participate at the platform. However, as soon as the fee 
becomes positive on either side, some users will no longer participate. On 
the buyer-side, when 𝑝𝐵 becomes positive, low value buyers will drop out 
first. On the seller-side, high reservation price sellers will decide not to 
participate when the listing fee becomes larger. From the data it is known 
that buyers are never charged, so they all participate, as was also assumed 
to derive the matching parameters. Sellers do are charged a listing fee in 
practice and hence they will not all participate. Only sellers with a 
reservation price smaller than or equal to ?̃? participate and by the present 
assumptions ?̃? =
1
2
(𝑏𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻) − 2𝑝𝑆, as also illustrated in the scheme 
above. So, the larger the listing fee, the fewer sellers post a listing on the 
platform. 
Now, what do the assumptions of uniformly distributed buyer values and 
seller reservation prices imply for the distribution of sales price predicted 
by the model? To see this, first consider the case where all buyers and sellers 
participate at the platform (𝑝𝑆 = 𝑝𝐵 = 0). Matching is assumed to be 
random, so 𝑏 and 𝑠 can be considered as i.i.d. random variables. We also 
know that 𝜌 =
1
2
(𝑏 + 𝑠), so the sales price is a fraction of the sum of two 
i.i.d. continuous uniform random variables. As formalized by Grinstead and 
Snell (1997), for example, this implies the sales price is distributed by a 
triangular distribution. Denote the density of the distribution of 𝜌 as 𝑔(. ), 
which can be summarized as: 
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𝑔(𝜌) =
4
(𝑏𝐻 − 𝑏𝐿)(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿)
(𝜌 −
𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐿
2
) , if 
𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐿
2
≤ 𝜌 ≤
𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻
2
   
𝑔(𝜌) =
4
(𝑏𝐻 − 𝑏𝐿)(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿)
(
𝑠𝐻 + 𝑏𝐻
2
− 𝜌) , if 
𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻
2
≤ 𝜌 ≤
𝑠𝐻 + 𝑏𝐻
2
 
𝑔(𝜌) = 0,   otherwise                                                                                      (29) 
Note that expression (29) implies that the minimum sales price in the market 
is equal to 𝜌𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
1
2
(𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐿), the maximum sales price satisfies 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1
2
(𝑠𝐻 + 𝑏𝐻) and the density reaches its top at 𝜌𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 =
1
2
(𝑠𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻).  
For the case not all sellers participate, 𝑠𝐻 in expression (29) should be 
substituted for ?̃? =
1
2
(𝑏𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻) − 2𝑝𝑆, in which case the density of 𝜌 not 
only depends on the distribution parameters 𝑠𝐿 , 𝑏𝐿 , 𝑠𝐻  and 𝑏𝐻, but also on 
the listing fee 𝑝𝑆. By also using the assumptions that 𝑏𝐿 =
1
2
(𝑠𝐿 + 𝑠𝐻) and 
𝑠𝐻 =
1
2
(𝑏𝐿 + 𝑏𝐻) and using expression (26), it follows that observing 𝜌𝑚𝑖𝑛 
and 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑥 suffices to calculate the four distribution parameters, 
𝑠𝐿 , 𝑏𝐿 , 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑏𝐻, and the seller listing intensity parameter 𝛾. 
To obtain a proxy for 𝜌𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑥, I use the observed distribution of ask 
prices available from the listing sample reported in table 3. Two important 
issues have to be addressed here. Firstly, that the posted ask prices do not 
necessarily correspond with the eventual sales prices once the properties are 
sold. Furthermore, comparing the average actual sales prices in table 1 to 
the average ask-price in table 3 suggests that ask-prices are systematically 
higher that actual sales prices. To account for this, the average ask-price is 
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calculated within the categories of houses and apartments and this is 
compared to the averages of actual sales prices. The ratio of sales price to 
ask-price for houses is about 0.80 and for apartments 0.86. This ratio is 
multiplied by the observed ask-price for each listing to get a proxy for the 
“expected sales price”. 
A second important issue is that real estate properties are not homogeneous 
in practice, as is assumed in the model. To control for the heterogeneous 
composition of the housing stock a hedonic price regression is estimated, in 
the spirit of Rosen (1974), with the expected sales price as dependent 
variable and the observable seller and property characteristics as covariates. 
The details of this regression can be found in appendix 2.B.  The regression 
results shows that when controlling for property category (house or 
apartment), seller type (broker, notary or independent seller), property size 
and detailed location can explain up to 70% of the variation in expected 
sales prices. The remaining 30% of the variation will be interpreted as 
variation that comes from underlying buyer and seller heterogeneities in 
their valuations and reservation prices. To do so, the residuals of the hedonic 
regression are stored and added up by the average predicted value of the 
expected sales price across the sample to obtain a “composition adjusted” 
distribution of the expected sales price. To avoid biased results due to 
outliers, the minimum expected sales price, 𝜌𝑚𝑖𝑛 in the model, is proxied 
by the 5th percentile of the distribution of the composition adjusted expected 
sales price. Similarly, the maximum expected sales price, 𝜌𝑚𝑎𝑥 in the 
model, is assumed to correspond to the 95th percentile. 
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The grey line in figure 1 plots the Kernel density estimate of the observed 
distribution of the composition adjusted expected sales price, truncated at 
the 5th and 95th percentile. The black line plots the estimated distribution 
when constructed by the model.  
Figure 1: Observed and estimated distribution of composition adjusted expected sales 
prices 
 
The figure suggests that the assumption of linear buyer and seller demand 
fits the data reasonable well, although there is clearly still room for 
improvement. I use this linear approximation because it allows me to 
identify the listing intensity parameter 𝛾, and thus the amount of sellers that 
participate in the market 𝑁𝑆, jointly with the distribution parameters. With 
richer data for Belgian real estate brokerage industry, chapter 4 of this 
dissertation presents a more refined specification of buyer and seller 
preferences derived from an observed distribution of sales prices, which 
unfortunately cannot be applied here by the limited data availability.  
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4.1.5 Obtained model parameters 
Table 5 reports the values for all the model parameters obtained from the 
described procedure. 
Table 5: model parameters 
𝑵 = 𝑺 𝒂 𝜸 𝜷 𝒔𝑳 𝒃𝑳 𝒔𝑯 𝒃𝑯 
2336 0.051 2.22 0.5 66897 184720 302540 420350 
 
The results show that the search intensity parameter for buyers is 0.51, 
which implies that it takes about 1/𝛼 ≈ 20 days for buyer to find a valuable 
trading platform on the platform. The listing intensity parameter is 2.22 
which implies that an average listing is posted more than twice on the 
platform. More loosely interpreted this suggests that there are many listings 
present on the platform that never result in a match. For example, some 
sellers might post their listing independently first and subsequently through 
a broker or vice versa, which results in two posted listings but only one 
match. Or, sellers might re-post the same listing to maintain the tag “new 
listing”. In addition, some sellers might post a listing without the intension 
to sell, just to explore the market value of their property, or may decide to 
rent their property instead of selling after a while. Whatever the underlying 
reason, the model assumes that none of the listings that eventually will 
remain unmatched cause additional congestion for the matching process. 
Should these listings cause additional congestion, the estimated matching 
elasticities reported below would be more unbalanced with a lower value 
for sellers and a higher value for buyers, which should be kept in mind. 
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In addition, table 5 shows that the reservation price of providing their 
(composition adjusted) real estate property to the market for sellers ranges 
from about €67000 to €300000. The valuation of buyers for the good ranges 
from approximately €185000 to €420000. Given that these values are large 
in magnitude compared to per-match listing fee that is incurred by sellers, 
𝑝𝑆 = 𝛾𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑆/𝑀 = €227, the model predicts that there is almost full 
participation on the seller side: 𝑁𝑆/𝑆 = 2332/2336 = 0.99. 
The estimated parameter values seem reasonable given the institutional and 
competitive setting described in section 3. By nature of the service the 
listing platform provides, additional revenues are made for every listing that 
is attracted and the platform is not necessarily concerned whether or not a 
listing actually results in the sale of a property, which can explain the large 
amount of “double” listings. In addition, the platform must keep the listing 
fees low to protect its dominant position in the market, which explains the 
large seller participation rate. A Pigouvian planner, in contrast, not only 
cares about the private platform revenues, but also about the number of 
matches that result from the platform service and about the surplus that 
these matches generate, which will result in very different socially optimal 
fees, than the ones observed in practice. Before turning to the derivation of 
the socially optimal service fees, however, the following subsection first 
simulates the steady state matching outcomes given the observed market 
allocation. 
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4.2 Steady state matching outcomes 
The matching process until now was analyzed as a one-shot matching game, 
while in practice it is a dynamic process. Not just once, but every week 
about 5000 novel listings are posted on the platform and about 2300 new 
potential buyers enter the platform. Furthermore, sellers and buyers that 
were unmatched in a certain period not necessarily immediately leave the 
platform. Sellers have a contract with the platform about the listing duration 
and buyers are likely to search longer than one week. On the other hand, 
they will not stay on the platform forever and at some point buyers and 
sellers will be matched through one of the alternative matching channels 
available in the market (remember that almost all buyers and seller multi-
home). 
Assuming that buyers and sellers leave the platform after the same time 
period, the duration until exit can be simulated using the estimated 
parameter values and the observable snapshot of total amount of listings 
being posted on the platform, reported in table 2. More specifically, if at 
any given point in time there are 95724 listings posted on the platform, as 
shows by the table, it must be that buyers and sellers stay on the platform 
about 50 weeks for this number to be consistent with the predicted weekly 
matching outcomes. Figure 2 illustrates the convergence to the steady state 
outcome, starting from the one-shot matching game with 2332 sellers, 2336 
buyers, a buyer search intensity of 0.05 and assuming that sellers and buyers 
exit after 50 weeks. 
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Figure 2: long-run outcomes repeated matching game 
 
The figure shows that under this scenario the unique number of sellers that 
post listings on the platform converges to about 43000, which multiplied by 
the estimated listing intensity parameter 𝛾 = 2.22 is consistent with a 
steady state stock of listings of about 96000. In addition, the figure shows 
that that in the long-run there must also be about 43000 unique buyers 
searching the platform, which follows from the assumption that the market 
must be balanced (there can be no excessive stock of buyers and sellers). 
Given that there are about 240000 weekly visits are being logged on the 
platform, this suggests that an active buyer on average visits the platform 
about 5.5 times a week, which seems reasonable. Finally, the figure shows 
that the steady-state amount of matches generated through the platform 
converges towards 2150, which implies that a fraction 2150/2336 = 0.92 
of the total amount of matches that occur in the market are established 
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through the observed listing platform. This again seems reasonable given 
the described institutional and competitive setting. 
These numbers can also be used to calculate the steady state matching 
elasticities for buyers and sellers using expression (18) and that the steady 
state matching efficiency of buyers is 𝛼𝑁𝐵/𝑀 = 1.02. This results in a 
predicted matching elasticity for sellers of 𝜙𝑆 = 0.43 and for buyers of 
𝜙𝐵 = 0.57. So, the platform is more efficient in matching buyers than 
sellers, but not that match. As noted above, accounting for the fact that some 
of the ‘redundant’ listings on the platform potentially cause additional 
congestion for the matching process would result in more unbalance 
estimates for the matching elasticities towards a lower value of 𝜙𝑆 and a 
higher value of 𝜙𝐵. 
4.3 Market distortions 
Now that all the model parameters and steady state matching outcomes are 
known, the socially optimal listing fees can be calculated. To do so, the 
system of equations (24)-(25) reported in proposition 2.2 can be solved for 
the socially optimal allocation of buyers and sellers, which in turn is 
substituted in the expressions for inverse demand. Similarly, the optimal 
monopoly outcome follows from equations (21-22) in proposition 2.1. 
Table 6 shows the results. 
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Table 6: observed, socially optimal and monopoly outcomes 
  Observed outcome Socially optimal outcome Monopoly outcome 
𝑵𝑺/𝑺 0.99 0.70 0.47 
𝒑𝑺 227 46860 90149 
𝑵𝑩/𝑩 1 0.80 0.53 
𝒑𝑩 0 41503 86578 
𝑴 2150 1645 1097 
𝝋𝑺 0.57 0.57 0.57 
𝝋𝑩 0.43 0.43 0.43 
welfare 253760000 290785000 258480000 
SS 126390000 68290000 30351000 
BS 126880000 77105000 34269000 
π 487000 145390000 193860000 
 
The top rows in table 6 show that a Pigouvian planner would charge a much 
higher fee to both sellers and buyers than is currently observed in practice. 
The planner would attract only 70% of all potential sellers and 80% of 
potential buyers by charging them a per-match fee of about €47000 and 
€42000, respectively, rather than attracting approximately 100% of all 
sellers and buyers as is currently the case. As a result only a fraction 
1645/2336 = 0.70 out of the potential matches would occur through the 
platform. In addition, the last column in table 6 shows that a monopoly 
platform would charge an even higher fee than the social planner and would 
only attract 47% of the potential sellers and 53% of the potential buyers. 
The bottom rows in table 6 show the amount of social value generated under 
the three scenarios and how this surplus is divided among the three parties 
of interest. Moving from the observed to the Pigouvian outcome would raise 
total surplus generated in the market on weekly basis from approximately 
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€254 million to €291 million. The main beneficiary of this transition would 
be the platform who’s profits are raised vastly. The surplus attributed to 
sellers and buyers would be reduced, from €126 million to €68 million and 
from €127 million to €77 million, respectively. Whether a regulator would 
be willing to allow for such redistributions in surplus is of course a 
normative question. The monopoly outcome compared to the socially 
optimal outcome would further transfer surplus from both buyers and sellers 
to the platform and there would be a deadweight loss of about €32 million. 
Note, however, that the monopoly outcome comes closer to the social 
optimum than the observed market outcome. So, the results suggest that 
competition under the current market structure is too strong to appropriately 
account for the network externalities inherent to a one-to-one matching 
market.  
Two final notes are in place about the results in table 6. Firstly, the outcomes 
are calculated for a constant buyer search intensity parameter 𝛼 and seller 
listing intensity parameter 𝛾. There is no reason to believe, however, why 
this parameter would remain constant when the allocation of buyers and 
sellers changes, especially when major shifts in the allocation would be 
carried through as proposed in table 6. For example, it might well be that 
buyers change their search behavior if less listings are available on the 
platform. I expect that buyers would start searching more intensively 
because of the increased per-period fee and increased competition among 
each other, which would be reflected in an increase of 𝛼. This would imply 
that the required increase in the fee charged to buyers would be less than 
the one calculated in table 6 to establish the social optimum. Similarly, 
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should the listing fee charged to sellers increase, the search intensity of 
sellers would be likely to decrease, mitigating the loss in surplus to sellers 
estimated in table 6. 
Secondly, the distribution parameters are calculated based on the residual 
variation in expected sales prices that could not be explained by the 
observables. The hedonic regression reported in appendix 2.B explains 
about 70% of the variation and the remaining 30% was interpreted as 
variation coming from underlying buyer and seller heterogeneities. 
Although property size and location are probably the most important 
attributes that explain the variation in property prices, there are other 
qualitative characteristics that are observable, but not taken up in the 
analysis. Examples of characteristics that do are observed in practice are the 
age of a property, whether or not it was recently renovated, whether or not 
there is a garden or a terrace, etc. Taking up these characteristics in the 
hedonic regression would reduce the estimated spreads between 𝑏𝐿 and 𝑏𝐻 
and 𝑠𝐿 and 𝑠𝐻. This in turn would render demand being more price elastic 
than currently estimated and would result in lower socially optimal and 
monopoly fees than reported in table 6. 
For both these reasons the counterfactual fees should be interpreted as the 
upper bound of the actual fees that are required to establish the optimal 
allocations. Given that the current estimates are quantitatively large, 
however, neither of the reducing effects is expected to reverse the important 
qualitative result that the platform service fees are currently too low 
compared to the social optimum. 
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5 Conclusions 
The first goal of this chapter was to apply the general platform pricing 
model developed in chapter 1 to the setting of a matchmaker that offers a 
listing service in a market for residential real estate. To do so, the model of 
chapter 1 was extended to allow for bargaining between matched buyers 
and sellers, such that the sales price of real estate properties is endogenously 
determined in the model. In addition, particular assumptions were imposed 
on the matching technology of the platform and the distributions of buyer 
and seller preferences, such that quantitative predictions could be made 
about the model outcomes for given parameter values. The second goal of 
this chapter was to take the model to the data. Data were collected from the 
largest online real estate platform in Belgium, based on which all the 
relevant parameters of the model were estimated or calculated. Then, using 
these parameter values, the observed market outcomes could be compared 
to the counterfactual outcomes of a Pigouvian planner and monopolist that 
optimally set the listing fee charged to sellers.  
The results suggest that the observed service fees charged to buyers and 
sellers are significantly below the fees a Pigouvian planner would charge. 
The intuition is that the negative externalities that result from the matching 
and bargaining process are currently insufficiently internalized in the 
service fees. A monopolist would set even higher fees than the social 
planner. Nevertheless, the calculated monopoly outcome comes closer to 
the socially optimum than the observed outcome in practice. The results 
therefore suggest that, despite the fact that the observed platform clearly 
dominates the market, it can insufficiently exploit this dominant position in 
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its fee setting to efficiently run the listing service by the presence of latent 
competition of alternative search channels available to buyers and sellers. 
Quantitatively, the results should be interpreted with some caution. To be 
able to get a good and realistic estimate of the listing fees that would 
maximize social value generated in the market some further investigation is 
required. Providing sensitivity analysis for different assumptions made to 
derive the relevant model parameters is an important next step. In addition 
extending the model to allow for endogenous search and listing intensities 
is a promising direction for further investigation to obtain more nuanced 
results. 
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Appendix 2.A: Survival analysis 
Table 3 in the main text shows that the average time a listing in the sample 
was online was 14.3 weeks. However, the observation period was 
terminated after 21 weeks, at which point 34% of the listings was still 
online. This problem can be viewed as a standard problem of right censored 
duration data. The expected time online taking the censoring into account 
can be calculated using standard duration analysis techniques. More 
specifically, the weekly survivor function of listings (when a listing is taken 
offline means death) can be estimated non-parametrically following Kaplan 
and Meier (1958) up to the censoring point. Beyond this point the survivor 
function can be extended to zero by using an exponentially fit curve and the 
"extended mean” of survival (or expected time online) can be calculated 
from the surface below the entire survivor function, following Klein and 
Moeschberger (2003).5 
The expected time online that follows from this procedure is 21.03 weeks, 
which is significantly above the sample average of 14.3 weeks. Figure A.1 
plots the estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor function with the exponential 
extension, suggesting that this specification to estimate the extended mean 
seems reasonable.  
                                                 
5 See, Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez and Marchenko (2010) for a useful practical guide to 
implement this procedure in Stata. 
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Figure A.1: Kaplan-Meier survivor function of online listing durations with exponential 
extension 
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Appendix 2.B: Hedonic regression 
Table B.1 reports the results for the OLS estimates, controlling for possibly 
heteroskedastic standard errors, of the expected sales price on various 
covariates. 
Table B.1: hedonic regressions expected sales price 
Dependent variable: 
expected sales price        
Covariates: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
category 50215 52482 -67149 -36655 -31225 
 (3563) (3586) (4641) (4483) (4680) 
agency  12504 9205 4402 4759 
  (4269) (3798) (3508) (3604) 
notary  -41367 -6020 -11450 -8100 
  (6150) (12139) (12040) (8336) 
bedrooms   17686 14631 12314 
   (2798) (2643) (2708) 
size   1072 1038 1025 
   (50) (48) (48) 
district dummies No No No Yes No 
zip-code dummies No No No No Yes 
constant 196847 187967 47836 69252 134005 
  (2707) (4253) (6041) (6813) (22645) 
𝑅2 0,023 0,030 0,469 0,556 0,709 
obs 6712 6712 4735 4735 4735 
 
The first column in table B.1 shows that houses on average are expected to 
sell more expensively compared to apartments. The second column in 
addition controls for seller type. Real estate agents are expected sell at a 
higher price and notaries at a lower price compared to independent sellers. 
However, these differences become insignificant when controlling for 
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additional property characteristics. Column 3 controls for property size by 
taking up the number of bedrooms and living surface. Note that the 
coefficient of category becomes negative and significant when controlling 
for size. So, per square meter of living surface, apartments are expected to 
be more expensive than houses. Finally, columns 4 and 5 control for the 
location of properties at the level of districts and zip-codes, respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Proportional Service Fees as a Selection Tool1 
 
1 Introduction 
In a broad range of markets, the use of fees charged proportional to an 
observed outcome of market transactions, possibly combined with a flat fee, 
is prevalent among some service providers that facilitate transactions, 
whereas others refrain from charging a proportional fee and simply charge 
a uniform price for their service. For example, real estate brokers in the US 
typically charge a commission rate up to 6% proportional to the sales price 
of properties, recently often combined with a flat fee component (e.g. Hsieh 
and Moretti (2003), USDOJ-FTC report (2007)2). Credit card issuers like 
Visa and MasterCard typically charge a proportional fee ranging from 1% 
to 2.5%, sometimes combined with a small per-transaction fee, whereas 
debit card issuers usually charge a flat per-transaction fee, although for the 
latter there has recently also been a shift towards the use of proportional 
fees (e.g. Shy and Wang (2011), Wang and Wright (2014)). Online market 
places like eBay and Amazon usually charge a relatively large proportional 
                                                 
1 This chapter is single-authored and presents new material, although some parts of the 
analysis already appeared in a previous working paper version of Goos, Van Cayseele and 
Willekens (2014) in different form. By limitation of space and a different focus, however, 
we decided to drop the analysis from that paper and it is therefore treated now as a separate 
chapter in this dissertation. 
2 See Delcoure and Miller (2002) for an overview of real estate brokerage fees charged in 
other industrialized countries. 
98 
 
fee and small flat fee per transaction (e.g. Amazon typically charges 15% + 
$1.35, as reported by Wang and Wright (2014)). Apple and Google charge 
application developers a fee up to 30% and no flat fee (e.g. Muthers and 
Wismer (2012)). Labor market intermediaries sometimes charge a fee 
proportional to the wage of a worker, like temporary help agencies and 
headhunters, but other agencies often only charge a flat fee for a job 
placement. More traditional market places like shopping malls, festivals and 
amusement parks that also connect consumers/visitors and merchants rarely 
charge proportional fees. Other examples of platforms that connect different 
types of consumer groups in return for a flat per-transaction fee can be found 
in the two-sided markets literature (e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), 
Rysman (2009), Evans and Schmalensee (2013)). 
A natural question that arises is why some service providers charge solely 
a proportional fee, some charge a fee with both a flat component and a 
proportional component, whereas others simply charge a flat per-
transaction fee. This chapter sheds new light on this question by modeling  
a monopoly service provider that aims to attract consumers that are 
heterogeneous in two dimensions. One dimension of consumer 
heterogeneity becomes observable to the monopolist once the service is 
provided and the service provider possibly charges a fee proportional to its 
revealed value. The other dimension of heterogeneity never becomes 
revealed to the monopolist and remains private information to consumers. 
The valuation of consumers is allowed to flexibly depend on both consumer 
types and the service provider possibly also charges a flat fee on top of (or 
instead of) the proportional fee. 
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In this setting, it is shown that the service provider only charges a positive 
proportional when the usage of such a fee results in “advantageous 
selection” of consumers into the market and will refrain from using this fee 
type when it induces “adverse selection”. Advantageous selection occurs 
when consumers with the highest observable types are also the ones with 
the highest willingness to pay for the service. I use the terminology 
“adverse” and “advantageous” selection given the equivalence of its use in 
the information economics literature (e.g. Akerlof (1970)). For example, an 
insurance market is typically said to be characterized with adverse 
(advantageous) selection when consumers with the highest (lowest) 
willingness to pay are also the ones most costly to serve. Equivalently, in 
the present setting I interpret the market to be characterized by adverse 
(advantageous) selection when consumers with the highest (lowest) 
valuation for the service are the ones least (most) valuable to the service 
provider, reflected by a low (high) value of the observable consumer type. 
On top of the selection effect of marginal versus inframarginal consumers, 
it is shown that the usage of a proportional fee also unambiguously induces 
“adverse sorting” within the group of marginal consumers attracted by the 
monopolist. The importance of this sorting effect at the margin has only 
recently been emphasized in the literature on selection markets by Veiga 
and Weyl (2013a,b) and only appears in the presence of multidimensional 
consumer heterogeneities. In the present setting, sorting within the group of 
marginal consumers (who all have the same unobserved type) is 
unambiguously adverse because consumers with the highest disutility for 
the proportional fee (those with the highest observable types) are also the 
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ones most valuable to the service provider, which makes the monopolist 
reluctant to use the proportional fee. Intuitively, it is shown that only a 
proportional fee and no flat fee is used when the intensive advantageous 
selection effect outweighs the adverse sorting effect at the margin. If not, 
the service provider uses both fee types (or only a flat fee when there is 
adverse selection). These stylized results are further illustrated using two 
specific examples. One of a competitive labor market in which workers 
receive a wage and fringe benefits, where an intermediate service provider 
can only charge a fee contingent on the wage and not the benefits. The other 
of a competitive multiple goods market with proportional consumer demand 
à la Wang and Wright (2014) extended to allow for fixed consumer benefits. 
A second important question is how the use of proportional fees affects 
welfare. It is shown that a Pigouvian planner never charges a proportional 
fee, independent of the selection and sorting effects it induces, and always 
simply equates the flat fee to marginal cost. The rationale for this is well-
known from the monopoly third-degree price discrimination literature (e.g. 
Schmalensee (1981), Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010)). When the 
marginal cost of serving different consumer groups is the same, charging 
different prices across consumer groups results in a “misallocation effect” 
and is socially inefficient. To explore whether or not the use of a 
proportional fee by a private monopolist is socially harmful, I further build 
on established results from this literature. It is shown that the welfare effects 
of allowing a monopolist to use a proportional fee are identical to allowing 
a monopolist to third degree price discriminate when there are only two 
observable consumer types. This result does not generalizes to a setting with 
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multiple or a continuum of observable consumer types, however, given that 
a monopolist that can only use two pricing instruments (a flat and 
proportional fee) to discriminate across more than two consumer groups is 
more restricted than a monopolist that can freely charge a different uniform 
price for each of these consumer groups. I am still working on conditions 
under which the usage of proportional fees tends to reinforce or mitigate the 
familiar welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination. 
In the literature, there is a recent strand of research that addresses the 
question why service providers make use of proportional fees, usually 
applied to a specific market in which the usage of such fees is common. For 
example, Loertscher and Niedermayer (2012, 2013) investigate the 
effectiveness of the use of proportional fees in a dynamic random matching 
model with buyer-seller bargaining with an application to real estate 
brokerage. Shy and Wang (2011) provide a rationale for payment card 
networks to use proportional fees when merchants possess market power. 
Muthers and Wismer (2012) justify the use of proportional fees in online 
market places as a commitment instrument for platforms not engage in 
competition with attracted merchants.  
Wang and Wright (2014) justify the use by the argument that it allows for 
efficient price discrimination. As in the present paper, Wang and Wright 
(2014) also establish the link between proportional fee pricing and third-
degree price discrimination. Furthermore, in their specific model of a 
multiple goods market with proportional consumer demand the equivalence 
holds for any number of goods being traded in the market. As argued above, 
however, this result does not hold in general. 
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Notably, both Loertscher and Niedermayer (2013) and Wang and Wright 
(2014) address an even broader question than the one investigated here in 
the sense that they investigate under which conditions the use of a “linear” 
or “affine” service fee (consisting of a flat and proportional component) is 
preferred over a more complex ad valorem fee schedule. In both papers 
these conditions are linked to the properties of the one-dimensional 
distributions of valuations of attracted consumers. 
In contrast, the present paper takes as given that the service fee consists of 
a simple flat and proportional component and instead allows for more 
flexible two-dimensional consumer types of which one dimension never 
becomes revealed to the service provider. None of the aforementioned 
papers allows for this and therefore the selection and sorting effects 
emphasized here do not appear in these papers. As mentioned, these effects 
have only recently been uncovered for selection markets by Veiga and Weyl 
(2013a,b), who are able establish their results by proposing a new 
methodology to tackle complicated multi-dimensional screening problems 
by using simple calculus through a generalized version of Leibniz’s integral 
rule. This methodology is also applied to establish the results in the present 
paper. 
The remainder of this chapter is built up as follows. Section two presents 
the model. Section 3 analyses the monopoly outcomes. Section 4 presents 
the welfare analysis. Section 5 discusses extensions and section 6 
concludes. 
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2 Model 
Consider a monopolist that provides a service in a market with a unit mass 
of potential consumers. Consumers have two-dimensional types, denoted 
by the vector (𝜃, 𝜇) ∈ [𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻] × [𝜇𝐿 , 𝜇𝐻] ⊆ ℝ0
+ × ℝ, distributed according 
to the density function 𝑓(𝜃, 𝜇), assumed differentiable in both arguments. 
Consumer willingness to pay for the service is given by the function 𝑣(𝜃, 𝜇), 
differentiable in both arguments. Assume 𝜃 can be expressed in monetary 
terms, while 𝜇 can take on both a monetary or a non-pecuniary subjective 
value. The nature of the service is such that 𝜃 and 𝜇 are both private 
information to consumers ex ante, when the fee charged in return for the 
service is announced by the monopolist and when consumers subsequently 
decide whether or not to purchase the service. However, ex post the value 
of 𝜃 becomes observable to the monopolist once the service is provided 
(while 𝜇 remains private information) and the service fee is possibly 
contingent on the revealed value of 𝜃. More specifically, assume that the 
service fee consists of two components, a flat component 𝑇, referred to as 
the flat fee, and a proportional component 𝑡, referred to as the proportional 
fee, such that consumer utility can be written as: 
𝑢(𝑇, 𝑡) = 𝑣(𝜃, 𝜇) − 𝑡𝜃 − 𝑇                                      (1) 
For the exposition of the model, and in the examples used to illustrate the 
model below, I maintain the assumption that 𝑣(𝜃, 𝜇) is monotonically 
increasing in 𝜇, such that consumers participate when 𝜇 ≥ 𝑣−1(𝜃, 𝑇 +
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𝑡𝜃) ≡ ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃).3 As formalized by Veiga and Weyl (2014a), demand can 
then be expressed as the following iterated integral: 
𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡) = ∫ ∫ 𝑓(𝜃, 𝜇)𝑑𝜇𝑑𝜃
𝜇𝐻
?̂?(𝑇,𝑡,𝜃)
𝜃𝐻
𝜃𝐿
                               (2) 
Assume that the monopolist incurs a constant marginal cost 𝑐 ≥ 0, such that 
profits of the service provider can be expressed as: 
𝜋(𝑇, 𝑡) = (𝑇 + 𝑡?̅?(𝑇, 𝑡) − 𝑐)𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡)                              (3) 
where ?̅?(𝑇, 𝑡) denotes the average observable consumer type, defined as: 
?̅?(𝑇, 𝑡) ≡
1
𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡)
∫ ∫ 𝜃𝑓(𝜃, 𝜇)𝑑𝜇𝑑𝜃
𝜇𝐻
?̂?(𝑇,𝑡,𝜃)
𝜃𝐻
𝜃𝐿
                      (4) 
Total social value generated in the market, defined as the sum of total 
consumer utility and profits, is equal to: 
𝑊(𝑇, 𝑡) = ∫ ∫ 𝑣(𝜃, 𝜇)𝑓(𝜃, 𝜇)𝑑𝜇𝑑𝜃
𝜇𝐻
?̂?(𝑇,𝑡,𝜃)
𝜃𝐻
𝜃𝐿
− 𝑐𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡)         (5) 
Before turning to the optimal pricing decision of the monopolist, first 
consider two stylized examples of markets that satisfy the assumptions of 
the presented model, which will be used to illustrate the intuition of the 
                                                 
3 More generally, it suffices that there exists a unique value of either 𝜃 or 𝜇 above or below 
which consumers participate. With proper adjustment of the expressions for demand, 
profits and welfare, the same methodology can be used to derive the results of the model. 
In addition, the analysis also readily extends any finite dimension consumer types. For 
some applications, for example, it might be required that 𝜇 is a vector rather than a scalar. 
In this case it suffices that there is one component of 𝜇 that uniquely determines the cutoff 
of participation. See, Veiga and Weyl (2014a) for further details on this. 
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results throughout the analysis. Further extensions and other applications 
are discussed in section 5. 
Example 1 Competitive labor market with fringe benefits 
Consider a labor market with a unit mass of firms and workers. Firms are 
heterogeneous in their productivity levels 𝑦. I abstract from any capital 
investments and assume that firms are competitive in the sense that workers 
get paid the value of their productivity. The payment to a worker possibly 
consists of a wage 𝑤 and various fringe benefits with value 𝑥, such that 𝑦 =
𝑤 + 𝑥. The service provider is a monopoly platform that provides a service 
of matching workers to firms and the service fee is possibly contingent on 
the wage earned by workers, but not on the fringe benefits. Given that firms 
are perfectly competitive, the incidence of the service fee falls on workers, 
independent to which side of market it is charged. Ignoring any frictions 
that might arise from the matching process and normalizing the reservation 
wage of workers to zero, worker utility can be written as 𝑢(𝑇, 𝑡) =
(1 − 𝑡)𝑤 + 𝑥 − 𝑇. In the notation of the general model above 𝑤 = 𝜃, 𝑥 =
𝜇 and 𝑤 + 𝑥 = 𝑣(𝜃, 𝜇) and all the expressions for demand, profits and 
welfare can be adjusted accordingly. 
Example 2 Competitive multiple goods market with fixed consumer 
benefits 
This example presents a simplified version of the multiple goods market 
model with proportional consumer demand of Wang and Wright (2014), 
extended to allow for fixed consumer benefits. Sellers provide goods to the 
market that are heterogeneous in cost or “scale”, denoted by 𝑠. For each 
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scale type there are at least two sellers who engage in Bertrand competition 
to provide the good to the market, such that price equals cost: 𝑠 = 𝑝. For 
each of the goods traded there is a unit mass of consumers with unit demand 
and consumer valuation for a good is proportional to the scale of the good: 
𝑠(1 + 𝑏). Wang and Wright (2014) assume that consumers are 
heterogeneous in 𝑏. Instead, I assume here that 𝑏 is the same across 
consumers (and sufficiently large such that all goods are traded), but that 
they also have a fixed benefit 𝐵 to participate in the market, which is 
allowed to differ across consumers. The model readily extends to 
consumers being heterogeneous in both dimensions, however, this 
additional complexity is not necessary to capture the important intuitions 
below. A monopoly platform organizes the market and can charge sellers to 
participate, possibly contingent on the price of the goods being sold. The 
incidence of the platform fee, however, falls on consumers because sellers 
are perfectly competitive. Equivalently, the flat fee can also be charged 
directly to consumers to participate in the market, depending on the 
application. In the general notation 𝑝 = 𝜃, 𝐵 = 𝜇 and (1 + 𝑏)𝑝 − 𝑝 + 𝐵 =
𝑣(𝜃, 𝜇). Consumer utility can thus be written as: 𝑢(𝑇, 𝑡) = (𝑏 − 𝑡)𝑝 + 𝐵 −
𝑇. So, the platform fee determines how many consumers participate in each 
market. Note that the expressions for demand, profits and welfare must be 
multiplied by the number (or mass) of goods being traded in the market 
given that there is a unit mass of consumers for each good. 
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3 Monopoly pricing 
This section derives the optimal monopoly service fee and investigates 
under which conditions the fee is composed of a flat component, a 
proportional component, or both. 
3.1 The optimal service fee 
Using the generalized version of Leibniz’s integral rule proposed by Veiga 
and Weyl (2014a) to differentiate multidimensional integrals, the first-order 
condition of the monopolist that maximizes profits with respect to 𝑇 can be 
written as: 
𝑇 + 𝑡?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) − 𝑐 =
𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡)
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)
                                     (6) 
where ?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) denotes the density of marginal consumers, defined as: 
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) ≡ ∫
𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))
𝜕𝑣(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))/𝜕𝜇
𝑑𝜃
𝜃𝐻
𝜃𝐿
                        (7) 
and ?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) denotes the average observable consumer type across marginal 
participants, defined as: 
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) ≡
1
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)
∫ 𝜃
𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))
𝜕𝑣(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))/𝜕𝜇
𝑑𝜃
𝜃𝐻
𝜃𝐿
               (8) 
Note that there is not a representative marginal consumer type, as in models 
with one-dimensional consumer heterogeneity. Instead, marginal 
consumers differ in their observable types and the monopolist accounts for 
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the average marginal type in the optimal pricing equation.4 More 
specifically, expression (6) shows that the monopolist, for a given 𝑡, chooses 
𝑇 such that the marginal service fee (equal to the sum of the flat fee and the 
average revenue extracted from marginal participants through 𝑡) over 
marginal cost is equated to the ratio of consumer demand over the density 
of marginal consumers. This ratio is the equivalent of the inverse hazard 
rate of demand in a setting of two-dimensional consumer types. As one 
would expect, for 𝑡 = 0 expression (6) collapses to the standard Lerner 
condition (𝑇 − 𝑐)/𝑇 = 1/𝜀, where 𝜀 ≡ −𝑇𝑞′(𝑇)/𝑞(𝑇) is the elasticity of 
demand with respect to 𝑇. 
The first-order condition with respect to 𝑡 can be written as: 
𝑇 + 𝑡?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) − 𝑐 =
?̅?(𝑇, 𝑡)
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)⏟  
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡)
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)
−
𝑡𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑇, 𝑡)
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)⏟    
𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛
          (9) 
where 𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑇, 𝑡) denotes the variance of observable types across marginal 
consumers, defined as: 
𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑇, 𝑡) ≡  
1
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)
∫ 𝜃2
𝑓(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))
𝜕𝑣(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))/𝜕𝜇
𝑑𝜃
𝜃𝐻
𝜃𝐿
− ?̃?2         (10) 
                                                 
4 Furthermore, note that weights by which the average marginal type is calculated, is not 
just the density function evaluated at ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃). In addition, marginal types must be 
normalized by the effect of the unobservable type on consumer willingness to pay 
(𝜕𝑣(𝜃, ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃))/𝜕𝜇)) because 𝜇 is not necessarily expressed in monetary terms. This 
weighting is important when consumer willingness to pay is not quasi-linear in 𝜇, which is 
possibly the case in the present model, and has previously been overlooked in the literature, 
as emphasized by Veiga and Weyl (2014a). 
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Expression (9) shows that the monopolist accounts for two additional 
effects when determining the optimal value of 𝑡 compared to the optimal 
choice for 𝑇. Both effects reflect how the platform accounts for the fact that 
changing the proportional fee changes the composition of consumers 
selected into the market. Firstly, the intensive selection effect captures that 
lowering the proportional fee reduces the revenue extracted from 
inframarginal consumers (?̅?(𝑇, 𝑡)𝑞(𝑇, 𝑡)), whereas it implies a gain in 
revenues at the margin (?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)). When the intensive loss is larger 
relative to the gain at the margin, the monopolist is more reluctant to reduce 
the proportional fee to attract additional consumers and hence this tends to 
push up the markup of the marginal service fee over marginal cost, as the 
effect appears positively in the right hand side of expression (9). This effect 
is not present under uniform pricing because then the surplus extracted from 
marginal and inframarginal consumers is the same. 
Secondly, the sorting effect at the margin captures that reducing the 
proportional fee, on top of the gain in revenues at the margin from attracting 
these consumers (?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)), implies a further gain because there is 
“adverse sorting” within the set of marginal consumers, captured by 
(−𝑡𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑇, 𝑡)?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)). That is, reducing the proportional fee attracts marginal 
consumers with a higher 𝜃 (the ones with the highest disutility for the 
proportional fee within the set of marginal consumers, who all have the 
same 𝜇) and these are precisely the consumers most valuable to the 
monopolist. All else equal, this effect therefore pushes down the markup of 
the marginal service fee over marginal cost, as it appears negatively in the 
right hand side of expression (9). The effect is larger when there is more 
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heterogeneity in observable consumer types across the marginal consumers, 
measure by the variance of 𝜃 for marginal consumers (𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑇, 𝑡)). Again, this 
effect is not present under uniform pricing because then all marginal 
consumers have the same value to the monopolist.5 
When a unique interior solution exists, the optimal flat and proportional fee 
charged by the monopolist, denoted by 𝑇∗ and 𝑡∗ respectively, is the 
solution to the system of equations (6) and (9).6 In addition, denote the 
optimal flat fee when the proportional fee is (exogenously or endogenously) 
equated to zero as 𝑇0. Similarly, denote the optimal proportional fee when 
the flat fee is equal to zero as 𝑡0.  
                                                 
5 The sorting effect at the margin described here is a specific characterization of a more 
general result derived by Veiga and Weyl (2014b). They show that when a monopolist 
chooses a product characteristic in the presence of multi-dimensional consumer 
heterogeneity, the effect at the margin of changing the product characteristic on profits is 
equal to the density of marginal consumers times to the covariance, among marginal 
consumers, between the marginal effect of the product characteristic on willingness to pay 
and the cost of providing the good to these consumers. In the present setting, the sorting 
effect collapses to a term proportional to the variance of 𝜃 among marginal consumers 
because 𝜃 captures both marginal disutility of consumers and the (negative) cost to the 
monopolist from changing 𝑡. 
 
6 By the Hessian test, the second-order restrictions for the monopoly maximization problem 
to be locally concave are 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑇2
,
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑡2
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑇2
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑡2
>
𝜕2𝜋2
𝜕𝑇𝜕𝑡
≡ 𝜒2 
When globally satisfied ∀𝑇, 𝑡 ≥ 0, the solution to the system (6) and (9) exists and is 
unique. Following Weyl (2010), who derives second-order restrictions for a monopoly 
platform that optimally chooses two quantities, sufficient and necessary conditions for this 
are that 𝑓(𝜃, 𝜇) satisfies the following conditions for any 𝑐 ≥ 0: (i) 𝜌𝑇 ≡
𝑑𝑇
𝑑𝑐
|𝑡 > 0, 𝜌𝑡 ≡
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑐
|𝑇 > 0 and (ii) ?̃??̃?
2 > 𝜌𝑇𝜌𝑡𝜒
2. When condition (i) is violated for one of the pricing 
instruments, and hence the monopoly equates that instrument to zero (the pass-through of 
cost is zero or negative), the sufficient and necessary condition for the model to yield a 
unique solution is simply that profits are globally concave in the other pricing instrument, 
which is assumed to be satisfied. 
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3.2 The optimal composition of the service fee  
Proposition 3.1 derives conditions for the optimal pricing incentives of the 
monopolist in terms of usage of the different pricing instruments available. 
The results follow from differentiating profits with respect to each pricing 
instrument, allowing the other pricing instrument to be dependent on its 
value, and using that totally differentiating the expression for demand (2) 
with respect to 𝑇 and 𝑡 yields 𝑑𝑇/𝑑𝑡 = −?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡). 
Proposition 3.1 The monopolist uses a positive proportional fee as a 
pricing instrument when it induces “advantageous selection” of consumers. 
That is, 
𝜕𝜋(𝑇0(𝑡), 𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
> 0 ⇔ ?̅?(𝑇0) − ?̃?(𝑇0) > 0                        (11) 
The monopolist only uses a positive proportional fee and no positive flat fee 
when the intensive advantageous selection effect is sufficiently large 
relative to the adverse sorting effect at the margin. That is, 
𝜕𝜋(𝑇, 𝑡0(𝑇))
𝜕𝑇
< 0 ⇔ (?̅?(𝑡0) − ?̃?(𝑡0)) 𝑞(𝑡0) > 𝑡0𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑡0)?̃?(𝑡0)     (12) 
Proposition 3.1 shows that, evaluated at the optimal monopoly outcome 
when 𝑡 = 0, the service provider can further increase profits by substituting 
a small piece of the flat fee with a positive proportional fee (keeping demand 
fixed) if and only if the use of this proportional fee advantageously selects 
consumers into the market. That happens when the average observable 
consumer type across all consumers is larger than the average across 
marginal consumers. Or, in other words, when consumers with the highest 
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valuation for the service are also the ones most valuable to the monopolist. 
When usage of a proportional fee induces consumers to adversely select into 
the market, it is not profitable for the monopolist to use this pricing 
instrument. 
In addition, the proposition shows that, evaluated at the optimal monopoly 
outcome when 𝑇 = 0, the service provider has no incentive to substitute 
some of the proportional fee for a positive  flat fee (keeping demand fixed) 
when the advantageous selection effect is sufficiently large compared to 
adverse sorting effect at the margin. Remember from the discussion of the 
optimal pricing equation for the proportional fee (9) that, all else equal, a 
larger adverse sorting effect at the margin tends to push down the optimal 
markup of the marginal service fee over marginal cost, whereas a greater 
intensive advantageous selection effect (a larger ?̅?(𝑡0)/?̃?(𝑡0)) tends to push 
up the margin. This tradeoff is also reflected in the optimal choice between 
the use of the two types of pricing instruments. When intensive 
advantageous selection induced by the use of the proportional fee is 
sufficiently large compared to the adverse sorting effect at the margin, the 
monopolist will only use the proportional fee and no flat fee. Otherwise, the 
monopolist uses both fee types. 
3.3 Signing the selection effect 
A natural question that arises at this point is: what determines the sign and 
the degree of intensive selection and the degree of adverse sorting at the 
margin? The answer lies in the properties of the joint distribution of 
observable and unobservable types. To see this, first consider the case where 
consumers are only heterogeneous in unobservable types 𝜇 and there is no 
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heterogeneity in the observable consumer type 𝜃. In this case there is no 
intensive selection effect and no sorting effect at the margin and the 
monopolist is indifferent between the two fee types. In this case the value 
of 𝑡𝜃 is the same for all consumers changing its value through 𝑡 affects 
consumer utility and monopoly profits in precisely the same as changing the 
flat fee 𝑇 by the same amount. 
At the other extreme, consider the case where consumers are only 
heterogeneous in observable types 𝜃 and there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity in 𝜇. Then, by assumption, 𝑣(𝜃) must be monotonically 
increasing in 𝜃 and when 𝑡 = 0 high observable consumer types will enter 
the market first. Hence, the market is characterized by advantageous 
selection and condition (11) in proposition 3.1 is satisfied. Furthermore, 
when there is only heterogeneity in 𝜃, there is a single marginal observable 
type and there is no sorting at the margin. Hence, condition (12) for the 
monopolist to only use a proportional fee and no flat fee simplifies to 
?̅?(𝑡0) − ?̃?(𝑡0) > 0. So, in the case of one-dimensional heterogeneity in 𝜃, 
the monopolist always charges a proportional fee (given that ?̅?(𝑇0) −
?̃?(𝑇0) > 0) and will do so up to the point where further raising this fee 
induces adverse selection (or reduces profits when ?̅?(𝑡0) − ?̃?(𝑡0) > 0). 
For intermediate cases, the sign of the intensive selection effect crucially 
depends on the correlation between observable and unobservable consumer 
types. To illustrate this, consider again the examples presented in section 2. 
Example 1 considered a competitive labor market with fringe benefits in 
which worker utility to purchase the service was 𝑢(𝑇, 𝑡) = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤 + 𝑥 −
𝑇, where 𝑤 is the worker wage and 𝑥 is the value of the fringe benefits, and 
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competitive firms simply pay the worker the value of its productivity 𝑦 =
𝑤 + 𝑥. In this example there is adverse selection when high productivity 
workers earn a lower wage than low productivity workers and instead get 
compensated through additional fringe benefits. This type of adverse 
selection might be a real threat to intermediate service providers in labor 
markets that want to charge a commission proportional to the wage of a 
worker, but are unable to control the determination the fringe benefits of the 
employment contracts. That is, when the service provider charges a positive 
proportional fee, the worker might ask the firm to substitute some of the 
wage for fringe benefits. This would raise utility of the worker, the firm 
would be indifferent and this undermines the pricing strategy of the service 
provider. 
Example 2 considered a competitive multiple goods market with buyer 
utility to purchase one of the goods in the market equal to 𝑢(𝑇, 𝑡) =
(𝑏 − 𝑡)𝑝 + 𝐵 − 𝑇, where 𝑏 is a constant markup of consumer valuations 
over sales prices 𝑝 and 𝐵 is a fixed consumer benefit to participate in the 
market. In this example, when there is no heterogeneity in 𝐵, the service 
provider always charges a proportional fee by the result in proposition 3.1. 
There are indeed many markets or marketplaces in which service providers 
facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers in which fixed consumer 
benefits are not expected to play an important role and where proportional 
fee pricing is prevalent. Examples are real estate markets where brokers 
facilitate transactions, online marketplaces like eBay or Amazon and 
payment card networks. Other types of service providers that operate 
markets or market places in which fixed consumer benefits are important, 
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however, might again be faced with a problem of adverse consumer 
selection if they want to use proportional fees as a pricing instrument. 
Examples are shopping malls, festivals and amusement parks. Consider a 
music festival, for example, that possibly charges an entry fee 𝑇 to visitors 
and the organizer wants to make additional profits by charging sellers to set 
up stands for food, drinks and other goods. The organizer might contemplate 
to charge sellers a fee proportional to the sales price of each good sold. The 
latter pricing strategy will be most profitable when consumers who highly 
value the music are also the ones who purchase expensive goods in the 
festival marketplace. However, if these consumers are the ones who 
purchase the least expensive goods, more profits might be extracted by 
charging a higher entrance fee. 
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4 Pigouvian pricing  and the effect of proportional fees 
on welfare 
This section derives the optimal service fee chosen by a social planner that 
maximizes total social value generated in the market and investigates under 
which conditions the usage of a proportional fee in the private market 
increases or reduces welfare compared to the case when the usage of such a 
fee is prohibited. 
4.1 The socially optimal service fee 
Using the same methodology as above, the first-order condition of a social 
planner that maximizes total social value, given by expression (5), with 
respect to 𝑇 can be written as: 
𝑇 − 𝑡?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) − 𝑐 = 0                                        (13) 
The Pigouvian planner thus chooses the optimal flat fee such that the 
marginal service fee is equated to marginal cost. Similarly, the first-order 
condition with respect to 𝑡 can be written as: 
𝑇 − 𝑡?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡) − 𝑐 = −
𝑡𝜎𝜃
2̃(𝑇, 𝑡)
?̃?(𝑇, 𝑡)⏟    
𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛
                         (14) 
Compared to the incentives of the monopolist, the Pigouvian planner also 
accounts for the sorting effect at the margin, but not for the intensive 
selection effect. It directly follows from (13) and (14) that the only possible 
solution for the composition of the optimal Pigouvian service fee is 𝑇𝑊 =
𝑐 and 𝑡𝑊 = 0. So, the Pigouvian planner never uses the proportional fee to 
117 
 
select certain types of consumers into the market and prefers that all 
consumers are served at marginal cost, independent of their specific types. 
The result that a welfare maximizer never charges different prices across 
different types of consumer groups when the cost of serving them is the 
same is well-known from the third-degree price discrimination literature 
and is usually referred to as the misallocation effect (e.g. Stole (2007), 
Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010)). That is, for a given amount aggregate 
consumption, price discrimination drives a wedge between willingness to 
pay of marginal consumers across different market segments such that some 
consumers with a relatively low willingness to pay replace consumers with 
a relatively high willingness to pay compared to the allocation under the 
nondiscriminatory price. In the present setting, each observable consumer 
type 𝜃 can be thought of as a separate market segment and the usage of 
proportional fees implies that different consumer types are charge different 
service fee 𝑇 + 𝑡𝜃, which thus results in allocative inefficiencies given that 
the marginal cost to serve all consumer types is the same. 
4.2 The effect of private proportional fee usage on 
welfare 
The fact that the usage of a proportional fee results in allocative 
inefficiencies, does not necessarily implies that banning proportional fees 
from a private market necessarily improves welfare. Again, as is well-
known from the third-degree price discrimination literature, allowing a 
monopolist to price discriminate might improve welfare if it increases 
aggregate consumption in the market, usually referred to as the output 
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effect. When the output effect outweighs the misallocation effect, allowing 
for price discrimination might be welfare improving. Aguirre, Cowan and 
Vickers (2010) show that whether or not this is the case crucially depends 
on the relative curvatures of demand across the different market segments. 
It can be shown that precisely the same welfare criteria for monopoly third-
degree price discrimination to be welfare improving apply to the present 
setting when there are only two observable consumer types, as formalized 
in lemma 3.1. 
Lemma 3.1 When there are only two observable consumer types (𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻), 
the welfare effect of prohibiting a monopoly service provider to charge 
consumers a fee proportional to the value of their observable types is 
identical to prohibiting a monopolist to third-degree price discriminate 
based on observable consumer types, i.e. to charge a different uniform price 
to consumer groups segmented based on their observable types. 
Proof Assume there are two observable consumer types, 𝜃𝐿 and 𝜃𝐻 where 
𝜃𝐿 < 𝜃𝐻. Denote the service fee charged to low observable types as 𝜏𝐿 =
𝜃𝐿𝑡 + 𝑇 and to high observable types 𝜏𝐻 = 𝜃𝐻𝑡 + 𝑇. The optimal 
nondiscriminatory service fee is 𝑇0 and the optimal discriminatory services 
fees to low and high types are 𝜏𝐿
∗ = 𝜃𝐿𝑡
∗ + 𝑇∗ and 𝜏𝐻
∗ = 𝜃𝐻𝑡
∗ + 𝑇∗. The 
monopoly profits can be written as 𝜋(𝜏𝐿 , 𝜏𝐻) = 𝜋𝐿(𝜏𝐿) + 𝜋𝐻(𝜏𝐻) =
(𝜏𝐿 − 𝑐)𝑞𝐿(𝜏𝐿) + (𝜏𝐻 − 𝑐)𝑞𝐻(𝜏𝐻) where 𝑞𝐿(𝜏𝐿) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜃𝐿 , 𝜇)𝑑𝜇
𝜇𝐻
?̂?(𝜏𝐿,𝜃𝐿)
 
and 𝑞𝐻(𝜏𝐻) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜃𝐻 , 𝜇)𝑑𝜇
𝜇𝐻
?̂?(𝜏𝐻,𝜃𝐻)
. Then, to evaluate the welfare effect of 
allowing the service provider to charge a proportional fee, the monopolist 
is initially not allowed to charge a proportional service fee and hence 
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charges the nondiscriminatory fee 𝑇0 to both consumer types. Then, the 
constraint on 𝑡 is gradually relaxed up to the point where the monopolist is 
free to set the optimal value 𝑡∗ (and corresponding 𝑇∗). This problem is 
equivalent to relaxing the constraint for a monopolist that directly chooses 
𝜏𝐿 and 𝜏𝐻 (rather than 𝑡 and 𝑇) under the restriction that 𝜏𝐻 − 𝜏𝐿 ≤ 𝑟, which 
is precisely the problem Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) consider to 
evaluate the impact of third-degree price discrimination on welfare. They 
evaluate the impact of gradually raising 𝑟 from 0 to 𝑟∗ ≡ 𝜏𝐻
∗ − 𝜏𝐻
∗  which is 
equivalent to gradually raising 𝑡 in the present setting, up to a scalar 
(𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿), which is irrelevant for the results. QED 
Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) impose three important assumptions to 
evaluate the welfare effect, which translate to the present setting as follows: 
(i) profits in each market segment are strictly concave in the service fee, i.e. 
𝜕2𝜋𝐼/𝜕𝜏𝐼
2 = 𝜕2𝜋𝐼/𝜕𝑇
2 < 0 for 𝐼 = 𝐿, 𝐻, which is more strict than the 
required second-order restriction on 𝑇 in the present setting that total profits 
need to be concave, (ii) all markets are served under the nondiscriminatory 
price, i.e. ∀𝜃: ?̂?(𝑇, 𝑡, 𝜃) < 𝜇𝐻, which again might be violated in the present 
setting. When allowing for proportional fee pricing also expands the market, 
the welfare effect is more likely to be positive, and (iii) the ratio 
(𝜕𝑊𝐼/𝜕𝑇)/(𝜕
2𝜋𝐼/𝜕𝑇
2) is strictly increasing in 𝑇, which is referred to as 
the increasing ratio condition. This is the key condition in Aguirre, Cowan 
and Vickers (2010) which makes the welfare analysis tractable and the 
authors argue that it is satisfied for a broad range of commonly used 
distributions to model demand.  
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In addition, define 𝜕2𝑞𝐼/𝜕𝑇
2 as the curvature of direct demand and 
𝜕2𝑇𝐼(𝑞𝐼)/𝜕𝑞𝐼
2 as the curvature of inverse demand, where 𝑇𝐼(𝑞𝐼) follows 
from inverting demand in each market segment with respect to 𝑇. Then, 
under assumptions (i) - (iii), the welfare results of Aguirre, Cowan and 
Vickers (2010) can be translated to the present setting as summarized in 
proposition 3.2.  
Proposition 3.2 (propositions 1-3 in Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers 
(2010)) Allowing a monopoly service provider to charge a fee proportional 
to the value of observable types (𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻) increases welfare when inverse 
demand in the low-type market is more convex than in the high-type market 
and the spread between high and low types (𝜃𝐻 − 𝜃𝐿) is sufficiently small, 
and it reduces welfare when direct demand is more convex in the high-type 
market. If direct demand is more convex in the low-type market at the 
nondiscriminatory fee and inverse demand is at least as convex in the high-
type market than in the low-type market at the discriminatory service fees, 
then welfare initially rises as the proportional fee increases and then falls. 
The results of Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) can readily be 
generalized to multiple consumer types, as formalized by Schmalensee 
(1981). In the setting of proportional service fee pricing, Wang and Wright 
(2014) show that this also true in their model for a competitive multiple 
goods market with proportional consumer demands. Furthermore, they 
generalize some of the results for a broader class of distributions that those 
that fall under the increasing ratio condition. In general, however, absent of 
restrictions on the joint distribution of observable and unobservable types 
(except of course the second-order restrictions discussed in the previous 
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section) the welfare effects in proposition 3.2 do not necessarily carry 
through for multiple (or  a continuum) of observable types. This because a 
service provider that has only two strategic decision variables (𝑇 and 𝑡) to 
serve more than two market segments is more restricted than a monopolist 
that third-degree price discriminates, i.e. charges a specific uniform price to 
each market segment. I am currently working on more general conditions 
to evaluate the welfare effect of allowing for proportional fee pricing. I 
expect that this additional restriction will have a moderating effect on the 
welfare results. That is, when third-degree price discrimination is harmful 
(beneficial), proportional fee pricing will be less harmful (beneficial), but 
further research is required to formalize this claim. 
5 Discussion 
This section discusses three important directions in which the stylized 
model analyzed in the previous sections could be extended to make it more 
broadly applicable. 
5.1 Imperfect competition among service providers 
The analysis in this paper focused on the conditions that make it profitable 
for a monopolist to make use of a proportional fee as a pricing instrument. 
In the presence of competition, however, this choice is more restricted given 
that service providers might steal business from one another by charging a 
flat fee instead of a proportional fee. More specifically, Veiga and Weyl 
(2014b) demonstrate that the usage of product characteristics to select 
valuable consumers into the market (and hence the described selection and 
sorting effect induced by the usage of such a characteristic) quickly 
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disappears when the market converges towards perfect competition. In the 
present setting this implies that the market would converge to efficiency 
given that flat fee marginal cost pricing is the social first-best. Nevertheless, 
proportional fee pricing is prevalent in practice, even in markets that are 
seemingly competitive (e.g. online marketplaces, real estate brokerage 
markets). So, there must be institutional features in these markets that 
somehow prevent the market to converge towards the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium. This could be the presence of fixed costs or the incentives to 
provide higher quality services when proportional fees are available, issues 
worth further investigation. 
5.2 Ramsey pricing 
Not only private service providers commonly make use of proportional 
pricing instruments, but also tax authorities prevalently use ad-valorem 
taxes to raise tax revenues. Analyzing the Ramsey pricing problem could 
contribute to the literature on optimal indirect and indirect taxation (see 
Keen (1998) and Piketty and Saez (2014), respectively, for surveys) and 
reevaluate some of the issues in the presence of flexible multidimensional 
heterogeneities of market participants. 
5.3 Imperfect competition in the input market and two-
sidedness 
The examples used to illustrate the intuition of the model assumed that one 
side of the market was perfectly competitive (firms and sellers in the labor 
and multiple goods market example, respectively). This conveniently 
allowed me to analyze the optimal pricing behavior of the service provider 
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in a “one-sided” setting. Of course, in practice the input providers might 
also possess bargaining power or market power in determining the value of 
the observable characteristic proportional to which the service provider 
charges its fee (e.g. wages or sales prices). Allowing for this would imply 
that the chosen service fee also affects the optimal behavior of the input 
providers, which in turn affects the utility of consumers. To account for 
these issues, the model has to analyzed in a “two-sided” setting. Loertscher 
and Niedermayer (2013) explore the issues in a model with flexible 
bargaining among buyers and sellers in a setting where the service provider 
can implement an incentive compatible mechanism by which all relevant 
heterogeneities on both sides of the market become revealed. Shy and Wang 
(2011) evaluate a single good market in which the seller and the service 
provider both possess market power and consumers are heterogeneous in a 
single dimension. It would be interesting the extend the present model to 
further explore these issues in a setting where part of the relevant 
heterogeneities remain unobservable to the service provider on both sides 
of the market. 
6 Conclusions 
This chapter presented a monopoly pricing model in which a service 
provider attracts consumers allowed to be heterogeneous in two dimensions. 
One dimension of consumer types always remains private information. The 
other consumer type, however, is assumed to become revealed to the 
monopolist once the service is provided and a fee can be charged 
proportional to its revealed value on top of a flat service fee. 
124 
 
It is shown that the service provider only makes use of a proportional service 
fee if its use induces advantageous selection of consumers into the market. 
In addition, the monopolist exclusively uses a proportional fee and no flat 
fee when the advantageous selection effect outweighs the adverse sorting 
effect at the margin, which is inherent to the use of this fee type. In terms of 
welfare, it is shown that a Pigouvian planner never charges a proportional 
service fee because it has an inefficient misallocation effect, familiar from 
the third degree price-discrimination literature. Furthermore, it is 
demonstrated that allowing a monopolist to use of a proportional fee has 
identical welfare effects as allowing for third-degree price discrimination 
when there are only two observable consumer types. This result does not 
generalize, however, two multiple consumer types and further research is 
required to explore this issue. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Competitive Service Fees, Free Entry and Social 
Efficiency in Real Estate Brokerage Markets1 
 
1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a model of imperfect competition among brokers that 
operate in a market for real estate and charge a service fee to sellers that 
possibly consists of flat and proportional component, as in the previous 
chapter. The model is more specific, however, than the one presented in 
chapter 3 in the sense that it only allows for a single source of heterogeneity 
in buyer valuations and seller reservation prices, thus the selection and 
sorting effects described above do not appear here. Apart from allowing for 
broker competition and proportional fee pricing, the model presented in this 
chapter also differs from to the ones presented in the first two chapters in 
that it assumes an efficient matching technology. This implies that the 
network externalities that emerge from the imperfect matching process 
captured by the matching elasticities will play no role. While these 
externalities are important for large decentralized matching technologies, as 
the one offered by the listing platform analyzed in chapter 2, they are 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on joint work with Roel Helgers, Maarten Goos and Erik Buyst. 
Roel Helgers provided great help in constructing the tables and figures reported in this 
chapter, for which many thanks. Of course, all errors are my own responsibility and mine 
to defend. 
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expected to be of less importance for matchmakers that offer individual 
matching services like real estate brokers and therefore are not taken up in 
the analysis. In contrast, the externalities that arise from the bargaining 
process discussed in chapter 2, do will play an important role. In addition, 
similar to chapter 2, the presented model is also taken to the data to evaluate 
market efficiency in the Belgian real estate brokerage market. The used data 
are richer that those in chapter 2 and therefore more refined estimates for 
the model parameters can be provided. 
The motivation for the analysis in this chapter, as already discussed in the 
general introduction of this this dissertation, is that the competitive 
environment of brokers that operate in real estate markets has drastically 
been changing over the past two decades. Before, throughout most of the 
20th century, commission rates charged by brokers have been known to be 
very rigid, suggesting a lack of competition among brokers in pricing there 
services. Since the rise of the internet, however, the traditional information 
systems that upheld this apparent collusive behavior have been severely 
under pressure. The novel information technologies make brokers rely less 
heavily on their colleagues to establish valuable real estate transactions 
which has led brokers to deviate from offering the traditional service 
packages and from the conventional fixed commission rates. The USDOJ- 
FTC (2007) present a detailed report on this transition for the US brokerage 
industry. Supporting empirical evidence for the increased variation in 
commission rates in various local US markets is given, for example, by 
Sirmans and Turnbull (1997), Schnare and Kulick (2009) and Wiley, 
Benefield and Allen (2012). 
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A natural question that arises is how the intensified competition among 
brokers in pricing their services affects the market outcomes. This question 
is particularly relevant to investigate because the traditional “fixed” 
commission rates are known to entail significant social losses. More 
specifically, in their seminal contribution, Hsieh and Moretti (2003) 
demonstrate that fixed commission rates combined with limited entry 
constraints for new brokers to enter local housing markets can be an 
important source of inefficiencies. Under free entry, an excessive amount 
of brokers enter in local markets with relatively high average prices of 
housing because more revenues can be extracted there by the proportional 
nature of the commission rate. In these relatively expensive markets, 
brokers inefficiently compete for transactions and a significant amount 
physical and human resources is invested which produces little social value 
in return. Hsieh and Moretti (2003) estimate a social loss due to excessive 
broker entry of billions of dollars across the US for the period 1980-1990, 
up to 50% of total industry revenue in their most pessimistic estimates. 
This chapter aims to contribute by addressing the question how market 
efficiency is affected when brokers do compete in setting commission rates 
in real estate markets. To do this, the analysis is built up as follows. Section 
2 presents the model of imperfect broker competition. Following Weyl and 
Fabinger (2013), it is shown that the degree of competition among brokers 
can be captured by a single “competitive conduct” parameter on the unit 
interval, where zero corresponds to Bertrand competition and one to brokers 
colluding on the monopoly service fee. In addition, the model allows for 
fixed entry costs and free broker entry, such that the distortions that might 
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arise from free entry emphasized by Hsieh and Moretti (2003) can be 
evaluated. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical results. It is shown that neither broker 
collusion (monopoly) nor perfect broker competition (Bertrand) can be 
socially efficient. This because the negative cross-side externalities that 
arises from the bargaining process are not properly internalized in the 
service fees under perfect competition. Under monopoly, these externalities 
do are properly internalized, but on top of this there is the classic Cournot 
distortion, such that the monopoly service fee is always too high from a 
social point of view, consistent with the findings in chapter 2. Therefore, an 
intermediate degree of broker competition is socially optimal.  
The crucial feature of the model that drives this result is that there is 
uncertainty about the trading partner buyers and sellers will eventually meet 
when they enter the market. In this case it is socially efficient (within 
homogeneous local submarkets) to exclude some buyers with a low 
willingness to pay and sellers with high reservation prices from the market 
because their participation decision causes a negative cross-side externality 
on the more efficient high value buyers and low reservation price sellers 
that participate through the bargaining process over the transaction price. 
This externality should be internalized in the service fee charged by brokers, 
justifying a positive markup over marginal costs. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Mahoney and Weyl (2014), who demonstrate a similar 
inverse u-shaped relationship exists in selection markets characterized by 
advantageous selection. The present market can also be interpreted as being 
characterized by advantageous selection (although different than described 
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in chapter 3) in the sense that high willingness to pay buyers and low 
reservation price sellers are also the ones that bring most value to market 
through the established transactions. 
In addition, consistent with Mankiw and Whinston (1986), it is shown that 
in the presence of fixed costs, free broker entry is always excessive. Both 
findings combined, that marginal cost pricing is not efficient and that entry 
is always excessive, has important implications for the effectiveness of 
different policy instruments that can be used should a social planner want 
to regulate the market to establish the social optimum. When the observed 
service fee is below the socially optimal level, regulating the service fee 
brokers are allowed to charge will result in a conflict of interest. Raising the 
fee will bring it closer to its desired level, but it will also worsen the entry 
distortion because a higher markup for a given fixed cost will incentivize 
more brokers to enter the market. In this case, it is preferable the regulate 
broker entry if possible, given that restricting the number of brokers allowed 
to operate the market will both raise the service fee and mitigate the entry 
distortion. In contrast, when the observed service fee is above the socially 
optimal level, the opposite policy recommendation holds. Restricting entry 
will mitigate the entry distortion, but will also undesirably further raise the 
service fee. In contrast, regulating the service fee in this case can again 
mitigate both distortions at the same time, given that for a lower service fee 
some brokers will be forced to exit the market. 
Section 4 demonstrates how the model parameters can be identified when 
data on broker service fees, market shares and the distribution of sales prices 
of real estate are observable. Section 5 presents the available data for the 
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present study, shows how some of the data imperfections can be resolved 
and reports the parameter estimates. Section 6 presents welfare 
counterfactuals of the social first-best, the outcomes when a social planner 
would regulate broker entry and when a planner would directly regulate the 
service fees. Given that in the observed equilibrium the average service fee 
is below the social optimum, entry regulation is predicted to yield a welfare 
gain of about 20%. In contrast, regulating the service fee, neglecting the 
entry effect, would result is a welfare loss of about 40%. These results 
illustrate the importance of making the proper choice of which policy 
instrument to use should a policymaker aspire to intervene in a real estate 
brokerage market. 
In the literature, there is vast body of research that investigates issues 
concerning the US brokerage industry. Benjamin, Jud and Sirmans (2000) 
and Zietz and Sirmans (2011) provide excellent surveys on the topic. 
Related to market efficiency, seminal contributions that point out conditions 
under which fixed commission rates can be socially wasteful are Yinger 
(1981), Crockett (1982), Miceli (1992) and Hsieh and Moretti (2003), 
where the latter is closest related to the present setting given the focus on 
excessive entry. Other recent work that builds on Hsieh and Moretti (2003) 
is that of Han and Hong (2011), who extend the model with generalized 
costs and test for cost inefficiencies across US local markets, and Jia and 
Pathak (2012), who exploit the dynamics of entry in Greater Boston's 
brokerage industry to evaluate market efficiency. Both papers maintain the 
assumption that commission rates are fixed and they report findings in line 
with Hsieh and Moretti (2003). 
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Closest related theoretical contributions on broker competition in setting 
commission rates are those of Yavas (2001) and Loertscher and 
Niedermayer (2013). Yavas (2001) demonstrates in a homogeneous buyer-
seller-broker framework that in the presence of fixed costs, the only unique 
Nash equilibrium is the monopoly outcome, suggesting that a competitive 
equilibrium is therefore infeasible in real estate brokerage markets. It can 
be argued, however, that this result no longer holds as soon as brokerage 
services are somehow differentiated from the point of view of buyers and 
sellers, for example, by their location. In principle, any equilibrium in 
between Bertrand and monopoly is then feasible, depending on the degree 
of residual market power of individual brokers, as it is modeled is the 
present study. The contribution of Loertscher and Niedermayer (2013) was 
already discussed in previous chapters. Relevant for the present setting is 
that they do not conduct the free entry analysis, which is the precisely 
emphasis of the present chapter.2 
As mentioned above, empirical contributions that support the increased 
variation in commission rates across the US are Sirmans and Turnbull 
(1997), Schnare and Kulick (2009) and Wiley, Benefield and Allen (2012). 
They explore the role of increased price competition among brokers to 
explain this phenomenon, but none of these studies structurally estimates 
the impact of price competition on market efficiency. 
                                                 
2 Other related theories of broker competition are presented by Bruce and Santore (2006) 
and Miceli, Pancak and Sirmans (2007). Again, none of these contributions evaluates 
market efficiency under free broker entry as the present chapter does. 
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Finally, this chapter also contributes to the theoretical (e.g. Mankiw and 
Whinston (1986)) and empirical (e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry 
and Waldfogel (1999)) work that investigates market efficiency under free 
entry for homogeneous goods oligopolies, by showing that in markets 
where marginal cost pricing is not socially optimal, the incentives of a social 
planner that aims to mitigate price distortions are not necessarily aligned 
with those of a social planner that aims to minimize social waste that results 
from free entry. 
2 Model 
Consider a four-stage static model of symmetric imperfect competition 
among brokers who offer a service of matching buyers and sellers in a 
market for a homogeneous real estate good. The timing of the model can be 
summarized as follows: 
Stage 1: 𝑁 brokers (out of an unrestricted amount) enter the market. 
Stage 2: Participating brokers simultaneously announce the 
brokerage fees charged to sellers and buyers in return for 
their services. 
Stage 3: 𝑁𝑆 sellers (out of a potential mass 𝑆) and 𝑁𝐵 buyers (out of 
a potential mass 𝐵) enter the market through one of the 
brokers. 
Stage 4: 𝑀 matches occur through the brokerage industry and 
generated transaction surpluses are divided among the three 
parties of interest. 
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Assume that brokers, sellers and buyers are risk-neutral and that sellers and 
buyers have unit supply and demand, respectively. Sellers are 
heterogeneous in their reservation price of providing the good to the market, 
denoted by 𝑠 and assumed smoothly distributed by 𝐹𝑆(. ) with density 𝑓𝑆(. ) 
on [𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐻] with 𝑠𝐻 > 𝑠𝐿. Similarly, buyers are heterogeneous in their 
valuation for the good, denoted by 𝑏 and assumed smoothly distributed by 
𝐹𝐵(. ) with density 𝑓𝐵(. ) on [𝑏𝐿 , 𝑏𝐻] with 𝑏𝐻 > 𝑏𝐿. The distributions of 
seller reservation prices and buyer valuations are public information. 
Individual seller reservation prices and buyer valuations, however, are 
private information up to the point where sellers and buyers decide on 
participation (stage 3) and they become revealed once a buyer is matched 
to a seller (stage 4). The outside option of not participating in the market 
through one of the brokers is normalized to zero for both sellers and buyers. 
In addition, assume that all agents have rational expectations about the 
events that occur throughout the different stages of the model. The 
remainder of this section further specifies the exact events that occur in each 
stage, starting with the last stage of the model, and specifies the welfare 
criteria that will be used to evaluate efficiency of the private market 
outcomes. 
2.1 Individual transaction valuations (stage 4) 
When sellers participate in the market by hiring a broker they are charged a 
fee that only has to be paid conditional on being matched. The fee possibly 
consists of a flat component 𝑝 and a commission rate 𝑡 charged proportional 
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to the sales price of the property. The individual transaction value of a seller 
type 𝑠 can hence be written as: 
(1 − 𝑡)𝜌 − 𝑝 − 𝑠                                                  (1) 
where 𝜌 denotes the transaction price. Buyers are not charged directly for 
the broker service and the individual transaction value of a buyer type 𝑏 can 
therefore be written as: 
𝑏 − 𝜌                                                             (2) 
The fee charged to the seller, however, is possibly passed through in the 
bargain over the sales price between the buyer and the seller. More 
specifically, assume the transaction price is chosen to maximize an 
asymmetric Nash bargain: 
max
𝜌
(𝑏 − 𝜌)1−𝛽((1 − 𝑡)𝜌 − 𝑝 − 𝑠)
𝛽
                            (3) 
where 𝛽 ∈ [0,1] denotes the bargaining weight of sellers and hence 1 − 𝛽 
is the bargaining weight of buyers.3 This yields the following expression for 
the transaction price: 
𝜌(𝑏, 𝑠) = 𝛽𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)
𝑝 + 𝑠
1 − 𝑡
                                  (4) 
                                                 
3 Note that in practice, the broker, rather than the seller, usually bargains over the 
transaction price with potential buyers (or buyer brokers) in most real estate markets. 
However, a seller-broker (buyer-broker) contract typically also explicitly specifies that the 
broker should represent the best interest of the seller (buyer) in this process, which is 
assumed to be case here. More generally, this chapter ignores any potential principle-agent 
problems concerning the seller-broker or buyer-broker relationship. See Benjamin, Jud and 
Sirmans (2000) and Zietz and Sirmans (2011) for reviews of the existing literature on these 
type of issues. 
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The assumptions on the bargaining process have two convenient 
implications for the purpose of our analysis. On the one hand, Nash 
bargaining is efficient in the sense that any match for which the buyer 
valuation is sufficiently high to cover the seller reservation price and broker 
fees will be established. In alternative price determination games there 
might be additional distortions that arise from seller and/or buyer market 
power or informational imperfections4. Given the focus of this paper on the 
distortions that possibly arise from broker market power, however, we 
prefer to exclude any additional potential inefficiencies. On the other hand, 
by assuming that sales prices are determined at the individual transaction 
level, rather than through a competitive market clearing mechanism (which 
would also exclude the aforementioned additional distortions), implies ex 
post sales price dispersion for homogeneous real estate goods. In the 
empirical part of this paper, it is precisely the residual variation in sales 
prices (after controlling for observable real estate characteristics) that will 
be used to identify the buyer demand and seller supply parameters of the 
model. 
2.2 Buyer and seller participation (stage 3) 
Assume that the service offered by brokers  is possibly perceived as 
differentiated across buyers and across sellers, for example, by the different 
locations of the brokers. Service differentiation is restricted, however, by 
the assumption that in equilibrium a symmetric and representative set of 
buyers and sellers is attracted by each broker. More specifically, market 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Burdett and Mortenson (1998). 
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supply of sellers is equal to 𝑁𝑆 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑆𝑁
𝑖=1  where 𝑛𝑖
𝑆 is the number of sellers 
attracted by broker 𝑖, which is assumed to be the same across brokers: 𝑛1
𝑆 =
. . . = 𝑛𝑁
𝑆 = 𝑁𝑆/𝑁 ≡ 𝑛𝑆. Similarly, market demand for buyers is equal to 
𝑁𝐵 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝐵𝑁
𝑖=1  where 𝑛𝑖
𝐵 is the number of buyers attracted by broker 𝑖 again 
assuming symmetry across brokers: 𝑛1
𝐵 =. . . = 𝑛𝑁
𝐵 = 𝑁𝐵/𝑁 ≡ 𝑛𝐵. In 
addition, assume that the matching technology offered by the brokers is 
efficient and random. That is, the amount of matches established by every 
broker is equal to min [𝑛𝐵, 𝑛𝑆], the match probability of sellers is 
min[𝑛𝐵, 𝑛𝑆] /𝑛𝑆 ≡ 𝑚𝑆 and the match probability of buyers is 
min[𝑛𝐵, 𝑛𝑆] /𝑛𝐵 ≡ 𝑚𝐵. By broker symmetry, it follows that the 
equilibrium amount of matches that occur through the brokerage market is 
equal to 𝑀 = min [𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆]. In what follows, broker subscripts are omitted 
to minimize the notational burden in the exposition of the model. 
Expected seller and buyer utility of participating through the brokerage 
market can be written as: 
𝑢𝑆 = ((1 − 𝑡)𝜌(?̅?, 𝑠) − 𝑝 − 𝑠) 𝑚𝑆 = 𝛽 ((1 − 𝑡)?̅? − 𝑝 − 𝑠) 𝑚𝑆     (5) 
𝑢𝐵 = (𝑏 − 𝜌(𝑏, ?̅?))𝑚𝐵 = (1 − 𝛽) (𝑏 −
𝑝 + ?̅?
1 − 𝑡
) 𝑚𝐵                 (6) 
where ?̅? denotes the expected buyer valuation for the good and ?̅? the 
expected seller reservation price, respectively: 
?̅? =
𝐵
𝑁𝐵
∫ 𝐹𝐵
−1
(1 − 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑁𝐵/𝐵
0
                               (7) 
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?̅? =
𝑆
𝑁𝑆
∫ 𝐹𝑆
−1
(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑁𝑆/𝑆
0
                                    (8) 
Sellers participate when 𝑢𝑆 ≥ 0 ⇔ 𝑠 ≤ (1 − 𝑡)?̅? − 𝑝 ≡ ?̃?, where ?̃? denotes 
the reservation price of the marginal seller that participates through the 
brokerage market. Similarly, buyers participate when 𝑢𝐵 ≥ 0 ⇔ 𝑏 ≥
𝑝+?̅?
1−𝑡
≡
?̃?, where ?̃? denotes the marginal buyer valuation. Market supply of sellers 
and market demand for buyers can thus be summarized as: 
𝑁𝑆 = 𝑆𝐹𝑆(?̃?)                                              (9) 
           𝑁𝐵 = 𝐵 (1 − 𝐹𝐵(?̃?))                                  (10) 
Note from expression (9) that market supply of sellers not only depends on 
the service fees 𝑝 and 𝑡 charged by brokers, but also depends on the amount 
of buyers that participate, through the expected buyer valuation ?̅?. 
Furthermore, ?̅? depends negatively on 𝑁𝐵, as is clear from expression (7), 
and hence seller supply is characterized by a negative externality induced 
by the participation decision of buyers. This because high value buyers enter 
the market first and because sellers do not know to which buyer they will 
be matched when they decide on participation (matching is random). This 
implies that increased buyer participation lowers the sales price sellers 
expect to receive, which in turn lowers seller supply. Similarly, expression 
(10) shows that market demand for buyers is characterized by a negative 
externality induced by the participation decision of sellers, through the 
expected seller reservation price ?̅?. Low reservation price sellers enter the 
market first and hence increased seller participation raises the sales price 
buyers expect to pay, which in turn lowers buyer demand. These 
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externalities, which exist by the presence of transferable utility among 
sellers and buyers in the model, will prove to be important for the results 
reported below.5  
Using the definitions of ?̃? and ?̃? allows us to write the market clearing flat 
fee 𝑝 and commission rate 𝑡 as a function of marginal and average 
preference values of sellers and buyers: 
𝑝 =
?̃??̃? − ?̅??̅?
?̅? − ?̃?
                                                 (11) 
1 − 𝑡 =
?̃? − ?̅?
?̅? − ?̃?
                                               (12) 
Expressions (11) and (12) can be interpreted as a system of inverse demand 
equations, in which ?̃? = 𝐹𝐵
−1
(1 − 𝑁𝐵/𝐵) and ?̃? = 𝐹𝑆
−1
(𝑁𝑆/𝑆), as 
follows from (9) and (10), and ?̅? and ?̅? are given by expressions (7) and (8). 
In what follows, it will be assumed that any equilibrium market allocation 
                                                 
5 Note that there is an additional channel through which externalities can result from the 
participation decision of users on either side. As is clear from the expressions (5) and (6) 
for expected seller and buyer utilities, respectively, the match probabilities of users on both 
sides, 𝑚𝑆 = min[𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆] /𝑁𝑆 and 𝑚𝐵 = min[𝑁𝐵, 𝑁𝑆] /𝑁𝐵, also depend on the 
participation decision of users on both sides. The assumption that the matching technology 
is efficient, however, will imply that brokers always balance the market, as formalized 
below. This in turn implies that the match probabilities of both buyers and sellers are equal 
to 1 in equilibrium and that the internalization of these externalities will not explicitly 
appear in the optimal pricing conditions of brokers (nor in those of the social planner). 
Allowing for additional frictions in the matching process would deflect us from the main 
focus of this paper, which is to investigate the implications of imperfect broker competition 
in pricing their services on market efficiency in the long-run, a focus for which the efficient 
matching assumption seems reasonable. That is, one could consider our model as reduced 
form to analyzing the market outcome in a dynamic model at the long-run steady state 
equilibrium, where we are not directly concerned with the cyclical fluctuations around this 
steady state. See, Goos, Van Cayseele and Willekens (2014) for a more general treatment 
of the implications of short-run matching frictions on optimal platform pricing. 
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𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆 is uniquely established through the two market clearing values of 
the pricing instruments 𝑝 and 𝑡 that follow from (11) and (12). In other 
words, we assume that the two available pricing instruments suffice to 
resolve the coordination problem faced by the brokers to attract two distinct 
user groups in the presence of indirect network externalities.6 
2.3 Imperfect broker competition (stage 2) and social 
first-best 
Expected broker profits can be written as: 
𝜋 = (𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶) min[𝑛𝐵 , 𝑛𝑆] − 𝐹𝐶                              (13) 
where 𝑀𝐶 ≥ 0 denotes a constant per-match cost incurred by each broker 
when matching buyers and sellers, 𝐹𝐶 ≥ 0 denotes a fixed cost incurred by 
                                                 
6 The described coordination problem, also referred to as the chicken-and-egg problem, is 
well-known from the two-sided markets literature. In that literature various solutions were 
proposed to resolve the problem. For example, Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) introduce 
the concept of “favorable beliefs”, Weyl (2010) introduces the concept of “insulating 
tariffs” for monopoly and White and Weyl (2012) of “insulated equilibrium” for platform 
competition and Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) introduce restrictions on the magnitude of 
network effects to guaranty existence and uniqueness in differentiated Bertrand 
equilibrium. None of these concepts are directly applicable to the present setting, however, 
by our assumption on transferable user utilities. We view exploring this issue as an 
important direction for future research, however, beyond the scope of this paper. One 
argument in favor of our simplifying assumption that the coordination problem is always 
resolved is that it is supported by the data used in the empirical part of this paper, which 
show that none of the investigated local markets unravels to the non-participation 
equilibrium, even though only a flat and proportional fee charged to sellers is used as a 
pricing instrument by brokers. In a sense this is not surprising, given that it is precisely an 
important part of the “job” of real estate brokers to deal with this coordination problem. 
Furthermore, brokers can credibly commit to buyers and sellers to resolve the problem to 
their best effort, given that payments to the broker only occur when a transaction is actually 
established. By this logic, the coordination problem is less of an issue in markets with 
transferable utilities and conditional payments compared to the classic two-markets 
examples where the platform has no direct control over the interactions between attracted 
user groups, like payment cards or newspapers.  
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each broker to operate in the market, independent of the amount of matches 
established, and 𝐴𝑅 is defined as expected per-match marginal revenue: 
𝐴𝑅 ≡ 𝑝 + 𝑡?̅?                                                  (14) 
in which ?̅? denotes the expected transaction price of transactions that occur 
through the brokerage market, which can be written as: 
?̅? = 𝛽?̅? + (1 − 𝛽)?̃?                                           (15) 
Note that by using expressions (11), (12) and (15), average per-match 
revenue can be written as a function marginal and average user types, which 
in turn only depend on the amount of buyers and sellers attracted in the 
brokerage market and not on the specific pricing instruments used by the 
brokers: 
𝐴𝑅 =  𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?) + (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)                       (16) 
To model symmetric imperfect competition among brokers in providing 
their service to the market, we follow the approach proposed by Weyl and 
Fabinger (2013) by which the degree of imperfect competition can be 
captured by a single “conduct parameter”, extended to our setup where 
competing brokers attract and efficiently match two distinct user groups. To 
do so, we first impose the assumption that competitive interactions among 
brokers (and the distributions of buyer and seller types) are restricted such 
that average per-match revenue for individual brokers is strictly decreasing 
in the amount of users attracted on both sides of the market, i.e. 𝑑𝐴𝑅/𝑑𝑛𝐼 <
0 for 𝐼 = 𝐵, 𝑆. This implies that individual broker profits, given by 
expression (13), are strictly decreasing in the amount of users on one side if 
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the attracted amount of users on that side exceeds the amount of users 
attracted on the other side, i.e. 𝑑𝜋/𝑑𝑛𝐼 < 0 if 𝑛𝐼 > 𝑛𝐽 for 𝐼 ≠ 𝐽. This in 
turn implies that any profit maximizing equilibrium must always be 
balanced, i.e. 𝑛𝑆 = 𝑛𝐵 = 𝑛 or, equivalently, 𝑁𝑆 = 𝑁𝐵 = 𝑀. If not, brokers 
can always raise profits by lowering the amount of users on the long side of 
the market. This result directly follows from the assumption that the 
matching technology available to brokers is efficient. This conveniently 
allows us to convert the problem of brokers competing to attract users on 
two distinct sides into a problem where the brokers compete in a single 
quantity (𝑛) by using one of the available pricing instruments (e.g. 𝑝). The 
other available pricing instrument (e.g. 𝑡) is “mechanically” adjusted to 
ensure the balanced market condition holds and therefore no longer needs 
to be considered as a strategic variable. 
Now, following Weyl and Fabinger (2013) (who themselves build on earlier 
contributions in the literature by Bresnahan (1989) and Genesove and 
Mullin (1998)), instead of explicitly modeling the interactions among 
competing brokers, we assume that in any imperfectly competitive 
equilibrium the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index is set equal to a conduct 
parameter 𝜃, which in our model satisfies: 
𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶
𝐴𝑅
(−
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝐴𝑅
𝐴𝑅
𝑀
) = 𝜃                              (17)  
where 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] when the broker services are substitutes, which we assume 
to be the case throughout this paper. As formalized by Weyl and Fabinger 
(2013), this framework nests a broad range of imperfect competition 
models, among which monopoly or cartel (𝜃 = 1), Bertrand (𝜃 = 0), 
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Cournot (𝜃 = 1/𝑁), Bresnahan (1989)’s constant conjectural variations 
model (𝜃 = (1 + 𝑅)/𝑁 where 𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑛 = 1 + 𝑅), symmetrically 
differentiated Nash-in-prices and monopolistic competition. For the latter 
two models 𝜃 is not a constant. We do not derive explicit conditions for 
these models for our setup (where we would have to account for the 
“mechanical” adjustment of 𝑡), however, given that none of the results in 
the next section hinge on the specific underlying model of imperfect 
competition. The only thing that matters, is that any model outcome on the 
continuum between monopoly and Bertrand is a feasible imperfect 
competition equilibrium, which we assume to be case. 
To evaluate market efficiency in the second stage of the model, the private 
market equilibrium it is compared to the outcome determined a Pigouvian 
planner that optimally chooses the number sellers 𝑁𝑆 and buyers 𝑁𝐵 
attracted in the brokerage industry to maximize total social value, taking the 
amount of brokers that operate the market as given. Total social value 
generated in the market is equal to the sum of total industry profits 𝛱 ≡ 𝜋𝑁 
and total consumer surplus 𝐶𝑆, defined as the sum of total buyer and seller 
surplus, which can be written as: 
𝐶𝑆 = (𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?) + (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)) min[𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆]           (18) 
By combining equations (13), (16) and (18), total social value 𝑊 simplifies 
to: 
𝑊 = (?̅? − ?̅? − 𝑀𝐶) min[𝑁𝐵 , 𝑁𝑆] − 𝐹𝐶 ∗ 𝑁                (19) 
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It can easily be shown that ?̅? − ?̅? is strictly decreasing in 𝑁𝐵 and 𝑁𝑆, which 
implies that the Pigouvian planner always balances the market, i.e. 
𝑁𝐵 = 𝑁𝑆 = 𝑀, because welfare is strictly decreasing in participation on the 
long side of the market. This again conveniently allows us to simplify the 
social optimization problem to a problem with a single strategic decision 
variable, in this case 𝑀.  
2.4 Free broker entry (stage 1) and social second-best 
In the first stage of the model brokers can freely enter the market and they 
will do so as long as profits of the marginal entrant are weakly positive. 
Ignoring the integer constraint on the number of brokers (in the empirical 
part of this paper we do account for this) and by our assumptions on broker 
symmetry this implies that individual broker profits must be equal to zero 
in the free entry equilibrium, i.e. 𝜋 = 0. 
The private outcome of the first stage of the model is compared to that of a 
social planner who optimally chooses the amount of brokers that operate the 
market, taking private broker once they entered the market as given. That 
is, the planner maximizes 𝑊, given by expression (19) in which 𝑁𝐵 =
𝑁𝑆 = 𝑛𝑁, by optimally choosing 𝑁, taking into account that the amount of 
buyers and sellers attracted by individual brokers 𝑛 is affected by 𝑁 through 
the private first-order conditions in the second stage of the model. This 
second-best social optimization problem is the one considered by Mankiw 
and Whinston (1986) to evaluate the distortions that can arise from 
unrestricted entry in markets characterized by the presence of fixed costs. It 
is particularly relevant to analyze this specific welfare criterion in our 
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model, given that Hsieh and Moretti (2003) show in a model with fixed 
commission rates that the presence of fixed costs combined with free broker 
entry can result in significant social waste due to excessive entry. We 
reevaluate this issue in our setting with imperfectly competitive service fees. 
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3 Analysis 
3.1 Private market equilibrium (stage 2) and the first-
best social optimum 
Proposition 4.1 summarizes the private market equilibrium when an 
exogenous amount 𝑁 of symmetric brokers operate the market. The result 
follows from equating 𝑁𝑆 and 𝑁𝐵 to 𝑀 in expression (16) for average per-
match revenue, differentiating with respect to 𝑀 and substituting the 
solution in the imperfect competition equation (17). 
Proposition 4.1 Optimal private broker behavior implies that the 
equilibrium amount of matches established through the brokerage market 
𝑀 satisfies: 
𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶 = 𝜃(𝑀𝑆 + 𝐸𝑇)                                    (20) 
where 𝑀𝑆 denotes marginal consumer surplus, defined as 𝑑𝐶𝑆/𝑑𝑀, which 
can be written as: 
𝑀𝑆 = 𝛽
𝐹𝑆(?̃?)
𝑓𝑆(?̃?)
+ (1 − 𝛽)
1 − 𝐹𝐵(?̃?)
𝑓𝐵(?̃?)
                       (21) 
and 𝐸𝑇 refers to an “externality tax”, raised to internalize the cross-side 
participation externalities in buyer demand and seller supply, which can be 
written as: 
𝐸𝑇 = 𝛽(?̅? − ?̃?) + (1 − 𝛽)(?̃? − ?̅?)                          (22) 
Expression (20) shows that the markup of average per-match revenue over 
per-match marginal cost is increasing in the conduct parameter 𝜃, ranging 
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from zero under Bertrand competition (𝜃 = 0) to 𝑀𝑆 + 𝐸𝑇, which is the 
monopoly markup (𝜃 = 1). The first term, 𝑀𝑆, denotes marginal consumer 
surplus, which in a standard monopoly model is equal to the inverse hazard 
rate (or semi-elasticity) of demand and coincides with the classic Cournot 
distortion. In the present setting, 𝑀𝑆 is equal to the weighted sum of inverse 
hazard rates of seller supply and buyer demand, where the weights are equal 
to the bargaining weight of users on these respective sides. This is intuitive, 
if one side possesses no bargaining power in determining property sales 
prices, users on that side capture no surplus from transactions and hence no 
surplus can be extracted by brokers from that side, independent of the 
elasticity of demand (supply) on that side. 
The second term, 𝐸𝑇, refers to the ‘externality tax’ raised by brokers to 
internalize the negative externality that the participation decision of 
marginal participants on either side causes on expected utility of cross-side 
participants. From expression (22) it is clear that the magnitude of the tax 
depends on the spread between average and marginal user types on both 
sides or, in other words, on the degree of heterogeneity in user types. For 
example, sellers care about the expected buyer valuation when they enter 
the market. When buyers are homogeneous in there valuation, sellers are 
indifferent to which buyer they will be matched and the participation 
decision of the marginal buyer causes no externalities. In this case, ?̅? = ?̃? 
and the first term in 𝐸𝑇 disappears because there is no externalities for 
brokers to internalize on the buyer side. In contrast, when dispersion in 
buyer valuations is large, the spread between the marginal and average 
buyer valuation will be large and that marginal buyer entails a large 
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externality. The tax raised to internalize this externality is precisely the 
spread between the average and marginal buyer valuation, weighted by the 
bargaining strength of sellers. Similarly, the tax to internalize the externality 
on the seller side is equal to spread between the marginal and average seller 
(where the former has a higher reservation price than the latter which is 
disliked by buyers), weighted by the measure of buyer bargaining power. 
Proposition 4.2 summarizes the first-best social optimum chosen by a 
Pigouvian planner. The result follows from equating 𝑁𝑆 and 𝑁𝐵 to 𝑀 in 
expression (19) for total social value and rewriting the first-order condition 
with respect to 𝑀. The socially optimal degree of broker competition is 
derived from equating the private and social first-order conditions. 
Proposition 4.2 At the first-best social optimum, the equilibrium amount of 
matches established through the brokerage market 𝑀∗ satisfies: 
𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶 = 𝐸𝑇                                             (23) 
This implies that the socially optimal degree of competition among brokers 
in a private market satisfies: 
𝜃∗ =
𝐸𝑇
𝑀𝑆 + 𝐸𝑇
                                              (24) 
Expression (23) demonstrates that a Pigouvian planner also taxes the 
negative externalities induced by the participation decision of users on both 
sides. Furthermore, it does so exactly to the same extent a monopolist does 
in the private market, as is clear from expression (20). The externality tax 
is strictly positive in the presence of heterogeneity in buyer and/or seller 
types, which implies that Bertrand competition among brokers (𝐴𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶) 
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is not socially optimal. In this case, broker fees are too low and the 
equilibrium amount of matches too high compared to the social optimum, 
because the participations externalities present in the market are not 
properly internalized. On the other hand, the monopoly outcome can never 
be efficient, because on top of the externality tax, broker fees are marked 
up by the weighted Cournot distortion, which results in upward distorted 
broker fees and hence insufficient participation. So, in a private market there 
exists an intermediate degree of imperfect competition 𝜃∗ which establishes 
the first-best social optimum. Expression (24) shows that 𝜃∗ depends on the 
magnitude of 𝑀𝑆 relative to 𝐸𝑇. When marginal consumer surplus is small 
relative to the externality tax, the desired degree of market power is large 
and vice versa. Which of both measures is largest depends on the underlying 
distributions of user types and relative bargaining weights, as is clear from 
expressions (21) and (22). 
Note that this result is consistent with the findings of Mahoney and Weyl 
(2014), who demonstrate a similar inverse u-shaped relationship exists in 
selection markets characterized by advantageous selection. The present 
market can also be interpreted as being characterized by advantageous 
selection in the sense that high willingness to pay buyers and low 
reservation price sellers are also the ones that bring most value to market 
through the established transactions. Similar to Mahoney and Weyl (2014), 
figure 1 summarizes the findings in propositions 4.1 and 4.2 graphically for 
linear buyer demand and seller supply, illustrating that the social optimum 
lies in between monopoly and Bertrand and requires a positive wedge 
between the 𝐴𝑅-curve and the 𝑀𝐶-curve. 
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Figure 1: Imperfectly competitive social optimum 
 
3.2 Free broker entry (stage 1) and the second-best 
social optimum 
Under free broker entry, the private market outcome is summarized by the 
following zero-profit condition: 
𝜋 = (𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶)
𝑀
𝑁
− 𝐹𝐶 = 0                                 (25) 
This implies that in free entry equilibrium average revenue is equated to 
average cost, 𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝐶, where 𝐴𝐶 = 𝑀𝐶 + (𝐹𝐶 ∗ 𝑁)/𝑀. The amount of 
brokers that enter the market depends on the markup they expect to receive 
in the second stage, given by expression (20). For example, when brokers 
collude on charging monopoly service fees, 𝐴𝑅 and 𝑀 are independent of 
the amount of entrants and 𝑁 is equal to (𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶)𝑀/𝐹𝐶. At the other 
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extreme, equation (25) shows that Bertrand equilibrium (𝐴𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶) is not 
feasible in the presence of positive fixed costs, given that a second entrant 
would not be willing to enter the market, consistent with Yavas (2001). 
More generally, when market power in the second stage is sufficiently large 
to cover the fixed cost of at least two entrants, the number of brokers that 
operate the market follows from the zero-profit condition (25), where 𝐴𝑅 
and 𝑀 depend on 𝑁 through the private first-order condition (20). In what 
follows, we denote the free entry equilibrium number of brokers that operate 
the market as 𝑁𝑒. This equilibrium is unique when assumptions (a), (b) and 
(c) specified in proposition 4.3 are satisfied. 
Proposition 4.3 summarizes the second-best social optimum of  a social 
planner that optimally chooses the number of brokers that operate the 
market, taking their private behavior once they have entered the market as 
given (ignoring the integer constraint on the number of brokers), as in 
Mankiw and Whinston (1986). 
Proposition 4.3 If for any 𝑁: (a) 𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑁 = 𝑛 + 𝑁𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑁 > 0, (b) 
𝑁𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑁 < 0 and (c) 𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶 > 0, then the free entry equilibrium 
number of brokers 𝑁𝑒 strictly exceeds the socially optimal number of 
brokers, denoted by 𝑁∗∗. 
At the second-best social optimum, the equilibrium amount of matches 
established through the brokerage market 𝑀∗∗ satisfies: 
𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶 = 𝐸𝑇 +
𝐹𝐶
𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑁
                                    (26) 
151 
 
Proof Differentiating expression (19) for total social value, in which 𝑁𝑆 =
𝑁𝐵 = 𝑛𝑁, with respect to 𝑁 yields: 
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑁
= (?̃? − ?̃? − 𝑀𝐶) (𝑛 + 𝑁
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑁
) − 𝐹𝐶                         (27) 
Equating expression (27) to zero, using the expressions for 𝐴𝑅 (16) and 𝐸𝑇 
(22), that 𝑛 + 𝑁𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑁 = 𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑁 and rewriting yields expression (26). 
Note that 𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑁 can be written as a function of 𝑀 by solving the private 
first-order condition (20) for 𝑁 as a function of 𝑀 (the solution is unique by 
assumption (b)) before differentiating. So, expression (26) can be written 
solely as a function of 𝑀 (independent of 𝑁) and hence can be solved for 
the equilibrium amount of matches at the second-best social optimum, 
which is convenient to interpret the results in comparison to the previous 
findings. 
The excessive entry result follows from adding to and subtracting from 
expression (27) expression (13) for individual broker profits, in which 𝑛𝑆 =
𝑛𝐵 = 𝑛 and 𝑁𝑆 = 𝑁𝐵 = 𝑛𝑁, which after rewriting yields: 
𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑁
= 𝜋 + (𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶)𝑁
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑁
− 𝐸𝑇 (𝑛 + 𝑁
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑁
)                (28) 
Expression (28) illustrates the distortions that result from free entry in the 
private market relative to the social optimum. Under free entry in the private 
market individual broker profits equate zero (𝜋 = 0), while entry is socially 
optimal when the impact of the marginal entrant on social welfare is zero 
(𝑑𝑊/𝑑𝑁 = 0). So, expression (28) implies that private entry and socially 
optimal entry coincide when the sum of the second and the third term equals 
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zero. When the sum of these terms is negative, there is excessive entry. This 
because 𝑑𝜋/𝑑𝑁 < 0, so 𝑑𝑊/𝑑𝑁 = 0 only holds when the number of 
brokers is smaller than under private entry. By assumptions (a)-(c) and the 
fact that 𝐸𝑇 > 0, the last two term in (28) are strictly negative and hence 
the private free entry equilibrium is unambiguously characterized by 
excessive entry. QED 
The result that the private free entry equilibrium is always characterized by 
excessive entry is consistent with the findings of Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986), who demonstrate under the same set of assumptions (a)-(c) that in 
standard oligopoly models there is always excessive entry in the presence 
of fixed costs. The intuition is that private brokers when they enter the 
market do not internalize a negative externality on the profits earned by 
incumbent brokers, referred to as the business-stealing effect. That is, when 
a new broker enters, the market “expands” (assumption (a)) in the sense that 
more matches will be established through the brokerage market, but if the 
market expansion is smaller than the individual amount of matches 
established by the incumbent brokers prior to the entry decision of the 
marginal entrant, this entrant also “steals business” from the incumbent 
brokers (assumption (b)). Absent of fixed costs, business-stealing has no 
social cost, i.e. generated revenues in the market are simply divided by more 
brokers. In the presence of fixed costs, however, business-stealing implies 
that investments in fixed costs are “wasted” from a social point of view, 
given that the same market outcome could also be established by less 
brokers and hence less investments in fixed costs. 
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In this light, a brokerage market where commission rates are “fixed”, as for 
the US case analyzed by Hsieh and Moretti (2003), is the worst case 
scenario. This because the amount of matches that occur through the 
brokerage market is also fixed and entry of brokers induces only a business-
stealing effect and no market expansion effect and hence the social cost 
from free entry will be maximal. For comparison, one can think of this case 
as brokers colluding on the monopoly service fee in the present setting, in 
which case 𝑀 is also unaffected by 𝑁. Compared to this case, increased 
broker competition is likely to mitigate the problem, given that this implies 
that additional entrants expand the market. There is a limit to this, however, 
given that there exists an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree 
of broker competition and welfare in the present setting, as formalized 
above. Furthermore, expression (26) shows that the second-best social 
planner internalizes the additional externality induced by the entry decision 
of brokers by setting an even higher markup of average revenue over 
marginal cost compared to the first-best social optimum, given by 
expression (23). The divergence between the first-best and the second-best 
is larger when fixed entry costs are larger and when the market expansion 
effect (𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑁 = 𝑛 + 𝑁𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑁) relative to the business-stealing effect 
(𝑁𝑑𝑛/𝑑𝑁) is smaller or, in other words, when the social cost induced by 
the marginal entrant is higher. 
The comparison between social first-best (23) and second-best (26) is also 
instructive about the effectiveness of various policy instruments that could 
potentially be used to regulate real estate brokerage markets. To see this, 
note that the first-best social optimum can only be established when fixed 
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entry costs are zero. So, should a policy maker be able to eliminate all fixed 
operating costs, the first-best could be established by regulating the service 
fees charged by the brokers in such a way that the degree of broker 
competition satisfies the socially optimal level 𝜃 = 𝜃∗. If one is not able to 
influence fixed operating costs, however, if one plans to regulate the service 
fees in the market, one should also be concerned with the amount of brokers 
that enter the market. 
More specifically, when the observed service fee is below the socially 
optimal level, regulating the service fee brokers are allowed to charge will 
result in a conflict of interest. Raising the fee will bring it closer to its 
desired level, but it will also worsen the entry distortion because a higher 
markup for a given fixed cost will incentivize more brokers to enter the 
market. In this case, it is preferable to regulate broker entry and aim for the 
social second-best described in proposition 4.3 because this outcome 
internalizes (although imperfectly) both the price and entry distortion. That 
is, restricting the number of brokers allowed to operate the market will both 
raise the service fee and mitigate the entry distortion.  
In contrast, when the observed service fee is above the socially optimal 
level, the opposite policy recommendation holds. Restricting entry will 
mitigate the entry distortion, but will also undesirably further raise the 
service fee. In contrast, regulating the service fee in this case can again 
mitigate both distortions at the same time, given that for a lower service fee 
some brokers will be forced to exit the market. 
Figure 2 summarizes the model outcomes under free broker entry, 
illustrating the case where the observed free entry equilibrium implies that 
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that the service fee is below the socially optimal fee. The picture shows the 
first-best social optimum which can only be established should the regulator 
be able to eliminate all fixed entry costs and regulate the service fee, which 
coincides with the social optimum depicted in figure 1 above. In addition, 
the figure also illustrates the second-best social optimum that can be 
established should the social planner be able to regulate entry, without 
interfering with the fee setting behavior of brokers once they have entered 
the market. 
Figure 2: First- and second-best social optimum for downward distorted service fees 
 
In the empirical part of this paper, we aim to quantify the first-best and 
second-best welfare counterfactuals for realistic parameter values derived 
from the data. For this purpose, the next section starts with presenting a 
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methodology that allows us to identify the relevant model parameters from 
potentially observable market outcomes in real estate brokerage markets. 
4 Identification 
4.1 Preferences and bargaining weight  
To be able to construct the welfare counterfactuals described in the previous 
section it is necessary to have information regarding the underlying 
distributions of buyer valuations and the reservation prices of sellers, which 
are typically unobserved. The purpose of this section is to describe a 
possible identification strategy for these underlying distributions when 
market outcomes, such as the flat fee, the percentage fee, the distribution of 
transaction prices and the total market share of the brokerage industry, are 
observed. Imagine, for now, that we have gathered a perfect dataset with an 
infinitely large number of transactions between different buyers and sellers 
of the homogeneous housing good7 where a certain fraction of transactions 
is carried out with the help of real estate agents. Assume furthermore that 
we know that the full distribution of transaction prices (both for the market 
as a whole and those transactions carried out by real estate agents) and the 
fees charged by real estate agents. The question now is whether we can 
                                                 
7 Imagine, for instance, that an infinitely large number of pairs of buyers and sellers bargain 
over an identical house at an identical location at the same time. Although housing is 
obviously not a homogeneous good (houses and apartments differ in size, location, time of 
sale, and many other features) the intuition is that we can attribute all observed price 
variation solely to differences in buyers’ valuations and sellers’ reservation prices. The 
methods to cope with the inherent heterogeneity of the housing good are discussed in 
section 5.1. 
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retrieve the underlying distributions of buyer valuations and seller 
reservation prices. 
To identify these two preference distributions it is necessary to impose some 
parametric structure, which will allow us to map a single distribution of 
observed prices onto the two underlying distributions of buyer valuations 
and seller reservation prices. With an infinitely large number of buyers and 
sellers who potentially bargain over a homogeneous housing good it is most 
natural, and will also prove to be convenient in solving the model, to assume 
that both buyer valuations and seller reservation prices are normally 
distributed.8 More specifically, assume that buyer valuations and seller 
reservation prices are distributed as follows: 
𝑏~𝑁(𝜇𝑏, 𝜎𝑏) and 𝑠~𝑁(𝜇𝑠, 𝜎𝑠)                                  (29) 
Given our assumption that transaction prices are the result of an asymmetric 
Nash-bargain we know that if both buyer valuations and seller reservation 
prices are normally distributed transaction prices are also normally 
distributed, by the property of the normal distribution that the sum of two 
independent normal variables is also normally distributed. It follows that 
the mean and standard deviation of all transaction prices as a weighted sum 
of their respective counterparts of buyer valuations and seller reservation 
prices, that is: 
𝜇𝜌 = 𝛽𝜇𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜇𝑠 and 𝜎𝜌 = 𝛽𝜎𝑏 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜎𝑠              (30) 
                                                 
8 Note that in reality it is typically observed that transaction prices are log-normally 
distributed. Keep in mind, however, that many of the determinants of house prices (such 
as living surface) are also log-normally distributed, which implies that when we control for 
these features, transaction prices might well be normally distributed. 
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Now, recall from section 2 that the average transaction price of transactions 
carried out by real estate agents can be written as a function of the 
bargaining weight and the average and marginal valuation of buyers 
participating through the brokerage market and that these valuations can be 
written as a function of the market share of the brokerage industry and the 
(inverse) distribution of buyer valuations, assuming that the mass of 
potential buyers and sellers is symmetric 𝑆 = 𝐵. More specifically: 
?̅? = 𝛽?̅? + (1 − 𝛽)?̃?                                           (31) 
where ?̅? is given by expression (7) in which 𝑁𝐵 = 𝑀 and ?̃? =
𝐹𝐵
−1
(1 − 𝑀/𝐵). 
Up to this point we have solely used information regarding prices, but we 
assumed also to observe the fees charged by real estate agents. Recall from 
section 2 that the flat fee and commission rate can be written as a function 
of the average and marginal valuations of buyers and sellers participating 
through the brokerage market. Again, the average and marginal valuations 
and reservation prices can be written as a function of the market share of 
the brokerage industry and function of their respective (inverse) 
distributions. More specifically: 
𝑝 =
?̃??̃? − ?̅??̅?
?̅? − ?̃?
 and 𝑡 = 1 −
?̃? − ?̅?
?̅? − ?̃?
                             (32) 
where ?̅? is given by expression (8) in which 𝑁𝑆 = 𝑀 and ?̃? = 𝐹𝑆
−1
(𝑀/𝑆). 
Given that by assumption the market share of real estate agents, the flat fee, 
the commission rate, the average transaction price of transaction carried out 
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by real estate agents, and the mean and standard deviation of the distribution 
of all transactions are observed, expressions (30)-(32) constitute a system 
of 5 equations (𝑝, 𝑡, ?̅?, 𝜇𝜌 and 𝜎𝜌) with 5 unknowns (𝜇𝑏, 𝜇𝑠, 𝜎𝑏, 𝜎𝑠 and 𝛽), 
which we can solve analytically, with a single unique solution. 
4.2 Costs and competitive conduct 
Although the previous subsection suggests an identification strategy for 
retrieving the underlying distribution parameters from observed market 
outcomes and observed variation in prices it remains to characterize the full 
market equilibrium under imperfect broker competition and free entry of 
real estate agents in the first stage of the model. If we are willing to assume 
that there is free entry of real estate agents in the market (stage 1) and they 
will enter as long as their (expected) profits are larger than zero, we can 
extract the constant per-match cost (𝑀𝐶) incurred by each broker when 
matching buyers and sellers. More specifically, by assuming that profits are 
equal to zero and subsequently rewriting equation (13), we obtain: 
𝑀𝐶 = 𝐴𝑅 −
𝐹𝐶 ∗ 𝑁
𝑀
                                          (33) 
which can easily be retrieved when we have information regarding the fixed 
costs incurred by each broker to operate in the market, the number of 
matches by real estate agents, the number of brokers in the market, and the 
average revenue given by expression (16) (which solely depends on the 
preference parameters identified above). A final step in providing a full 
characterization of the observed equilibrium is describing the conduct 
parameter 𝜃 in our model. Provided that we have backed out the constant 
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marginal cost per-match in the previous step we can back out 𝜃 using 
proposition 4.1 that describes the optimal private broker behavior. More 
specifically, by rewriting equation (20), we obtain that: 
𝜃 =
𝐴𝑅 − 𝑀𝐶
𝑀𝑆 + 𝐸𝑇
                                               (34) 
which can be written fully in terms of the previously identified preference 
parameters and marginal costs. 
5 Data and parameter estimates 
5.1 Data and solutions to data limitations 
In the previous section we proposed a possible identification strategy in a 
hypothetical world where we have a perfect dataset containing an infinite 
number of transactions of a homogeneous housing good where, for each 
transaction, we know the transaction price, whether or not the transaction 
was carried out by a real estate agent, and if so, the flat fee and the 
commission rate. For the empirical part of this paper, we have gathered a 
sample of more than 15000 dwellings that were put up for sale by their 
owners through one of 135 agencies of a large (Belgian) franchise system 
of real estate agents between the first quarter of 2011 and the second quarter 
of 2014. Of these 15000 dwellings slightly over 9000 (=63.5%) were 
actually sold within their marketing period. Note that our sample contains 
both properties that were sold and properties that remained unsold, which 
we will use to address the selection problem that not all sellers participate 
through the brokerage market. For every property an exhaustive list of 
characteristics is provided, which will allow us to take into account potential 
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price variation arising from differences in dwelling characteristics. We 
furthermore observe the total commission charged by the real estate agent 
for every transaction and its respective components (the respective flat fee 
and commission rate) when the property was sold throughout its marketing 
period. Summary statistics of the transaction sample are provided in table 
1. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics transactions 
 
The table immediately demonstrate that we are far from a hypothetical 
world in which there exists a homogeneous housing good. The different 
between the 5th and 95th percentile of observed transaction prices is 
approximately 316000 euro’s, which cannot solely be attributed to 
differences in buyer valuations and seller reservation prices, but is also due 
to differences in the underlying characteristics of the respective dwellings. 
This becomes apparent when looking at the last 4 rows of table 1 where we 
observe that there are large differences in the living surface, parcel size, 
number of bedrooms and age of dwellings present in the data. It now 
becomes crucial to disentangle the observed price variation into price 
variation arising from heterogeneity in dwelling characteristics and price 
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variation that can be attributed to heterogeneity in buyer valuations and 
seller reservation prices, which we can use to identify the underlying 
distribution parameters.  
Fortunately, many housing economists have been interested in the (cross-
sectional) determinants of house prices and have developed suitable 
methods. Probably the most well-known method used in the literature is the 
hedonic pricing method (Rosen, 1974), which is a revealed preference 
approach that departs from the assumption that the value or demand for an 
item (in our case house) is determined by the sum of implicit values of its 
constituent characteristics. Where many housing economists have used the 
hedonic pricing method to estimate the externalities that arise from, for 
example, air pollution, we are not intrinsically interested in these estimated 
implicit values, but use the method purely as a filtering mechanism to 
disentangle the different sources of price variation. More specifically, our 
goal is to capture all price variation arising from differences in dwelling 
characteristics in the model and use the remaining price variation (that is 
captured by the residuals) to identify 𝜎𝜌. When we estimate the hedonic 
price model using the following simple regression model (using OLS): 
𝜌𝑖 = 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                               (35) 
We can use the following definitions for the different parameters necessary 
to identify the underlying distributional parameters: 
?̅? = 𝜇𝜌 = 𝛿?̅? and 𝜎𝜌 = √
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜀𝑖2
𝑁
𝑖=1
                      (36) 
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Now, we still face a sample selection problem in the sense that we only 
observe transaction prices for dwellings that were sold by real estate agents, 
which implies that our estimates of 𝜇𝜌 and 𝜎𝜌 in expression (36) are likely 
biased if we do not account for this. Recall from section 2 that only buyers 
above the marginal valuation and sellers below a certain reservation price 
will participate. Although we do not have information concerning 
transactions that occurred in the outside market, our dataset contains 
dwellings that were not sold by real estate agents throughout their marketing 
period, which implies that we can potentially address the selection bias by 
estimating the well-known Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). 
The Heckman selection model addresses the selection problem (i.e. is the 
property sold by a real estate agent?) by explicitly modelling it in the first 
stage and subsequently take it into account by including an additional 
explanatory variable in the outcome equation (i.e. what is the price of the 
dwelling?). More specifically, in the first stage, we estimate the following 
probit model using maximum likelihood estimation: 
Pr (𝑆𝑖 = 1|𝑍𝑖) = Φ(𝛾𝑍𝑖)                                     (37) 
Where 𝑆𝑖 is a dummy-variable that is equal to 1 when the property is sold, 
and 0 otherwise. Once we have explicitly modeled the selection process, we 
can take into account the (potential) selection effect by adding the inverse 
Mill’s ratio (which can be defined as ?̂?𝑖(𝛼𝑢) =
𝜑(?̂?𝑍𝑖)
Φ(?̂?𝑍𝑖)
) as an additional 
explanatory variable in the outcome equation (stage 2). We thus estimate 
the following equation in the second stage: 
𝜌𝑖|𝑧𝑖
∗ > 0 = 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝜆𝜆𝑖(𝛼𝑢) + 𝜈𝑖                            (38) 
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Now that we have used the Heckman selection model where our second 
stage is a hedonic pricing model, we can retrieve the necessary parameters 
using the following definitions: 
?̅? = 𝛿?̅? + 𝛿𝜆𝜆(?̅?𝑢), 𝜇𝜌 = 𝛿 and ?̅?𝜎𝜌 =
𝛿𝜆
𝜉
  where 𝜉 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜐, 𝜈)   (39) 
Once we have retrieved the distributional parameters we need additional 
information to identify the necessary market parameters. In section 4.2 it 
was shown that the constant per-match cost can be identified when we are 
willing to assume that we’re in a steady state equilibrium where brokers 
earn zero profits and we have information regarding the fixed costs real 
estate agents incur to operate, the number of matches carried out by brokers, 
and the number of brokers that is active in the market. 
As in Hsieh & Moretti (2003) we assume that the fixed costs brokers incur 
is equal to the reservation wage, for which we use the average remuneration 
per person in the services sector in Belgium in 2012. We retrieve data 
concerning the average remuneration from the website of the National Bank 
of Belgium (NBB). In addition, the National Statistics Office (ADSEI) 
publishes statistics concerning the total number of transactions that were 
registered in a certain administrative area at a certain time. This, together 
with the fact that we know that 63.5% of all houses that were put up for sale 
were sold by brokers allows us to calculate the number of matches carried 
out by real estate agents. Finally, information concerning the number of real 
estate agents active in the market which is necessary to identify the constant 
cost per-match was kindly provided to us by the Belgian professional 
association of real estate agents (BIV). Since real estate agents are obligated 
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to register with the BIV to be allowed to carry out transactions, but are not 
necessarily active this proxy for N should be interpreted as an upper bound. 
Given that we use 𝑁 to identify 𝑀𝐶 and subsequently the competitive 
conduct parameter 𝜃, it is important to clarify the market definition we use 
in the empirical analysis. Schaumans & Verboven (2013) use ZIP-codes as 
their local market definition in their study on local service sectors, among 
which real estate brokers, in Belgium. The authors suggest, however, that 
this market definition might not be fully appropriate for brokers (where it 
do seems appropriate for the other local services studied). In our analysis 
we therefore define the geographic market at the more aggregate level of 
the administrative districts. There are 43 administrative districts in Belgium, 
which largely correspond with a city and its respective agglomeration and 
rural areas. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the market 
definition, which will be used in the subsequent analysis. 
Table 2: descriptive statistics districts for 2013 (obs = 43) 
 
The descriptive statistics presented in table 2 suggest that large differences 
exists between different market areas in Belgium. Where the Brussels 
Capital Region for example houses more than 1600 brokers, there are only 
10 registered brokers in Bastogne. We use the average number of real estate 
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agents in a local market as our measure of N. The other variables presented 
in table 2 also display a large degree of heterogeneity, as is to be expected. 
We furthermore use the (average of) the total number of transactions to 
calculate the number of matches by real estate agents, that is 0.635 =
 𝑀/2832, which implies that 𝑀 = 1798.  
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5.2 Parameter estimates 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in table 3.  
Table 3: parameter estimates
 
The first part of the table contains information regarding the observed 
market equilibrium. We observe that in an average local market there are 
208 (registered) brokers, who charge an average flat fee of approximately 
€2800 and an average commission rate of 3.4%. Furthermore, we observe 
that approximately 63.5% of all dwellings that were put up for sale were 
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sold within their marketing period by the broker. As mentioned previously, 
we assume that the fixed cost incurred by each broker is equal to the average 
(yearly) wage observed in the services sector and is equal to approximately 
€48500.  
In the second part of the table we present the main results from our Heckman 
selection model, where we control for both heterogeneity in dwelling 
characteristics and the potential selection problem. As was expected, we 
observe that the average transaction price charged by brokers (represented 
by ?̅?) is higher than the average transaction price in the whole market 
(represented by 𝜇𝜌). 𝜎𝜌 reveals that despite that we control for dwelling 
heterogeneity, there is a substantial degree of remaining price variation, 
which we attribute to differences in buyer valuations and seller reservation 
prices in our model.  
Using the information from the first two parts of the table and the 
identification strategy we proposed in section 4 we can identify the 
underlying distributional parameters. Our estimates reveal that the mean of 
buyer valuations is slightly below the mean of seller reservation prices 
(225171 vs. 222103). Our estimates also reveal that buyers, however, are 
more dispersed in their valuations, which is represented by the slightly 
higher standard deviation of the distribution (53433 vs. 51804). Finally, the 
estimates reveal that sellers have a relatively high bargaining weight of 0.79. 
The third part of table 3 in addition presents the according marginal and 
average buyer valuations and seller reservation prices.  
The calibration further suggests that the average per-match cost of a 
transaction is equal to approximately €4600. In a final step we back out the 
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parameter of competitive conduct 𝜃, which is equal to approximately 0.021 
in our model. This low estimate suggest that there is strong competition 
among brokers in setting their service fees.  
6 Welfare counterfactuals 
This section presents three welfare counterfactuals based the estimated 
parameter values in the previous section. Firstly, the first-best reported in 
proposition 4.2, which serves solely as a hypothetical benchmark given that 
it can never be established in the presence of fixed costs. Secondly, the 
second-best outcome reported in proposition 4.3 should a social planner that 
aims to maximize social value be able to regulate entry (𝑁), leaving the 
private behavior of brokers once they have entered the market unspecified. 
Thirdly, the outcome of a “naive” social planner that regulates service fees 
with the purpose to achieve the first-best, neglecting the effects on the entry 
distortions, which serves to illustrate the importance of the proper choice of 
policy instrument used to regulate the market. 
More specifically, the first counterfactual is obtained by simply substituting 
the relevant parameter estimates in equation (23) and solving for 𝑀∗, setting 
𝑁 = 0 (which in terms of welfare is equivalent to setting the fixed costs 
equal to zero) and subsequently calculating the model outcomes using the 
relevant equations implied by the model. The second counterfactual follows 
from expression (26), where the market expansion effect (𝑑𝑀/𝑑𝑁) is 
simulated through the private first-order condition, given by expression 
(20). To do this, we assume that competitive conduct follows Bresnahan 
(1989)’s constant conjectural variations model, where 𝜃 = (1 + 𝑅)/𝑁, 
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assuming that 𝑅 is pinned down by the observed free entry equilibrium and 
is subsequently kept constant, which allows us to simulate the value of 𝑀 
for a broad range of values for 𝑁. The third counterfactual results in the 
same allocation as the first, through expression (23), but all broker profits 
are now dissipated by free broker entry. Table 4 reports the results. 
Table 4: Welfare counterfactuals 
 
The results suggest that welfare generated in the market uder the different 
scenarios is ranked as follows: first-best ≥ regulating 𝑁 ≥ observed 
outcome ≥ regulating 𝑝 and 𝑡. In the hypothetical first-best scenario the 
social planner can perfectly take into account the distortions from both entry 
(fixed costs) and the externalities of cross-side participation in buyer 
demand and seller supply, as reported in the second column. The third 
column shows, however, that the second-best outcome that could be 
established by regulating entry is estimated to come very close to the first-
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best. In contrast, the last column demonstrates that when the social planner 
would only regulate prices, ignoring the social waste as a result of excessive 
entry, the resulting price increase would induce a large number of new 
brokers to enter the market, dissipating all profits, which would result in an 
enormous welfare loss due to excessive entry ending up in a worse situation 
compared to observed starting point. 
Quantitatively, the results should be interpreted with some caution given 
that up to this point we have not provided any sensitivity or robustness 
analysis for the various assumptions made and techniques used to establish 
the findings. This work is still in progress. In addition, two notes of caution 
are in place about the results in table 4. Firstly, note that moving from the 
observed market outcome to the social first-best would induce a large shift 
in surplus from buyers and sellers to brokers. It is a normative question 
whether a social planner is willing to allow for such a shift in return for the 
gains in market efficiency. 
Secondly, as already emphasized in the theory section, the welfare 
recommendations that result from the analysis are highly contingent on 
whether in the observed market equilibrium the broker fees are below the 
socially optimal fees, as reported here, or above. In the latter case the policy 
recommendations reverse and regulating the service fees is likely to be 
preferable over regulating entry. It is therefore extremely important for a 
social planner that contemplates to regulate a private brokerage market, to 
be aware of the “position” of the observed market equilibrium compared to 
the hypothetical first-best. We are still exploring whether we can derive 
some reduced form tests from our framework, for example, by exploiting 
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cross local market variation in broker service fees, market shares and sales 
prices, which could pin down the position of observed market equilibria on 
the locus between Bertrand and monopoly (broker collusion), without 
having to impose the structure required now to establish the results. 
7 Conclusions 
This chapter presented a model of imperfect competition among brokers 
that operate in a market for real estate and charge a service fee to sellers, 
that consists of flat and proportional component and is allowed to be 
imperfectly passed through to buyers through an asymmetric Nash bargain 
over the sale price of the traded real estate properties. In this setting it is 
shown that there exists an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree 
of price competition among brokers in setting their service fees and social 
value generated in the market. Thus neither monopoly (broker collusion) 
nor Bertrand, but an intermediate degree of price competition is optimal 
from a social point of view. The crucial feature of the model that drives this 
result is that there is uncertainty about the trading partner buyers and sellers 
will eventually meet when they enter the market. In this case it is socially 
efficient (within homogeneous local submarkets) to exclude some buyers 
with a low willingness to pay and sellers with high reservation prices from 
the market because their participation decision causes a negative cross-side 
externality on the more efficient high value buyers and low reservation price 
sellers that participate through the bargaining process over the transaction 
price. This externality should be internalized in the service fee charged by 
brokers, justifying a positive markup over marginal costs. 
173 
 
In addition, in the presence of fixed entry costs and free broker entry, the 
familiar result that free broker entry always results in excessive entry from 
a social point of view (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Hsieh and Moretti 
(2003)) is confirmed in the present setting. Both findings combined, that 
marginal cost pricing is not efficient and that entry is always excessive, has 
important implications for the effectiveness of different policy instruments 
that can be used should a social planner want to regulate the market to 
establish the social optimum. When the observed service fee is below the 
socially optimal level, regulating the service fee brokers are allowed to 
charge will result in a conflict of interest. Raising the fee will bring it closer 
to its desired level, but it will also worsen the entry distortion because a 
higher markup for a given fixed cost will incentivize more brokers to enter 
the market. In this case, it is preferable the regulate broker entry, given that 
restricting the number of brokers allowed to operate the market will both 
raise the service fee and mitigate the entry distortion. In contrast, when the 
observed service fee is above the socially optimal level (for example due to 
broker collusion), the opposite policy recommendation holds. Restricting 
entry will mitigate the entry distortion, but will also undesirably further 
raise the service fee or leave it unaffected. In contrast, regulating the service 
fee in this case can again mitigate both distortions at the same time, given 
that for a lower service fee some brokers will be forced to exit the market. 
The model was then taken to the data on the Belgian market for real estate 
brokerage. Based on estimated parameter values derived from the data, 
several welfare counterfactuals were constructed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the different policy instruments that can possibly be used 
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by a social planner. Given that in the observed equilibrium the average 
service fee is below the social optimum, entry regulation is predicted to 
yield a welfare gain of about 20%. In contrast, regulating the service fee, 
neglecting the entry effect, would result is a welfare loss of about 40%. 
These results illustrate the importance of making the proper choice of which 
policy instrument to use should a policymaker aspire to intervene in a real 
estate brokerage market. 
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General conclusions 
 
If there is one general conclusion that can be drawn from the analyses 
conducted throughout the different chapters of this dissertation it is the 
following: the conventional social benchmark of marginal cost pricing to 
evaluate the optimal pricing behavior of firms is not readily applicable to 
evaluate the optimal pricing behavior of private intermediaries in one-to-
one matching markets. Furthermore, where relevant, the proper benchmark 
to evaluate prices can be significantly above marginal costs. Translated into 
optimal market structures, this implies that perfect competition among 
matchmakers will not imply the social optimum. Instead, some market 
power is likely to be desirable for privately intermediated matching markets 
to function efficiently. 
The underlying economic intuition for this conclusion is twofold. Firstly, 
the network externalities inherent to a one-to-one matching technology tend 
to unbalance the social costs of participants entering the market across the 
two sides of the market. The side of the market where negative own-side 
congestion externalities among participants are strongest should be priced 
the highest fee for entering the platform. Or, equivalently, the side that 
induces the strongest positive cross-side externalities should be charged the 
lowest fee. The first chapter of this dissertation shows that private 
matchmakers that charge a flat fee for their service indeed tend to follow 
this regularity, however, the unbalance in prices will usually be insufficient 
from a social point of view. That is, the high priced side of the market should 
be priced an even higher fee and the low priced side an even lower fee. 
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Given that in practice the fee on the low priced side is typically already 
restricted at zero, only the former distortion is relevant. Hence, the 
conclusion that the observed fees charged by many matching platforms are 
likely to be too low from a social point of view. 
Secondly, the inherent feature that there is a lot of uncertainty about the 
trading partner participants in matching markets will eventually meet when 
they enter the market provides an additional justification for matching 
platforms to possess market power. In the presence of bargaining among 
matched participants this uncertainty implies that it is socially efficient to 
exclude some participants from the market who are expected to bring little 
value to the surplus generated by transactions once they are matched. The 
participation decision of these low value participants causes a negative 
externalities on the high value participants and these externalities should be 
internalized in the service fee charged by matchmakers, justifying a positive 
markup over marginal costs. 
Chapters 2 and 4 of this dissertation empirically test for the potential 
inefficiencies induced by excessive platform competition. Chapter 2 shows 
that the service fees charged to both buyers and sellers by a large online real 
estate listing platform are indeed below the estimated socially optimal fees, 
suggesting that the externality induced by the uncertainty in the matching 
process is currently insufficiently internalized. Similarly, chapter 4 suggests 
that service fees charged by real estate brokers are currently below the 
socially optimal level. Combined with the presence of familiar distortions 
that might arise from free entry in this market, this result is shown to have 
subtle implications for competition policy. 
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Given that matching platforms possess market power, if possible, these 
platform are likely to charge service fees proportional to an observable 
outcome of the established matches, like the observed transaction price of a 
real estate property or the wage of a worker. At least, if the usage of such a 
proportional fee induces participants to “advantageously select” into the 
market as formalized in chapter 3. Whether or not the use of such a fee is 
socially harmful or desirable is ambiguous. It is shown that welfare effect 
of allowing for proportional fee pricing is closely related to the welfare 
effect of allowing for third-degree price discrimination in standard product 
markets. 
Apart from illustrating a few special cases for which the conventional 
wisdoms about market power and competition are potentially violated for 
the specific case of matching markets, I hope that the analyses in this 
dissertation will also contribute in a broader sense to how economists are 
thinking about the functioning of markets in a rapidly changing 
environment characterized by constant innovations of available information 
technologies. More specifically, the digitalization of markets, of which 
online listing markets are only one example, require a different way of 
thinking about economic efficiency. Marginal and start-up costs have never 
been lower to set up businesses that potentially attract billions of consumers, 
suggesting the valuations of network effects have never been higher as they 
are today. So, different social benchmarks are required to evaluate these 
type of markets compared to the familiar benchmarks of brick-and-mortar 
markets. This dissertation may serve to put a few puzzle pieces into their 
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right locations in search of where these benchmarks should be. If so, this 
will mark progress towards a worthy goal.  
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